

**AIRCRAFT
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD
REPORT**

**US ARMY UH-60
BLACK HAWK HELICOPTERS
87-26000 AND 88-26060**

VOLUME 15

TABS V-067 thru V-089

**AIRCRAFT
ACCIDENT INVESTIGATION BOARD
REPORT**

COPY

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LIST OF WITNESSES
(Arranged in Tab Order)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>
MATTHEWS, PERRY J.....	CW2.....	V-001
MURREY, DANIEL P.	Second Lieutenant.....	V-002
MURREY, DANIEL P.	Second Lieutenant.....	V-002A
MURREY, DANIEL P.	Second Lieutenant.....	V-002B
BONG, JAMES I.	First Lieutenant.....	V-003
BONG, JAMES I.	First Lieutenant.....	V-003A
BONG, JAMES I.	First Lieutenant.....	V-003B
DAWSON, KENNETH D.....	Captain.....	V-004
CONTROL WITNESS 02.....	AWACS Co-Pilot.....	V-005
CONTROL WITNESS 03.....	AWACS Flight Engineer.....	V-006
CONTROL WITNESS 04.....	AWACS Instructor Comm Tech.....	V-007
CONTROL WITNESS 05.....	AWACS Instructor Navigator.....	V-008
CONTROL WITNESS 06.....	AWACS Aircraft Commander.....	V-009
CONTROL WITNESS 07.....	AWACS Instr Comm Syst Op.....	V-010
CONTROL WITNESS 08.....	AWACS Comm Tech.....	V-011
CONTROL WITNESS 09.....	Mission Crew Commander.....	V-012
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CONTROL WITNESS 11.....	AWACS Senior Director.....	V-014
CONTROL WITNESS 11.....		V-014A
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CONTROL WITNESS 13.....	AWACS Enroute Weapons Dir.....	V-016
CONTROL WITNESS 13.....		V-016A
CONTROL WITNESS 14.....	AWACS Tanker Weapons Director..	V-017
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CONTROL WITNESS 19.....	AWACS Air Surveillance Tech.....	V-022
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CONTROL WITNESS 25.....	F-15 Wingman.....	V-028
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CONTROL WITNESS 26.....	F-15 Lead.....	V-029
FOSTER, CHRISTOPHER T.....	Captain.....	V-030
SCHULZ, JOSEPH W.....	Captain.....	V-031

LIST OF WITNESSES
(Arranged in Tab Order)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>
RICHARDSON, DOUGLAS J.....	Colonel.....	V-032
PILKINGTON, JEFFREY S.....	B-Gen.....	V-033
KULA, JAMES D.....	Colonel.....	V-034
KULA, JAMES D.....	Colonel.....	V-034A
BICKET, JOHN S.....	Major.....	V-035
WHITE, BARTON W.....	Senior Airman.....	V-036
SCHMITT, MICHAEL N.....	Lt Colonel.....	V-037
ROCHEN, JERRY G., JR.....	Chief Master Sergeant.....	V-038
RIVERS, GLORIA H.....	Civilian.....	V-039
NORMAN, TODD B.....	Airman First Class.....	V-040
THOMAS, BENNIE, JR.....	Sergeant.....	V-041
ZAHRT, JOHN W.....	Lieutenant Colonel.....	V-042
SONNENBERG, DAVID L.....	Colonel.....	V-043
(RESERVED).....		V-044
COGGINS, LYNDON R.....	Sergeant.....	V-045
YOUNG, LAVERM.....	Major.....	V-046
NETHERLAND, SCOTT R.....	Major.....	V-047
MENARD, MICHAEL J.....	Chief Warrant Officer 4.....	V-048
HENRY, WILLIAM E.....	Chief Warrant Officer 3.....	V-049
HOLDEN, KENNETH D.....	Chief Warrant Officer 3.....	V-050
HOLDEN, KENNETH D.....	Chief Warrant Officer 3.....	V-050A
HOLDEN, KENNETH D.....	Chief Warrant Officer 3.....	V-050B
KOCH, KENNETH J.....	Chief Warrant Officer 2.....	V-051
BOULEY, WILLIAM R.....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-052
PATTERSON, SCOTT F.....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-053
BEACHLER, CORY C.....	Sergeant.....	V-054
BOWEN, DEON M.....	Sergeant.....	V-055
MCCARTHY, JOHN A.....	Specialist.....	V-056
MONSULICK, CHRISTINA M.....	Specialist.....	V-057
MCCARTHY, RUSSELL P.....	Specialist.....	V-058
INGRAM, JOHN.....	Civilian.....	V-059
PAGE, GILMAN WILLIAM.....	Civilian.....	V-060
STREET, TERRY W.....	Civilian.....	V-061
NEUSER, STEVEN T.....	Captain.....	V-062
JOLY, MICHELE.....	Captain.....	V-063
TAHSIN, MOWFIK.....	Civilian.....	V-064
AMIN, HADI MOHAMMED.....	Civilian.....	V-065
AMIN, AZIZ MOHAMMED.....	Civilian.....	V-066
AMIN, MOHAMMED.....	Civilian.....	V-067
CARLSON, MICHAEL A.....	Chief Warrant Officer 2.....	V-068
SANDERS, DONALD L.....	Major.....	V-069

LIST OF WITNESSES
(Arranged in Tab Order)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>
SANDERS, DONALD L.	Major	V-069A
SANDERS, DONALD L.	Major	V-069B
FRASER, GEORGE M.	Captain	V-070
GANZE, ELIZABETH	Captain	V-071
SHORT, JOHN E.	Staff Sergeant	V-072
LARREAU, ROD P.	Staff Sergeant	V-073
DAIGLE, CONNIE S.	PFC	V-074
DEWITT, TERRY A.	Staff Sergeant	V-075
CONTROL WITNESS 34	CFAC Mission Dir (Mad Dog)	V-076
CONTROL WITNESS 34		V-076A
DONOVAN, JOHN C.	Staff Sergeant	V-077
WALKER, ROBERT HUGHES	Captain	V-078
WALKER, ROBERT HUGHES	Captain	V-078A
KENT, JEFFREY L.	Captain	V-079
DOUGHERTY, MARK E.	Lieutenant Colonel	V-080
CATLETT, CHARLES E., JR.	Technical Sergeant	V-081
NOLAN, WILLIAM C. III	First Lieutenant	V-082
MANION, KEVIN J.	Captain	V-083
NILSEN, CARL R., JR.	Staff Sergeant	V-084
SCHNEIDMULLER, GEORGE C., JR.	Staff Sergeant	V-085
LINDAMOOD, DONNA G.	Technical Sergeant	V-086
GODIN, ROBERT A.	Technical Sergeant	V-087
MARCIK, ROBERT J. II.	Master Sergeant	V-088
ZIMMERMAN, GARY R.	Captain	V-089
FEMENELLA, JAMES C.	Senior Airman	V-090
HUNT, JOSEPH F.	Colonel	V-091
EMERY, CURTIS H. II.	Colonel	V-092
FELS, JAMES D.	Lieutenant Colonel	V-093
FRECHTLING, ANDREW C.	Major	V-094
MALBROUGH, RODNEY L. JR.	First Lieutenant	V-095
PINTER, MICHAEL W.	Lieutenant Colonel	V-096
O'BRIEN, JAMES R.	Colonel	V-097
O'BRIEN, JAMES R.	Colonel	V-097A
WIGGINS, BURTON D.	Major	V-098
MUSTAFA, ALI	Civilian	V-099
THOMPSON, GERALD B.	Colonel	V-100
THOMPSON, GERALD B.	Colonel	V-100A
ATKINS, BRIAN MICHAEL	Lieutenant Colonel	V-101
BALL, TERRY G.	Chief Warrant Officer 2	V-102
BROWNE, JAMES S.	Captain	V-103

LIST OF WITNESSES
(Arranged in Tab Order)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>
BROWNE, JAMES S.	Captain.....	V-103A
NYE, MICHAEL A	1st Lieutenant.....	V-104
NYE, MICHAEL A	1st Lieutenant.....	V-104A
THOMAS, SCOTT ALLEN	Captain.....	V-105
PINGEL, STEPHEN R.	Colonel.....	V-106
HENSON, ALLEN T.....	Chief Warrant Officer 2	V-107
HASSELL, LEONARD G.	Colonel.....	V-108
WHITE, LARRY D.	Major	V-109
WITCHER, CARL J.	Lieutenant Colonel	V-110
CUMBEE, MARK K.	Lieutenant	V-111
HALL, WILLIAM E., JR.	Colonel.....	V-112
BETHEL, PAULETTE M.....	Major	V-113
STEVENS, PHILIP R.....	Captain.....	V-114
FOLEY, JOHN M. II	Civilian	V-115
THOMPSON, ALAN.....	Colonel.....	V-116
MASON, WILLIAM D.....	Major	V-117
BERNARD, ANDREW T.....	1st Lieutenant.....	V-118
BERNARD, ANDREW T.....	1st Lieutenant.....	V-118A
BRONSON, MATTHEW F	Staff Sergeant.....	V-119
MAHER, ROGER D.....	Colonel.....	V-120
ROGERS, JAMES R.	Staff Sergeant.....	V-121

LIST OF WITNESSES
(Arranged in Alphabetical Order)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>
AMIN, HADI MOHAMMED	Civilian	V-065
AMIN, AZIZ MOHAMMED	Civilian	V-066
AMIN, MOHAMMED	Civilian	V-067
ATKINS, BRIAN MICHAEL	Lieutenant Colonel	V-101
BALL, TERRY G.	Chief Warrant Officer 2	V-102
BEACHLER, CORY C.	Sergeant	V-054
BERNARD, ANDREW T.	1st Lieutenant	V-118
BERNARD, ANDREW T.	1st Lieutenant	V-118A
BETHEL, PAULETTE M.	Major	V-113
BICKET, JOHN S.	Major	V-035
BONG, JAMES I.	First Lieutenant	V-003
BONG, JAMES I.	First Lieutenant	V-003A
BONG, JAMES I.	First Lieutenant	V-003B
BOULEY, WILLIAM R.	Staff Sergeant	V-052
BOWEN, DEON M.	Sergeant	V-055
BRONSON, MATTHEW F.	Staff Sergeant	V-119
BROWNE, JAMES S.	Captain	V-103
BROWNE, JAMES S.	Captain	V-103A
CARLSON, MICHAEL A.	Chief Warrant Officer 2	V-068
CATLETT, CHARLES E., JR.	Technical Sergeant	V-081
COGGINS, LYNDON R.	Sergeant	V-045
CONTROL WITNESS 02	AWACS Co-Pilot	V-005
CONTROL WITNESS 03	AWACS Flight Engineer	V-006
CONTROL WITNESS 04	AWACS Instructor Comm Tech	V-007
CONTROL WITNESS 05	AWACS Instructor Navigator	V-008
CONTROL WITNESS 06	AWACS Aircraft Commander	V-009
CONTROL WITNESS 07	AWACS Instr Comm Syst Op	V-010
CONTROL WITNESS 08	AWACS Communication Tech	V-011
CONTROL WITNESS 09	AWACS Mission Crew Commander	V-012
CONTROL WITNESS 10	AWACS Instr Mission Crew Cmdr	V-013
CONTROL WITNESS 10		V-013A
CONTROL WITNESS 11	AWACS Senior Director	V-014
CONTROL WITNESS 11		V-014A
CONTROL WITNESS 12	AWACS Instr Weapons Director	V-015
CONTROL WITNESS 13	AWACS Enroute Weapons Director	V-016
CONTROL WITNESS 13		V-016A
CONTROL WITNESS 14	AWACS Tanker Weapons Director	V-017
CONTROL WITNESS 14		V-017A
CONTROL WITNESS 15	AWACS Air Surveillance Officer	V-018
CONTROL WITNESS 16	AWACS Advanced-Air Surv Tech	V-019

LIST OF WITNESSES
(Arranged in Alphabetical Order)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>
CONTROL WITNESS 17.....	AWACS Air Surveillance Tech.....	V-020
CONTROL WITNESS 18.....	AWACS Air Surveillance Tech.....	V-021
CONTROL WITNESS 19.....	AWACS Air Surveillance Tech.....	V-022
CONTROL WITNESS 20.....	AWACS Instr Comp/Display Tech ...	V-023
CONTROL WITNESS 21.....	AWACS Airborne Radar Tech.....	V-024
CONTROL WITNESS 22.....	AWACS Airborne Radar Operator ...	V-025
CONTROL WITNESS 23.....	ACE/DUKE	V-026
CONTROL WITNESS 23.....		V-026A
CONTROL WITNESS 24.....	AWACS TAOR Weapons Director...	V-027
CONTROL WITNESS 25.....	F-15 Wingman.....	V-028
CONTROL WITNESS 25.....		V-028A
CONTROL WITNESS 26.....	F-15 Lead.....	V-029
CONTROL WITNESS 34.....	CFACC Mission Dir (Mad Dog).....	V-076
CONTROL WITNESS 34.....		V-076A
CUMBEE, MARK K.	Lieutenant	V-111
DAIGLE, CONNIE S.	PFC	V-074
DAWSON, KENNETH D.....	Captain.....	V-004
DEWITT, TERRY A.	Staff Sergeant.....	V-075
DONOVAN, JOHN C.	Staff Sergeant.....	V-077
DOUGHERTY, MARK E.....	Lieutenant Colonel	V-080
EMERY, CURTIS H. II.....	Colonel.....	V-092
FELS, JAMES D.	Lieutenant Colonel	V-093
FEMENELLA, JAMES C.	Senior Airman	V-090
FOLEY, JOHN M.	Civilian.....	V-115
FOSTER, CHRISTOPHER T.	Captain.....	V-030
FRASER, GEORGE M.	Captain.....	V-070
FRECHTLING, ANDREW C.	Major	V-094
GANZE, ELIZABETH	Captain.....	V-071
GODIN, ROBERT A.	Technical Sergeant	V-087
HALL, WILLIAM E., JR.	Colonel.....	V-112
HASSELL, LEONARD G.	Colonel.....	V-108
HENRY, WILLIAM E.....	Chief Warrant Officer 3	V-049
HENSON, ALLEN T.....	Chief Warrant Officer 2	V-107
HOLDEN, KENNETH D.....	Chief Warrant Officer 3	V-050
HOLDEN, KENNETH D.....	Chief Warrant Officer 3	V-050A
HOLDEN, KENNETH D.....	Chief Warrant Officer 3	V-050B
HUNT, JOSEPH F.	Colonel.....	V-091
INGRAM, JOHN.....	Civilian.....	V-059
JOLY, MICHELE	Captain.....	V-063
KENT, JEFFREY L.....	Captain.....	V-079
KOCH, KENNETH J.....	Chief Warrant Officer 2	V-051

LIST OF WITNESSES
(Arranged in Alphabetical Order)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>
KULA, JAMES D.....	Colonel.....	V-034
KULA, JAMES D.....	Colonel.....	V-034A
LARREAU, ROD P.....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-073
LINDAMOOD, DONNA G.....	Technical Sergeant.....	V-086
MAHER, ROGER D.....	Colonel.....	V-120
MALBROUGH, RODNEY L. JR.....	First Lieutenant.....	V-095
MANION, KEVIN J.....	Captain.....	V-083
MARCIK, ROBERT J. II.....	Master Sergeant.....	V-088
MASON, WILLIAM D.....	Major.....	V-117
MATTHEWS, PERRY J.....	CW2.....	V-001
MCCARTHY, RUSSELL P.....	Specialist.....	V-058
MCCARTHY, JOHN A.....	Specialist.....	V-056
MENARD, MICHAEL J.....	Chief Warrant Officer 4.....	V-048
MONSULICK, CHRISTINA M.....	Specialist.....	V-057
MURREY, DANIEL P.....	Second Lieutenant.....	V-002
MURREY, DANIEL P.....	Second Lieutenant.....	V-002A
MURREY, DANIEL P.....	Second Lieutenant.....	V-002B
MUSTAFA, ALI.....	Civilian.....	V-099
NETHERLAND, SCOTT R.....	Major.....	V-047
NEUSER, STEVEN T.....	Captain.....	V-062
NILSEN, CARL R., JR.....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-084
NOLAN, WILLIAM C., III.....	First Lieutenant.....	V-082
NORMAN, TODD B.....	Airman First Class.....	V-040
NYE, MICHAEL A.....	1st Lieutenant.....	V-104
NYE, MICHAEL A.....	1st Lieutenant.....	V-104A
O'BRIEN, JAMES R.....	Colonel.....	V-097
O'BRIEN, JAMES R.....	Colonel.....	V-097A
PAGE, GILMAN WILLIAM.....	Civilian.....	V-060
PATTERSON, SCOTT F.....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-053
PILKINGTON, JEFFREY S.....	B-Gen.....	V-033
PINGEL, STEPHEN R.....	Colonel.....	V-106
PINTER, MICHAEL W.....	Lieutenant Colonel.....	V-096
(RESERVED).....		V-044
RICHARDSON, DOUGLAS J.....	Colonel.....	V-032
RIVERS, GLORIA H.....	Civilian.....	V-039
ROCHEN, JERRY G., JR.....	Chief Master Sergeant.....	V-038
ROGERS, JAMES R.....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-121
SANDERS, DONALD L.....	Major.....	V-069
SANDERS, DONALD L.....	Major.....	V-069A

LIST OF WITNESSES
(Arranged in Alphabetical Order)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>
SANDERS, DONALD L.	Major	V-069B
SCHMITT, MICHAEL N.....	Lt Colonel	V-037
SCHNEIDMULLER, GEORGE C.....	Staff Sergeant.....	V-085
SCHULZ, JOSEPH W.	Captain.....	V-031
SHORT, JOHN E.	Staff Sergeant.....	V-072
SONNENBERG, DAVID L.....	Colonel.....	V-043
STEVENS, PHILIP R.....	Captain.....	V-114
STREET, TERRY W.....	Civilian.....	V-061
TAHSIN, MOWFIK	Civilian.....	V-064
THOMAS, BENNIE, JR.	Sergeant.....	V-041
THOMAS, SCOTT ALLEN	Captain.....	V-105
THOMPSON, GERALD B.....	Colonel.....	V-100
THOMPSON, GERALD B.....	Colonel.....	V-100A
THOMPSON, ALAN.....	Colonel.....	V-116
WALKER, ROBERT HUGHES	Captain.....	V-078
WALKER, ROBERT HUGHES	Captain.....	V-078A
WHITE, BARTON W.....	Senior Airman	V-036
WHITE, LARRY D.....	Major	V-109
WIGGINS, BURTON D.	Major	V-098
WITCHER, CARL J.....	Lieutenant Colonel	V-110
YOUNG, LAVERM	Major	V-046
ZAHRT, JOHN W.....	Lieutenant Colonel	V-042
ZIMMERMAN, GARY R.....	Captain.....	V-089

**CLASSIFIED ADDENDUM WITNESSES
(Arranged in Tab Order)**

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>	<u>CLASSIFIED ADDENDUM</u>
MATTHEWS, PERRY J.....	CW2	V-001	
MURREY, DANIEL P.....	Second Lieutenant.....	V-002	
MURREY, DANIEL P.....	Second Lieutenant.....	V-002A	
MURREY, DANIEL P.....	Second Lieutenant.....	V-002B	
BONG, JAMES I.....	First Lieutenant	V-003	
BONG, JAMES I.....	First Lieutenant	V-003A	
BONG, JAMES I.....	First Lieutenant	V-003B	
DAWSON, KENNETH D.....	Captain.....	V-004	
CONTROL WITNESS 02.....	AWACS Co-Pilot.....	V-005	
CONTROL WITNESS 03.....	AWACS Flight Engineer ...	V-006	
CONTROL WITNESS 04.....	AWACS Instr Comm Tech	V-007	
CONTROL WITNESS 05.....	AWACS Instr Navigator ...	V-008	
CONTROL WITNESS 06.....	AWACS Aircraft CC.....	V-009	
CONTROL WITNESS 07.....	AWACS Inst Com Syst Op.	V-010	
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CONTROL WITNESS 20.....	AWACS Comp/Disp Tech.	V-023	
CONTROL WITNESS 21.....	AWACS Radar Tech.....	V-024	
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<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>	<u>CLASSIFIED ADDENDUM</u>
SCHULZ, JOSEPH W.	Captain	V-031	pgs 4,5,10
RICHARDSON, DOUGLAS J.	Colonel	V-032	pgs 21-24
PILKINGTON, JEFFREY S.	B-Gen	V-033	
KULA, JAMES D.	Colonel	V-034	
KULA, JAMES D.	Colonel	V-034A	
BICKET, JOHN S.	Major	V-035	
WHITE, BARTON W.	Senior Airman	V-036	
SCHMITT, MICHAEL N.	Lt Colonel	V-037	
ROCHEN, JERRY G., JR.	Chief Master Sergeant	V-038	
RIVERS, GLORIA H.	Civilian	V-039	
NORMAN, TODD B.	Airman First Class	V-040	
THOMAS, BENNIE, JR.	Sergeant	V-041	
ZAHRT, JOHN W.	Lieutenant Colonel	V-042	
SONNENBERG, DAVID L.	Colonel	V-043	
(RESERVED)		V-044	
COGGINS, LYNDON R.	Sergeant	V-045	
YOUNG, LAVERM	Major	V-046	
NETHERLAND, SCOTT R.	Major	V-047	
MENARD, MICHAEL J.	Chief Warrant Officer 4	V-048	
HENRY, WILLIAM E.	Chief Warrant Officer 3	V-049	
HOLDEN, KENNETH D.	Chief Warrant Officer 3	V-050	
HOLDEN, KENNETH D.	Chief Warrant Officer 3	V-050A	
HOLDEN, KENNETH D.	Chief Warrant Officer 3	V-050B	
KOCH, KENNETH J.	Chief Warrant Officer 2	V-051	
BOULEY, WILLIAM R.	Staff Sergeant	V-052	
PATTERSON, SCOTT F.	Staff Sergeant	V-053	
BEACHLER, CORY C.	Sergeant	V-054	
BOWEN, DEON M.	Sergeant	V-055	
MCCARTHY, JOHN A.	Specialist	V-056	
MONSULICK, CHRISTINA M.	Specialist	V-057	
MCCARTHY, RUSSELL P.	Specialist	V-058	
INGRAM, JOHN	Civilian	V-059	
PAGE, GILMAN WILLIAM	Civilian	V-060	
STREET, TERRY W.	Civilian	V-061	
NEUSER, STEVEN T.	Captain	V-062	pgs 19-22,24,26,30,37,51
JOLY, MICHELE	Captain	V-063	
TAHSIN, MOWFIK	Civilian	V-064	
AMIN, HADI MOHAMMED	Civilian	V-065	
AMIN, AZIZ MOHAMMED	Civilian	V-066	

CLASSIFIED ADDENDUM WITNESSES
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<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>	<u>CLASSIFIED ADDENDUM</u>
AMIN, MOHAMMED.....	Civilian.....	V-067	
CARLSON, MICHAEL A.	Chief Warrant Officer 2	V-068	
SANDERS, DONALD L.	Major.....	V-069	
SANDERS, DONALD L.	Major.....	V-069A	
SANDERS, DONALD L.	Major.....	V-069B	
FRASER, GEORGE M.	Captain.....	V-070	
GANZE, ELIZABETH	Captain.....	V-071	
SHORT, JOHN E.	Staff Sergeant.....	V-072	
LARREAU, ROD P.	Staff Sergeant.....	V-073	
DAIGLE, CONNIE S.	PFC.....	V-074	
DEWITT, TERRY A.	Staff Sergeant.....	V-075	
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CONTROL WITNESS 34.....		V-076A	
DONOVAN, JOHN C.	Staff Sergeant.....	V-077	
WALKER, ROBERT HUGHES	Captain.....	V-078	
WALKER, ROBERT HUGHES	Captain.....	V-078A	
KENT, JEFFREY L.	Captain.....	V-079	
DOUGHERTY, MARK E.....	Lieutenant Colonel	V-080.....	pgs 39-41
CATLETT, CHARLES E., JR.	Technical Sergeant	V-081	
NOLAN, WILLIAM C. III	First Lieutenant	V-082.....	pgs 4,6,7
MANION, KEVIN J.....	Captain.....	V-083.....	pgs 5,7
NILSEN, CARL R., JR.	Staff Sergeant.....	V-084	
SCHNEIDMULLER, GEORGE C.,JR.	Staff Sergeant.....	V-085	
LINDAMOOD, DONNA G.	Technical Sergeant	V-086	
GODIN, ROBERT A.	Technical Sergeant	V-087	
MARCIK, ROBERT J. II.....	Master Sergeant	V-088	
ZIMMERMAN, GARY R.....	Captain.....	V-089	
FEMENELLA, JAMES C.....	Senior Airman	V-090	
HUNT, JOSEPH F.	Colonel.....	V-091	
EMERY, CURTIS H. II.....	Colonel.....	V-092.....	pgs 4, 21, 24, 30, 31
FELS, JAMES D.	Lieutenant Colonel	V-093.....	pgs 5,12
FRECHTLING, ANDREW C.	Major.....	V-094.....	pgs 6-8,14
MALBROUGH, RODNEY L. JR.....	First Lieutenant	V-095	
PINTER, MICHAEL W.	Lieutenant Colonel	V-096	
O'BRIEN, JAMES R.	Colonel.....	V-097	
O'BRIEN, JAMES R.....	Colonel.....	V-097A	
WIGGINS, BURTON D.	Major.....	V-098	
MUSTAFA, ALI.....	Civilian.....	V-099	
THOMPSON, GERALD B.	Colonel.....	V-100	

CLASSIFIED ADDENDUM WITNESSES
(Arranged in Tab Order)

<u>NAME</u>	<u>RANK</u>	<u>TAB</u>	<u>CLASSIFIED ADDENDUM</u>
THOMPSON, GERALD B.	Colonel.....	V-100A	
ATKINS, BRIAN MICHAEL	Lieutenant Colonel	V-101	
BALL, TERRY G.	Chief Warrant Officer 2	V-102	
BROWNE, JAMES S.	Captain.....	V-103	pg 2
BROWNE, JAMES S.	Captain.....	V-103A	
NYE, MICHAEL A.	1st Lieutenant.....	V-104	
NYE, MICHAEL A.	1st Lieutenant.....	V-104A	
THOMAS, SCOTT ALLEN	Captain.....	V-105	
PINGEL, STEPHEN R.	Colonel.....	V-106	
HENSON, ALLEN T.	Chief Warrant Officer 2	V-107	
HASSELL, LEONARD G.	Colonel.....	V-108	
WHITE, LARRY D.	Major	V-109	
WITCHER, CARL J.	Lieutenant Colonel	V-110	
CUMBEE, MARK K.	Lieutenant	V-111	
HALL, WILLIAM E., JR.	Colonel.....	V-112	
BETHEL, PAULETTE M.	Major	V-113	
STEVENS, PHILIP R.	Captain.....	V-114	
FOLEY, JOHN M. II	Civilian.....	V-115	
THOMPSON, ALAN.....	Colonel.....	V-116	
MASON, WILLIAM D.	Major	V-117	
BERNARD, ANDREW T.	1st Lieutenant.....	V-118	
BERNARD, ANDREW T.	1st Lieutenant.....	V-118A	
BRONSON, MATTHEW F	Staff Sergeant.....	V-119	
MAHER, ROGER D.	Colonel.....	V-120	
ROGERS, JAMES R.	Staff Sergeant.....	V-121	

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V-064

AMIN, MOHAMMED

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V-067

SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

MOHAMMED AMIN
TUSHEKEY VILLAGE, IRAQ

The interview was conducted by Lt Col Scott Black, at Crash Site 1, Iraq, beginning at 1400 hours, 18 April 1994. The witness advisement of rights was given in accordance with AFR 110-14.

NOTE: This interview was conducted through an interpreter (Shafik Taha). The summarization is therefore based upon his translation of the witnesses words.

EXAMINATION

On the morning of the accident I was working on my garden on the hill above the crash site. I was with my two sons. We came out to work about 0800-0900 and the accident happened between 1000-1100. This I can say because I looked at my watch. It was clear weather. First I saw one aircraft, then I saw two. I see the airplane come and they are low and then they are high, make around but I go on with my duty because at all times they come here. I first see the helicopters come from the village. I could see both airplanes. They were far away from the helicopters. I saw the airplane from the village from my side. They moved down and up and after that I see the helicopters.

The jets were going up and down and after that I heard a sound that something was exploded and I see the fire was by helicopter. I did see the jet shoot the helicopter. It looked like fire when I see it. Fire was out from the airplane and shoot fire at the helicopters. It was about 200-250 meter between me and the helicopter when it crashed. The helicopter flew over my place when the missile hit him. When they make a fire by helicopter it falls down to me. The distance between the two helicopters was about 30 meters. My eyes are not very good to see the markings on the helicopter, but it normal for us because all the time the airplane was coming.

Just like that I see fire happen to the second helicopter. When the fire was happened for helicopter some part was broken from helicopter after that the helicopter was down on the ground and the heat was beside me. The first place it hit the ground was on the other side of the river. I didn't see it when it hit the ground. When it hit the earth, I didn't see any part, just fire, didn't see inside of the fire or what happened. It was big and every part was heavy and hot because each piece had a big fire inside. The other helicopter I heard and didn't see it. At first I was afraid for my children so we keep away because we think that they would hit us so we went to our Village. I could not go closer to the crash site because there is more bullets and explosion in the fire.

AMIN

15 / e

After we see the people, we come up to see the crash site about one hour later. I went to the village one time to care for my family, to be together if we needed to go. I make myself ready. After the airplanes shoot the helicopters they make about two rounds after that they went. They leave the place. I saw someone maybe from the United Nations come and take pictures. The people were dressed very well, just like United Nations. And the people was saying it was traditional to take pictures. I did not talk to them. There were about 2 or 3 people there. Or maybe they are from Egypt. That happened same day of the accident about 1230-1300. I don't remember when General Ali arrived with his camera. I did not see anyone else in the area, someone from another village before the helicopter crash, just some people bringing some sheep to herd. So they would have seen the crash also.

The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions.

WITH THE U.S. ARMED FORCES AT)

CRASH SITE # 1, IRAQ)

I have read the foregoing summarization of a statement I provided to Lt Col Scott C. Black on behalf of the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board convened to inquire into the Black Hawk helicopter accident on 14 April 1994. I hereby swear (or affirm) that the statement I provided was true and accurate when given, and remains so to the best of my belief and knowledge. I further swear (or affirm) that I am the same MOHAMMED AMIN who provided that taped statement, and I am satisfied this is a true and accurate summary of that statement.



MOHAMMED AMIN

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 26 day of April, 1994.



AMIN

TAB V-068

CARLSON, DONALD L.

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V-068

SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

CW2 MICHAEL A. CARLSON
A Company, 2nd BN, 10th SFGA
Fort Devens, Massachusetts

The interview was conducted by Lt Colonel Black at Zakhu, Iraq, beginning at 1905 hours, 18 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14.

EXAMINATION

My duty position here is Deputy Security Officer. I work under the British Major's billet.

They were on a flight. We did a road trip that morning and returned. I was having lunch with the commander of the guards when I got called over the radio. Colonel Hassell notified me that two helicopters are down. He didn't know if it was Eagle Flight or what it was, but his primary concern, his intent talking to me was to confirm that we had not talked to Eagle. Apparently he had talked to the communications guy before and he did have contact with Eagle at that time. They tried to confirm that they had arrived at Irbil which was their first destination.

I concurred that we had had no contact and he insisted that we continue to try; we continued to try to contact them with negative contact. He advised me on that first phone call to keep this information tight because we weren't sure what was going on. We didn't want to send out the alarm. I did so.

After that he told me to stand by the Ops and I would have anyway, and he was going to get back to me. He said to keep the line open so we kept the line open. He didn't call again. And what happened was that we lost the lines. I was getting ready to call him and he had already called back. So we opened the line of communication again and he was confirming the information and asking had we had contact with them and I said no. He said I needed to get in touch with John Cooley and that was pretty much all he said.

I went down there and talked to John Cooley. Essentially, Peter Strock was Relief One. He's O.F.D.A. over here at Zakhu. He told me to keep it close -- close hold the information but it kind of came out. I know that they have contacts down there as far as finding out information of what's going on and stuff, so I basically generically told him, "We've got a problem, we've got two helicopters that are down and see what you can find out about it. Get in contact with Colonel

CARLSON

Hassell to establish a line of communication."

I believe he might have called to get some more information. Anyway, within about ten minutes, he had information. I was back up in Ops and I took him into a room separately and kept him away from anyone else, as I was directed to keep a close hold. He had confirmed that they had reports that two helicopters were down. So he called me over the Saber. I was in Ops, and what I did at that time was that I had them re-establish contact with Colonel Hassell so I could relay this information. We had guys that came in a few days prior to 14 April because of a security situation that had essentially died out and had nothing to do with this. Captain Little and members of his team were sitting in the TV room. I closed the door and I wanted to tell him because they had medical assets, communications assets and I wanted to alert them just to get the medics together with all the medical gear that they figured they would need to be able to assist if it was true.

Just because John Cooley called and said they had reports, that didn't tell me anything really. About one or one-fifteen, after I talked to Captain Little, I made sure that the medics were gathering. I didn't want to call out to the CP.

I went back up to Ops and I opened up the colonel's office to start working out of there because I really couldn't talk on the phone because of the sensitivity of the information and other people there. So I decided I'm going to have to start talking actively here, so I went over to the colonel's office, got on the phone there. At that time Colonel Hassell told me, "We believe two Hind-Ds have been shot down and it's not Eagle. But we're not sure; have you heard from them?" And I stepped out of line probably but I had to say it. I said, "No, and is Eagle Flight at Diyarbakir getting geared up?" He assured me that everything was being taken care of and I said, "Fine." It's not my place but I just had to say it as far as getting something going, because I was, at that time, convinced that there was a very good chance it was Eagle and why not gear up for it. I had already gotten Captain Little and his team geared up for it.

Colonel Hassell wanted the flight route for Eagle faxed to him. I said that was already being taken care of. I talked to Corporal Hicks who was up in comm. He started a late log on it but he caught up and in that log you'll probably find a little more accurate times on the chain. The log is up in operations. It's possibly the same log that Major Sanders was referring to. He asked me, "Do you know their flight route?" I said, "No, but we're going to check around and we're going to get the flight route worked out." He reminded me of that and I said it was on the way.

At that time I went back downstairs and talked to Captain Little and said, "This doesn't look good right now. Let me check the status of what you guys are doing as far as medical." He had already had all the medical equipment packed up over in our med shed and they were pretty much ready to go medically. I said, "I think it's getting to be time to let the company commander know who is out there." I said, "I don't want to put it over the airway," so he sent someone out to the CP.

CARLSON

Captain Little came back in and I was checking on Arrow 3, Major Sanders' return from the road trip. I didn't go on the road trip, I was here in the morning. Major Sanders was on the road trip out to the overlook and he had been checking along the way. He arrived within about five minutes. I briefed him on what was going on as quickly as I could so he could take over that role.

After I briefed him, I coordinated with him and continued to work with him to continue to monitor the situation and see where I could help out, and he was pretty emphatic that, "I'm security." I was just trying to help out. But it was really no problem.

In the process of getting all their equipment ready, we were pretty much ready to go. I was going to take myself, the Captain of the Guards, because he knows his way around that area real well, and some SAR guys and guards and we were getting ready to get on the road by vehicle. We were in the vehicles and I was standing outside just checking to make sure we had everything we needed in the vehicles. Major Sanders came out and he notified me that it's an air mission, they're sending in birds and that vehicles would not go. I don't know if that was his decision that the vehicles wouldn't go or if he got that from higher up.

We unloaded and we shut down the MCC, closed everything off, increased the security some more, even though it was already increased. I made sure the place was secure and then I just monitored the situation. Later in the afternoon, we came to a point where we felt there was a damn good chance that this was going to be at nighttime thing, so I said to Captain Little, "We're going to have to get a liaison team out there, especially if these guys come in at night." The information I was getting was that it was Iraqis who had shot down two of the Eagle Flight, and with helicopters coming in there and everything at nighttime, I figured we'd need some ground assets.

So Major Sanders wanted me here. He sent the company commander, Captain Kent, and a few of those guys, along with John Cooley. They hit the road and they didn't want them taking HMMWVs because they were going to have to go outside the grounds. So they hit the road and after that, I started coordinating because the helicopters were coming in. I started working with JOC which is liaison between here and JSOTF, to make sure their equipment was ready and keep them updated on when the helicopters were coming in.

So the helicopters were supposed to be coming, MHs to pick them up. I was at the CP waiting for them to land. They were refueling so I figured once they finished refueling, they would come in and land and pick up whatever they needed to pick up and then would go on out. We got cut down to, "Well, we're only landing one helicopter to pick you all up," because we had CCT with comms with the -- I believe it was the MHs they were talking to. Then it turned out that they just kept right on going and they said, "We're not coming in at all. We're going straight in."

I never went out to the site that night.

CARLSON

I was running the CP down there for the helicopters coming in, getting them off loaded. I handled all of that.

The day it happened we operated all night long to get casualties in and the next day, I believe it was, was when they were going out to the site. I did not go out to the site that day. I was with the general when he came out. That was the first time I got to hit the site.

They kept telling us they're not coming in to the CP, they're going straight out and I didn't believe that, and I kept people around because I figured that was going to happen, that they were going to shuttle them in so they could get down there. It was going to take some time. Ultimately they did do that. We were prepared down there.

As far as evacuation of the remains, after the first helicopter came in, it took fifteen minutes. What we wanted to do was we had different rooms set up. We would put the Kurdish in one section, Turkish in another section, the French and British in one and the U.S. in another. We made sure that we had an accurate count.

One of the guards that went down there told me that one of the people down there had said that they saw the pilot jump out of the aircraft. And I said, "Well, which site was this at?" He said, "Site Two." He said that definitely the guy saw it impact and then he jumped out of the aircraft after impact and he said it was one of the pilots, and he said as he was jumping, the aircraft blew up. I don't know how true it is. One of the guards told me that one of the locals there had told him that.

The flight surgeon that went out there that day, I gave him my tape recorder so he could tape stuff so it may already be on there, I'm not sure.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions)

CARLSON

WITH THE U.S. ARMED FORCES AT)

INCIRLIK AIR BASE, TURKEY

I have read the foregoing summarization of my testimony to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board. I am satisfied that is a true and accurate summary of that testimony.

Michael A. Carlson

MICHAEL A. CARLSON, CW2

Subscribed and sworn to before me this 15 day of May, 1994.

Scott A. Black

MEMO FOR RECORD:

OATH WAS ADMINISTERED VIA TELEPHONE BY LTC BLACK (INCIRLIK AB) WITH CW2 CARLSON (MCC, ZAKHU, IRAQ), 10 MAY 1994. FAX COPY BEARING CW2 CARLSON'S SIGNATURE WAS RECEIVED BY ACCIDENT BOARD AT 1900 HOURS, 10 MAY 94. CW2 CARLSON WILL FORWARD ORIGINAL DOCUMENT BY MAIL.

Scott A. Black

LTC, USA

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TAB V-069

V-064

SANDERS, DONALD L.

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V-069

**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY
OF
MAJOR DONALD L. SANDERS
HCC, 3D ID
CTF, MCC ZAKHU**

The interview was conducted by Colonel Patrick J. Bennett, at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, beginning at 0736 hours, 2 May 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14 and the witness was sworn.

EXAMINATION

I am the same Major Donald L. Sanders who testified previously.

I have reviewed my previous statement and there are things in here that I have not said and there are some misspellings. For example on page 2, paragraph 3, the statement "I spoke with Captain McKenna that morning. I came in and got all my stuff that I normally use to do training for the mission brief." Normally, I don't train for the mission brief; I do a mission brief. There appears to be many inconsistencies in this statement.

(The Aircraft Accident Board recessed at 0742 hours, 2 May 1994, and resumed at 0836 hours, 2 May 1994, with all parties present before the board recessed, again present.)

During the course of the recess Major Sanders reviewed a draft of his previous testimony and made corrections to it. It was marked as 69A correlating with the witness number that pertains to him. Those corrections noted by Major Sanders will be made to that summary. Major Sanders indicated that he would adopt 69A as part of his sworn testimony with the understanding that the corrections would be made.

EXAMINATION

In paragraph 3 on the first page of 69A, I stated that I faxed a request to the Deputy Commander, Colonel Hassel, at CTF and the Commanding General. I did receive a personal reply back from Colonel Hassel. I dealt directly with Colonel Hassel because anytime that we request to go out of the security zone I would have to submit a written request up to CTF, and get approval back prior to going out of the security zone. I sent the request to the JOC at CTF because they have a secure fax capability. It is then passed to the Chief of Staff, and then onto the CG for their approval. The request that I

SANDERS

submitted went to the JOC initially, and then on to Colonel Hassel. The request that I submitted had the destination, but not the route; nor did it have the take-off times from Zakhu.

On page 2 of my testimony, I mentioned when I submitted my request to the CTF, I had an approximate time and date that I submitted the request. I also have a copy of the request that I submitted. There is a signature from both of the guys signing on the 12th of April 1994, and I received an approved copy on the 13th of April 1994.

(Colonel At Lee stated that the request that Major Sanders had submitted would be marked as 69B.)

EXAMINATION CONTINUING

I do not remember if anyone called me at the CTF personally to tell me if this mission had been approved prior to my receiving the faxed copy.

On the second paragraph of the second page, I mentioned that the radio operator called me and said that "AWACS was up and operational." The radio operator contacts CTF periodically or if there is a ROLEX with AWACS, CTF will call us and tell us that there is a ROLEX. This information is critical because we do not fly outside of the security zone unless AWACS is operational.

We have a planning cell at MCC, which includes myself, the security officer, one of the Turkish Majors and it is led by the French coalition Chief. We will plan a week's mission three weeks in advance, which is normally done on Sunday night. On Monday we will brief the coalition chiefs on that week's worth of mission. They will approve or disapprove the missions. The day prior to a mission being conducted, I will go through the final stage of my planning. I go through and develop a time line on the time of travel from point A to point B, the time that they are going to stay on site, the time of departure and the time of return; be it a ground mission or an air mission. Normally, we don't pass this information to the CTF. If it's a ground mission, it's not a requirement to pass all that information back to CTF; we track it there in our Ops Center. If it's an air mission we don't pass the specific times back to the CTF; they know the time of departure. We receive a report from the ground force when the aircraft lands, and we pass that information on back to CTF. I don't pass a specific plan back to CTF. I do pass on the information to the JOC of the time that the aircraft departed the CP, which is Zakhu. I do not pass on any information to the JOC ahead of time of the aircraft arriving at Zakhu about the aircraft departure time at Zakhu.

SANDERS

I normally don't back-brief the CTF. We do a SITREP (situation report) that consists of the day's events of a mission where the coalition chiefs went to that particular day, the activity that was conducted in that area, and it provides data on the villages that they visited. I do pass them information about Eagle Flights; if it is going to be an Admin Flight, or Tactical Reconnaissance or a Mission Flight. An Admin Mission is a mission where Eagle Flight flies supplies to us from Diyarbakir to Zakhu, lands, drops off supplies and they may stay on the ground for a while if I have passengers that need to go back, and then they depart and go back to Diyarbakir. A TOAR Mission is a tactical Area Recon Mission where they will fly from Diyarbakir to Zakhu, receive a mission brief and I would normally fly out with them at the same time that I am conducting the Recons of future village visits; then we would return to Zakhu and they would depart back. An MCC mission is when the aircraft will come in, and they have a specific mission to fly the MTC or coalition chiefs out to a specific village for a visit.

Inside the security zone we don't necessarily have to get the Commanding General or the Chief of Staff's approval, but to go out outside of the security zone we do. If they are flying the coalition chiefs out, it's a MCC Support Mission. The TAOR is just a tactical area reconnaissance which is normally flown by myself. Normally, all the TAOR missions are flown within the security zone. All "MCC Support Missions" will not be outside the security zone. You cannot tell from looking at "MCC Support Mission" whether it will be inside or outside the security zone. Again, the only time that we will fly outside of the security zone is if we have permission from CTF. The recipients of my information that I send to the JOC will be able to tell whether a particular mission listed as support mission is inside or outside the security zone, because I send a mission schedule up to CTF which will have coordinates. There are several reports that I send up to CTF, and even the request that I sent up provided coordinates which identified that they were going outside of the security zone. They would have to break out the coordinates to know that these coordinates are outside the security zone. The only time that we fly outside of the security zone is if we gain approval from the Chief of Staff or the Commanding General to do so.

Colonel Thompson had been talking about the mission on the 14th of April 1994 for some time. The 12th of April is when he wanted me to send a formal request to the CTF requesting approval. I know that a couple days prior to that, he and the CTF CG along with the Turkish General Commanding General and coalition chiefs flew down to Salah ad Din for a meeting. At that time Colonel Thompson wanted to fly down and introduce the U.S. Co-Commander to Mr. Steve Allen and Mr. Barzani, because the 15th of April was the day when Colonel Thompson was to have his change of command reception.

The request that is marked as 69B is the notification that went to the JOC about the mission on the 14th of April 1994.

SANDERS

On 12 April 1994, the SITREP indicates a 2-ship "MCC Support" on the 13th of April 1994 and on the 14th of April 1994 a 2-ship Admin Support. The SITREP which is dated the 13th of April 1994, indicates a change to the 2-ship MCC Support Mission on the 14th of April and the 15th of April is a two-ship Admin Mission. On the 13th of April 1994, I sent a change for the mission on the 14th of April 1994 to the JOC, close to midnight. I would have to check my log book to know if I passed along any information to the CTF pertaining to the aircraft taking off from Zakhu on the morning of the 14 April 1994. Normally, when the aircraft departs, if they are going out of the security zone, we will call back to CTF, that's why we maintain a log so that we can pass that information back to them. That particular morning, I was sitting at the CP when the aircraft departed, and I would have to check my log book to see if that information was passed to the CTF. The information that would have been passed would have been the take-off times, but I'm not sure if the guy passed along the destination.

We have a commo person onboard who has a TACSAT radio. Once the aircraft lands the commo person is instructed to contact us and let us know their location. MCC does not routinely pass that information to the CTF. This information is passed on the CTF frequency and they have TACSAT capability, but they are not directly addressed in the report from the field site unless the commander wants to talk directly to the CTF.

I have never contacted Eagle Flight during a mission to change their destination after they have taken off from Zakhu, but I would contact the JOC to let him know that the destination had changed. The commander may change the destination. But, I have no means of talking to him once he is at a certain point on the aircraft, unless he stops somewhere on the ground and calls me. I do not recall Colonel Thompson calling me to say that he has changed his destination or asking me to pass information to the CTF.

We have a map down at the CP where I read the routes and I would draw a little arrow around the route of travel for the aircraft. It's normally a recommended route of travel for the aircraft; the pilots have the final say so on the route that they are going to take, based on their understanding of the route. For that particular morning, I had to brief them off of a map laying on a hood of a vehicle, based on the fact that we had JSOTF personnel that were sleeping inside of our operations room. I briefed them on their destination and their recommended route of travel. I never provided these recommended routes to the CTF.

On the 14th of April 1994, when both of the aircraft landed at Zakhu they shut down their engines. When the two aircraft departed from Zakhu their doors were closed. I did not observe the pilots while they shut down their aircraft. I did not observe the pilots

SANDERS

shutting down the transponders. I never heard any comments such as "hold switch" in regards to the transponders. I do not know if the pilots had any problems with the transponders or avionics while they were in Zakhu. I never heard the pilots mention any problems concerning the batteries or any other problems with the aircraft.

I may have notified Captain McKenna on the 12th of April 1994 concerning the change to the mission on the 14th of April 1994. Normally, when we have a change in missions especially going out of the security zone, I will call him up in advance and give him a warning order. I am not exactly sure, but I think it may have been around that 12th of April, that I briefed Captain McKenna that they were going to Irbil.

I do not know of a four-ship mission that was scheduled for the 14th of April 1994.

I submitted a request to the JOC, which goes to the Chief of Staff and then to the CG for approval to fly out of the security zone. I do not remember the exact date that General Pilkington flew out of Zakhu, but I know we flew a 4-ship mission that particular day. General Pilkington did not require four aircraft to fly. I do not remember what time General Pilkington went out on the mission. I do not remember how long the aircraft spent on the ground prior to departing with General Pilkington. My log book states the arrival times and the departures times from Zakhu. I'm almost sure that AWACS was operational when General Pilkington's aircraft took off. We flew a 2-ship mission outside of the security zone which carried General Pilkington, the Turkish CG and the two co-commanders of the MCC along with a security package down to Salah ad Din. The other two aircraft were used by the French and the British coalition chiefs to fly them on a village visit within the security zone.

For a flight to be conducted within the security zone they have to remain in the security zone, and we try to plan our missions so that they have AWACS coverage. Normally, if we do not have AWACS coverage we will try to plan a ground patrol; a patrol conducted by vehicle. I would have to go back and check the regulation to be able to say that AWACS is required to be able to fly within the security zone. To fly outside of the security zone we have to gain approval from CTF and we do have to have AWACS coverage. I am not aware of a requirement for fighters to sweep the security zone before helicopters fly in that area. I am not aware of a requirement for fighters to sweep the entire AOR before helicopters fly in the area. I am not familiar with the Airspace Coordination Order published by the CTF.

In the month of April 1994, I do not remember how many flights were conducted in the security zone. I only remember one flight outside of the security zone prior to the month of April 1994, which carried General Pilkington to Salah ad Din. I have been the

SANDERS

Operations Officer since the 8th of January 1994. During this three month period I have had four flights outside of the security zone including two flights prior to the flight carrying General Pilkington and then the flight on the 14th of April 1994.

The RCC is the Relief Coordination Center which coordinates the humanitarian aid for the Turkish people. The RCC works with the UN agencies throughout northern Iraq.

I do believe they did refuel the aircraft at Zakhu prior to doing the mission on the 14th of April 1994, because they had side tanks with them. Normally, for a mission like that they would refuel them because of the distance that they have to travel. They sometimes refuel with their engines running and sometimes the engines are shut down. Normally, when they come in the morning for a brief, they shut the aircraft down if the pilots leave the aircraft. On the 14th of April 1994, they did shut the engines on the aircraft down and then refueled because they had to come over for the briefing. As soon as they landed, they started shutting their engines down after they went through their procedures that they normally go through. I can't be positive if they refueled or not, nor would there be a log of it anywhere. I'm not sure when they refuel with the engines shut-down, if they put electrical power or a generator or a battery on the aircraft.

I do not know why Eagle Flight helicopters had Have-Quick One radios. I believe you would have to ask their unit because the aircraft comes from the 12th Aviation Brigade and they are responsible for outfitting the aircraft with the equipment. CTF may have given them requirements. We take what we get.

On 69B, the request for travel outside of the security zone appears to have a typographical error of "22 April 1994," because the document is signed on the 12th April 1994 by Colonel Hassel and General Pilkington. I recognize these signatures by Colonel Hassel and General Pilkington by having seen them on other documents before. From the markings on the document, I can tell that we received this document back at 1002 hours on 13 April 1994 by Sergeant Barkley. The request for travel outside of the security zone is faxed to the JOC, addressed through the Deputy Commander/Chief of Staff and to the Commanding General for approval. This request comes back with their signatures on it. I do not have any personal knowledge of what occurs at the CTF from the time they receive my fax for a request to travel outside of the security zone and the time that I receive their fax with approval.

I do not know if "commo person" refers to a "communications expert"; it does refer to the guy that handles the radio.

TACSAT is a tactical satellite radio.

SANDERS


JSOTF personnel is Joint Special Operations Task Force personnel.

I have provided you with all the information that I have pertaining to this investigation.

I have no further information that would be of assistance.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of MAJOR DONALD L. SANDERS, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.



WILLIAM K. AT LEE, JR, Colonel, USAF
Legal Advisor

SANDERS

ITEM IDENTIFIED AS "69a" NOT
INCLUDED—CORRECTIONS REFERENCED
WERE INCORPORATED INTO
WITNESS SUMMARY V69

(Eagle Flight Detachment Standard
Flight Operating Procedures)

Item 69a

THIS REPRODUCES THE TYPED PORTIONS
OF THE ATTACHED ITEM "69b"
FOR EASE OF READING

CMCC/US

22 Apr 94

MEMORANDUM FOR CTF/CG

THRU CTF/DC

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE SECURITY ZONE

1. Co-Commanders, MCC, Zakho request authorization to travel outside the security zone via MCC Helicopter on 14 Apr 94. Destination will be Irbil (MF 0709) and Salah Ad Din (MF 2826).
2. Purpose of travel is to introduce the new US CCMC to the head people of the US agencies (Irbil) and to Mr Barzani (Salah Ad Din).
3. This travel is in accordance with current CTF policy governing travel outside the security zone as outlined in Tab J, MCC SOP, your authority to approve this travel is found in DOD 4515.13R Ch 6 and ECIC 190720Z Aug 92 msg. This air travel is deemed necessary to execute the OPC mission.
4. Recommend approval.

DONALD L. SANDERS
Maj
Opns Off

CTF/CG or DC Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Item 69b

696

[Faint, illegible text, possibly bleed-through from the reverse side of the page]

[Handwritten signature and scribbles]

[Handwritten signature]

TOC 11002
PB 13 APR

CERTIFICATE

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.

[Signature]
WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

12 May 94
Date

Item 696

THIS REPRODUCES THE TYPED PORTIONS
OF THE ATTACHED ITEM "69b"
FOR EASE OF READING

CMCC/US

22 Apr 94

MEMORANDUM FOR CTF/CG

THRU CTF/DC

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR TRAVEL OUTSIDE THE SECURITY ZONE

1. Co-Commanders, MCC, Zakho request authorization to travel outside the security zone via MCC Helicopter on 14 Apr 94. Destination will be Irbil (MF 0709) and Salah Ad Din (MF 2826).
2. Purpose of travel is to introduce the new US CCMC to the head people of the US agencies (Irbil) and to Mr Barzani (Salah Ad Din).
3. This travel is in accordance with current CTF policy governing travel outside the security zone as outlined in Tab J, MCC SOP, your authority to approve this travel is found in DOD 4515.13R Ch 6 and ECIC 190720Z Aug 92 msg. This air travel is deemed necessary to execute the OPC mission.
4. Recommend approval.

DONALD L. SANDERS
Maj
Opns Off

CTF/CG or DC Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Item 69b

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.




TO: W 1002
 PB 13 APR

CERTIFICATE

I certify that I am the Records Custodian for the Accident Investigation Board convened to investigate the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters in the no fly zone in northern Iraq on 14 April 1994, and that this is a true and accurate copy of the record which is kept in my records system.

12 May 94
 Date


 WILLIAM L. HARRIS, Capt, USAF, MSC
 Evidence Custodian, Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

V-062

V-063

TAB V-069A

V-064

SANDERS, DONALD L.

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V-069A

**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY
OF
MAJOR DONALD L. SANDERS
HHC, 3d Infantry Division
APO AE 09096**

The interview was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Scott C. Black at Zakhu at 1800 hours, 18 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given. This summary includes corrections made by the witness during his subsequent testimony on 2 May 1994, which were incorporated under oath at that time.

EXAMINATION

I am the operations officer for the MCC in Zakhu. I'm generally flying in day to day missions, and all that goes with that particular mission. I work directly for the MCC commander. I was involved in the planning of the mission that resulted in the accident that's being investigated.

The commander, COL Thompson, gave me guidance some time before the 12th on what he wanted me to do for this mission. He wanted to take a trip down to Irbil. COL Thompson instructed me to request permission from CTF to fly into the security zone on the 14th to go down to introduce the new MCC commanders. We were also to meet with the chief of the UNGCI, or one of his representatives. Then after about 30 minutes on the ground there, we would fly down to Salah ad Din to meet with Mr. Barzani. Both of these places were in the no-fly zone in northern Iraq.

After I received the guidance on the missions from COL Thompson, I submitted a request to the deputy commander at CTF and the Commanding General. The Deputy Commander is COL Hassell who is also the Chief of Staff, and the Commanding General is Brigadier General Pilkington. I typed up the request on the computer, then faxed it up to them. I know they received the request, because I received a faxed copy back. Once we received the approved copy back, I informed the commander that they had in fact approved the request. I then started planning for the mission and started coordinating through MCC in Pirinlik. The mission was for COL Thompson and the three coalition chiefs, to take the new U.S. co-commander down to Irbil and Salah ad Din to introduce him to Mr. Allen and Mr Barzani . There were two local Guards per aircraft. Two Turk LNO's have to fly with any aircraft that comes into sector. Then we have a security officer or a deputy security officer and a civilian interpreter who normally rides the aircraft with the commander. There's also a military interpreter who normally rides the second aircraft. This was all a standard packet for this mission. There wasn't anything included in this packet that made it unusual. I also informed the detachment commander, Captain McKenna.

SANDERS

Normally, we'll start planning these missions 3 weeks out. Any time we have a change in mission, we have to go back and notify CTF and Eagle flight detachment that the mission for a particular day has changed.

When I submitted my request to CTF, I immediately gave them a heads up that the mission for the 14th could possibly change. I also informed Captain McKenna of this possible change in mission. Once I got the approval, I went ahead and started to analyze the plan. I sat down and came up with a roster of the time, place, as well as the planning guide that I need for the plan to take us from point A to point B. Then the morning departure, we'd come in and have a command and staff meeting to brief the plan -- the load plan for the aircraft, the time of departure, the route the aircraft would be flying. Usually, I'll recommend the routes to the Eagle pilots, along the corridor, and they choose the most beautiful route inside of the security zone because of the places that they had to fly to. I always recommend the routes for the mission commander, but it's the option of the mission commander whether he wants to change it. The crash did occur below the route that I recommended; it happened just south of the route. We wanted to ensure that AWACS was aware when we fly out of the security zone. We do not fly out of the security zone unless we get AWACS help.

Initially, the plan was for them to fly out to a village along the outskirts of the security zone. Once there, they would set down and make a radio check back with us because we can't talk to the aircraft that far away. Before the aircraft landed here, the AWACS was up and operational. Normally, we would get a call from CTF, saying that AWACS is on the way, or AWACS will be ROLEX one half hour. When I went to the CP that morning, my radio operator called me and said that AWACS was up and operational. When the aircraft came in, I spoke with Captain McKenna, he said they had spoken with AWACS that morning, and AWACS was up and operational.

After I spoke with CPT McKenna that morning, I came in and got all my stuff that I normally use to do the mission brief. Then I went and gave everyone the mission brief. I covered where they're going, where I basically think they are going to be flying over, the time that we should reach this point, the amount of time we're going to stay on the ground at that point; the time to the next point, the time we'll be on the ground there, and the time that we're going to lift off from there, and fly back into the sector; and the time they would lift off from there and arrive back into the sector. During the briefing, there were no questions to my recollection.

Following the brief, they were loaded on the aircraft. According to the log, they departed around 1050 hours. After the aircraft took off, I departed and came back to the house, then I took a second tour, a ground tour, up to Faydah Overlook. At that time, we had news from the ground and CTF that they were over-flying a fighter, so I went up there to observe that particular

SANDERS

operation. As I was sitting out there, CTF apparently was trying to contact the Eagle flight and failed to make contact. They then called down and asked us various information on the Eagle flight aircraft. I'm not sure exactly what time this occurred. After the Eagle departed here, we did not have any kind of pre-programmed communications check with them. We cannot talk to Eagle once they reach a certain point, but they would have AWACS coverage.

After I observed the fighter flying over, I reported back to the house. I got a call from one of the operators here at MCC on the radio requesting that I come back to the house ASAP. He told me I needed to come back to the house. He asked my location and I indicated I was at the checkpoint. When I got in the house, Chief Carlson had received a call saying that the fighter jets thought they might have shot down a couple of Hinds. Everything was pretty fuzzy as far as the location of where the shooting took place. Everybody had sat down and briefed me basically on what was going on, and we tried to make an assessment of the situation. They did not have contact with the Eagle flight aircraft, so we could not talk to them. In order to verify that they weren't at Irbil at the time, we asked the radio operator to try to contact them. The operator had no success in making contact, so I asked him to call Mr. Steven Allen who is one of the guys that was going to meet with them there in Irbil. I wanted him to confirm whether the flight had reached that location. Mr. Allen then informed me that they had not reached Irbil.

As time went on and on, we started receiving reports that a couple of aircraft had been shot down. These reports were coming from various locations. We were getting various reports, even out of Irbil. Then there was one sighting, and they accounted for 12 bodies. I looked at my load plan and determined that had to be one of our aircraft. I received a call some time after that from Mr. Barzani on the phone, and he indicated that the two MCC helicopters were shot down, and that all personnel aboard were dead. He also indicated that he would be going with local forces out there to secure the area.

I called CTF up and reported to COL O'Brien what Mr. Barzani had said. I'm not sure what time I made this call. We were trying to get a fix on what had happened out there, whether it was MCC helicopter or if it was in fact Hinds that were shot down. As time went on, we kept receiving various reports from the PRO office, the public relations office, as well as reports on the radio, and other places. We could not confirm it was an MCC aircraft until we had sent out the ground force. I requested permission from CTF to launch six people out there to go out and check the area out, determine whether those were MCC aircraft, to secure the area, and to determine what had happened out there, and to conduct recovery operations.

The commanding general gave me the approval to launch the ground patrol because normally we would not send a ground patrol that far out. Once we got the verbal approval, I confirmed it with COL O'Brien before launching the vehicles out. It was at that point that we were 100 percent sure that the aircraft belonged to us.

SANDERS

Once they got out there to the first site they went to, they made an assessment of the situation and determined that all the people aboard were dead. I sent the information that the team had reported back to me up to CTF. I was instructed that I would stay at the office, so that someone there that would be able to track the information that was coming in. The company commander went forward. I did not go out to the site.

When the team got out there, a bunch of locals had moved into the area. The ground patrol was still trying to assess the situation. The team started the recovery action. My actions during this period was basically to monitor the situation, drawing information from that location, and report everything that I knew back to CTF. Captain Hurley went out to the CP to establish a temporary morgue to make preparations to receive the bodies as they arrived. He ran that operation there at the morgue, along with some other people.

I cannot think of anything else that I could offer at this point. I'll provide you with a copy of the log that I kept during this time of the incident.

(The standard witness caution was given, and the witness had no questions.)

(The interview terminated at 1830 hours, 18 April 1994.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of DONALD L. SANDERS, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.



SCOTT C. BLACK, LTC, U.S. Army
Legal Advisor

TAB V-069B

SANDERS, DONALD L.

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V-069B

SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

OF

MAJOR DONALD D. SANDERS MCC, ZAKHU, IRAQ

A telephonic interview was conducted at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, by Lieutenant Colonel Scott C. Black, Accident Board Legal Advisor, with the Witness located at Diyarbakir, Turkey, beginning at 1450 hours on 10 May 1994. The identity of the Witness was established by voice recognition and preliminary discussion of matters known to the Witness.

EXAMINATION

The helicopter crew members wore the standard U.S. Army issue "nomex" flight suit. Each member of the crew wore standard leather combat boots and the individual flight crew survival vest. On board the aircraft, crew members each wore the standard U.S. Army helmet. I do not specifically recall whether the crew members wore gloves.

I recall that the two U.S. Army Colonels and the Special Forces soldiers were all dressed in the standard Battle Dress Uniform -- BDUs -- and combat boots. The U.S. Air Force officer passenger was also dressed in a BDU uniform. I do not recall if any passengers wore field jackets or had any other additional clothing items.

The British and Turkish officers, and the Turkish LNOs aboard the aircraft, each wore green camouflage uniforms. The French officer passenger wore a desert camouflage uniform. I do not recall if these personnel wore any specific additional clothing items.

The male MCC interpreter wore civilian slacks and a jacket. The female U.S. Political Advisor wore civilian slacks and a blouse. I do not recall any other specific items of clothing worn by either individual.

The male, civilian, local national guards, employed by MCC, all wore civilian clothing of varying types. Each guard wore a U.S. military issue Flak Vest, and one or two of the guards also wore a U.S. military Gortex field jacket.

I do not recall any further details with regard to clothing, or personal and survival items, worn by the crew or passengers on the flight. As a general matter, there was nothing unusual about the dress of the personnel on the flight.

SANDERS

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I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of DONALD D. SANDERS as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.



SCOTT C. BLACK, LTC, USA
Legal Advisor

SANDERS

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TAB V-070

FRASER, GEORGE M.

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V-070

SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

**CAPTAIN GEORGE M. FRASER
COMPANY A, 2nd BATTALION
10th SPECIAL FORCES
FORT DEVENS, MA**

The interview was conducted by Lt Colonel Scott C. Black at Zakhu, Iraq, beginning at 1840 hours, 18 April 1994. A witness advisement of rights was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn.

EXAMINATION

I do understand the difference between safety and accident investigations and I have no questions at this time.

I am the Detachment Commander with Company A, 2nd Battalion. This includes a variety of missions at any time. As far as what I was doing on 14 April 1994, we are presently stationed at the Area Operations Base at Incirlik and our primary mission there is to fly combat search and rescue and personnel recovery.

As far as my involvement in the activities on 14 April concerning the accident under investigation here, I was alerted at about 1200 on the 14th that there were two downed aircraft, possibly Hinds, somewhere near the border of the security area. I know it was about 1200 because I was on my way to lunch. I was called to facilitate orders and I received that word from Major Rosenberg. At that time, we returned to the AOB, assembled our portion of the SAR package and reported to SOC 3 on the other side of the airfield at which point we went into a hold pattern while planning was done.

At approximately 1500, or a little after that, we took off in the helicopters and headed for the crash site. We had a planned aerial refuel and we planned to go straight in. We arrived at the crash site at approximately 1915. There were three MH-60s. The SAR package, by SOP, is made up of two SF members for security and two PJs and a CCT in a trail aircraft. PJs are the pararescue from the Air Force. The CCT is basically the commo man from the Air Force. They provide all the commo with the aircraft. The lead aircraft, again, is two PJs, however, this time the plan was adjusted. Three aircraft went. From what I understand, and I can't confirm this, the CCT package was dropped off. They took six PJs. There were two on the aircraft with me-- myself and Sergeant Mallory, SF Security, and the other bird had a number of people on it-- Colonel Hunt, Colonel Zahrt and the remainder of the PJs. I couldn't tell you the total number of people on the entire package. The planning and the way it went did not go by SOP.

FRASER

(5 -)

The force had arrived at Site 2 at about 1915. There were two PJs and Sergeant Mallory. We went directly into Site 2. We circled the crash sites two or three times identifying the sites and we went in and landed maybe 800 meters, maybe 1,000 meters uphill from the crash site. At that point, we offloaded the aircraft and we were approached by locals. They were armed. We tried to confirm with the aircraft that they were friendlies, that their actions were friendly. We wanted to make sure before we left the aircraft. After we were told they were friendlies, we still went down in a modified posture. We followed them down to the crash site where I was introduced to the leader. Of the small group, there was maybe 10 or 15 that I could see there. I knew there were more in the area. We provided security at the crash site.

At that point, the leader informed me they had 14 bodies they counted. Again, the light was fading. He didn't speak very much English, but he knew the number "14". His name was something like Tahsina. I can't confirm if his name was Tahsina. Mr. Cooley might be able to tell you his name because he had contact with him later. At this point, he took us over and showed us the first bodies on the crash site. I was looking at the bulk of the wreckage or what I could see then and I could not identify it as anything more than a helicopter. There was no way to identify what type it was, not knowing aircraft or their parts. This was not the crash site on the hill; this was the site down in the draw.

There were roughly 10-15 people in the area at this point. We didn't see any western-type people. They all seemed to be locals. The majority of them were gathered around the fire. A few led us down to the site and a few were standing about, but nobody was going through the wreckage at that point.

It was getting dark quickly and I wanted to try to count the number of casualties on site. It was getting dark real fast. I confirmed 14 and possibly 15. At that point, we notified the aircraft. They wanted us to mark a drop area so that they could drop some body bags down so we could start recovery operations. We marked it and they dropped five bags and told us to do what we could on scene. As far as the time . . . (The witness at this point is apparently looking through some notes and is then asked if he took notes this whole time to which he responded in the negative and states he took some notes upon his return. He is asked if he would consent to provide a copy of these notes to which he responded affirmatively). After 1915, the time just ran together, but I would assume this was within about a half hour of our arrival on site. Before we started, I asked what the aircraft's intentions were. I was told we were supposed to place the remains that we could in the bags and carry them to the drop zone. I tried to explain to them that was impossible for four people to do in that terrain and we weren't going to be able to accomplish that mission. While we were waiting, a few minutes later, I received word to pack up and go back to the LZ and come back in the morning. We grabbed all of our gear and Tashina led us back up to the LZ. We boarded the aircraft, strapped in, and waited and waited. The next word I got was offload, you will do it tonight. We left non-essential gear in the aircraft, picked up what we needed and headed back down the hill.

FRASER

At this point, we started with recovery procedures. If you looked upstream, we approached the site from up the hill and down the ridge line. When you came up the hill, you came out just above the hub of the main road. We grounded gear that we didn't need. We moved around to the bottom of the crash site where the bulk of the wreckage and bodies were. We spread out the bags and started to move the remains. We knew that there would be an investigation and we didn't want to disturb the crash site too much, but there was little we could do. We did the removal we had to do. As we were doing this, we received word that more people were coming down from the top and one of the teams were bringing more bags so we bagged all the bodies. We had the same argument with the pilots about the possibility of carrying them out as opposed to hoisting them out. Sometime during this point, we did a linkup with Mr. Cooley and the ground force coming up from the bottom.

At some point, Colonel Zahrt, the Air Component Commander, came down from the LZ and arrived on site. We were trying to convince the aircraft that we could not carry them out. Colonel Zahrt asked Mr. Cooley if we could take them down. We didn't see a way that we could carry them down on a single track with two people side by side with a body in between. We finally convinced the aircraft to try a hoist. We moved the bodies across the street to a small area. The pilot came in and tried one and it worked. They figured out how they could do it and we moved all the bodies across at that point. All the bodies were moved and about two lifts had been taken out when I released the ground crew that came up from the bottom to go back down. Myself, Sergeant Mallory, six PJs and Colonel Zahrt remained on the site. When they were down to about two more lifts, Sergeant Mallory and myself moved back up the ridge line, secured the LZ and Colonel Zahrt and the PJs returned. We uploaded the aircraft with equipment on the first lift and did two more lifts to get the personnel out. I was on the last lift out.

We moved down to Site 1, uploaded the personnel and moved to Zakhu by air. We landed and were greeted. We grounded our gear. We met Mr. Carlson there. He was pretty much running the ground operations. Some of the bodies had been flown there and offloaded. They were placed in rooms. They were trying to keep them separated as best they could by crash site or whatever. I am not sure what their operation was. We received word that the aircraft would be coming in to pick up the bodies. They would be uploaded and flown to Diyarbakir and we would remain here in Zakhu. We helped load them up on two separate aircraft.

We were put in vehicles and brought to the MCC Compound here where we were allowed to clean up and get some food and rest. At that point, that operation ended for us and we went into recovery.

During the time on the hill while we were having discussions with the pilot about how we were going to get the bodies out, he requested that we try to find an alternate LZ closer so we sent out two of the PJs and had them scout the area looking for another area. They did move about 800 meters downstream and go from the opposite ridge line on the other side of the stream and then they came back. They did tell me that they confirmed it was a UH-60. They did find the door about 800 meters downstream.

FRASER

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of George M. Fraser, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation board.



SCOTT C. BLACK, Lt Colonel, USA
Legal Advisor

FRASER

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TAB V-071

V-064

GANZE, ELIZABETH

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AFFIDAVIT

I am Captain Elizabeth Ganze. I am assigned to the 561 Fighter Squadron as the Officer in Charge of the Intelligence Branch. My squadron is deployed to Incirlik AB, Turkey, in support of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT (OPC). We fly F-4G Wild Weasel aircraft. The squadron Intelligence Branch is responsible for aircrew intelligence training which includes visual recognition of friendly and enemy aircraft. AF regulations require visual recognition training and testing for aircrew members every six months. The scope and content of the training is left to the discretion of the squadron's Intelligence Branch. The 561 FS visual recognition training program includes a weekly training session at our home base. During our three month TDY to OPC, the squadron does not perform formal training session. Our testing schedule at OPC is informal as well. From time to time, I personally quiz the crew members to make sure they are able to identify various aircraft. In the formal visual recognition training program at home base, pilots are required to identify helicopters as friendly or enemy and by type.

The following resources are available at Incirlik AB, Turkey, to train aircrew members on visual identification of aircraft;

1. Middle East and Africa Theater Recognition Guide, Part I
DIAM 57-25-131, 1 July 1988
2. Visual Aircraft Recognition
FM 44-30, October 1986
3. Threat Guide and Countertactics
MCM 3-1 Vol II, 29 Oct 1993

The first two documents listed above are written for ground observers to identify aircraft flying above their position. They include written descriptions as well as line drawings of helicopters from the front, side and below. MCM 3-1 contains a threat assessment and pictures from the side of a Hind. This document is not intended to be used for visual recognition purposes, but is often used as such.


ELIZABETH GANZE, Captain, USAF
561 FS Intelligence Officer
Nellis AFB, Nevada

Sworn to and subscribed before me on this 12th day of May 1994.


CHARLES H. WILCOX II, Colonel, USAF
Legal Advisor

TAB V-072

SHORT, JOHN E.

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SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

**JOHN E. SHORT, STAFF SERGEANT
COMPANY A, 2ND BN, 10TH SFG
FT DEVENS, MA**

The interview was conducted by LTC Scott C. Black at Zakhu, Iraq, beginning at 0830 hours, 19 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14.

EXAMINATION

I am with the special forces in the Army. For the MCC I take care of medical problems with regards to making sure our forces stay healthy.

On 14 April 1994, I was part of the ground movement that would link up later that day with the helicopters that went down. When we were unable to call them at the proper time, we drove back as quick as we could. The first time that we tried to make contact with the helicopters was around 1120 hours, and it was around 1330 hours when Major Sanders decided that it was time to move out to find out what the problem was. We were heading back when we got the call that we needed to get back as quick as possible. When we got back, all of the vehicles were loaded. We were also going to do a ground movement to the point where the helicopters went down. We were told to stand down and move back to our people in our unit to, basically, inform them of what was going on. Finally, I talked to Captain Kent and we both agreed to come back to see if we still couldn't initiate some form of ground movement at which point we came back over here. Captain Kent was able to talk to someone at CTF and got approval to move six men down there. All of this occurred around 1700 hours.

It took us around three and a half hours to get out to the accident site. We took down the Combat Control Technician of the Air Force. Captain Kent and Sergeant Larreau went down and talked with the PJs. Essentially, they hadn't done anything yet except to go around the site to identify where the bodies were and identify the helicopters. When they came back and said that essentially nothing had been done with the bodies, I told Captain Kent that I was going to go down and help. We were given orders to go to White Lights. We were also told that they

SHORT

wanted the bodies moved at night no matter what. At that point, I bagged up as many bodies as I could and helped move them to the helicopter. We were told that the other site was pretty non-accessible from the road, it turned out later on that it really wasn't that bad because I ended up getting out first with some of the PJs to fly to the other side. By the time I walked down from the LZ that they had, the people that took the road were already there. It was dark. Basically, when I got down there the bodies were all in bags. When I got to the bottom of the hill they were hoisting up the first body which was Colonel Thompson, and it took approximately 15 minutes.

At that point, we had to decide whether we should take the bodies up to the top of the LZ or to take a hoist. The final determination was that we would continue to hoist the bodies out of there, so we moved them all across the creek. The hoist up operation went pretty well. At that point, basically, that was it. I went back to the vehicles after the bodies were hoisted out. I caught the last bird out around 6:00 o'clock that morning it seems that it was around 7:00 o'clock or around that point when I returned back to the CP. The only other thing that I really have to add is that there were some problems; they didn't mark the sites where they got the bodies.


I did not take any personal notes, nor do I keep a log. Most of the conversations that occurred with the locals went through Cooley and his men. He, basically, set up the operation as far as what we were going through.

The only thing that I heard that was unusual about the circumstances was that there weren't any other weapons found. We surmised that the locals cleaned up the site before we got there -- they had plenty of time. Even though the agreement was that the area should be secured, that is not going to prevent the locals from picking up weapons because a weapon is worth more than almost anything in this part of the world.

The only other thing that I have to add is that John Cooley did an excellent job of getting us down there and wrapping up the situation with the locals.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of JOHN E. SHORT as given, and sworn to, before the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.


SCOTT C. BLACK, LTC, USA
Legal Advisor

SHORT

TAB V-073

LARREAU, ROD P.

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**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY OF
STAFF SERGEANT ROD P. LARREAU
COMPANY A, 2ND BATTALION
10TH SPECIAL FORCES GROUP
FORT DEVENS, MA**

The interview was conducted by Lt Colonel Scott C. Black at Zakhu, Iraq, beginning at 0900 hours, 19 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14.

EXAMINATION

I am now the Communications NCO of the MCC. It entails opening up the OPS Center, turning on all the communication equipment, and I monitor and control the telephones lines, SATCOM nets and tapes access. I'm just now learning how to do all that, and I go out on most of the patrols carrying SATCOM radios and report back to the CTF. I was not working on 14 April, the day of the accident. I was part of the JSOTF Team that came down. We basically came down after the journalist was killed and the MCC got a threat notice. It took us a while to get here. I arrived in Turkey on Tuesday of the previous week. By Wednesday we were packed up and we got ready to move. My team sergeant and I were actually attached to the JSOTF as a sniper team. We are both CAT I snipers. We brought our sniper rifles. The first day was a no-go. We didn't get out of Turkey. The second day we actually got all the way down to the MCC but didn't get to the CP until after dark on Thursday.

The MCC drivers had some SVD sniper rifles and they had a couple of MCC guards, the Kurdish guards, up on the roof, basically trying to teach them how to use the equipment. I believe it was Capt Kent that came into the CP. Obviously, something was wrong and five minutes later I was told later by Sgt Tremmel that the training was over, to pack up the equipment and tell the guards to go back to the MCC. I still didn't know what was wrong, but I knew something serious was happening. We returned back to the MCC and about five minutes later was told that Eagle Flight had not been heard from in approximately two hours and they had gotten reports that all were dead, they crashed; they had been shot down by Hinds. I got that information from Sgt Flatley. Rumors were flying.

Sgt Tremmel came and said that four or five of us were going to go and try to secure the crash site. I elected to leave the sniper rifle behind and take an M-60. We basically kept going over our equipment to make sure everything was correct. Everything kept changing for next couple of hours. I then understood the Eagle Flight was canceled and the MH-60s out of Incirlik wouldn't be there until approximately 1830. This was right before dark. Captain Kent and Sergeant Short came back to the MCC. They convinced the MCC Commander that they needed a ground party out there at the crash site. Capt Kent came back and said that he definitely needed

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Marty Fry, the communicator of our team, to go and he needed two more personnel. Sergeant Mike Toth and I volunteered to go because he had the SAWs and I had the M-60. We decided we needed a little more fire power in that ground area. About 1600-1615 we were met by John Cooley and we headed for the crash site. During the road trip out there, John Cooley's vehicle got a flat tire and that cost us some time. Everything was sketchy to us. We didn't know if the Iraqis had made a move or if the Iraqis had shot them down or if they would actually make a move so everybody was nervous.

We got to the crash site after dark. There was absolutely no light at all. The helicopters had been there for a little while. You could hear them. They said they had gotten there before it had gotten too totally dark and they had already counted the casualties from the air. They had landed at Crash Site 1 and were trying to land at Crash Site 2. Crash Site 1 is the one located down in the valley near the river. It's a little more accessible to the MCC. As a special note, as soon as we drove up, there were many, many Kurdish people on the road or walking away. There were vehicles all over the place. I saw two people walking away with video cameras. One was obviously an Iraqi or Kurd or whatever. The second one was a western type with auburn or brown hair and brown beard, approximately 5'6" wearing a white shirt and tan pants. We drove right beside him. This road was nothing more than a dirt path. I saw no card or any press identification. The equipment looked like a JVC camcorder. The individual with the camcorder obviously was English or understood English because when Mike said "Look, the news is here" he turned around and looked at us. I didn't think about stopping because we were only a couple hundred meters from the crash site and I had other things on my mind.

We used night vision goggles because we didn't want bright lights all over. Mike told Marty Fry and I to work our way down to Crash Site 1. We were still carrying our weapons. We met pararescue Air Force personnel. He was the one who informed us that it was two F-15s that shot the helicopters down. At first, he said it was two F-16s, but he later corrected himself.

There was still a small fire. It had obviously been burning for a while. We were told to secure the site, but Peshmerga had actually been on site for about three hours. They had everyone away from the scattered debris approximately 50 meters. There must have been about 25 vehicles up there. I went to the crash site. Colonel Hunt met up with Captain Kent. I immediately noticed some of the casualties. He just told us that everyone was dead. He was across the creek to the west. He said there was one body over there by the helicopter. It was a good 100 or 150 meters away from the crash site. He said there were more bodies inside the crash sight, but it was difficult to see them with the PVS7s. I have had experience like this before. They started pointing some of them out. We started marking some of the places where the bodies were with chem lights. I think I had three or four of them in my pocket. It was then decided that we'd grab some body bags, put down the machine gun, get rid of the unnecessary equipment and start picking up the casualties. Colonel Hunt had given the order that all casualties had to be removed that night. Colonel Hunt's RTO was up on the site and pretty

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shaken up. It was the first time that he had ever seen something like that. We grabbed the body bags, got some flashlights from John Cooley and we started picking up the casualties.

After they got the equipment and PJs on the ground, they pulled security around the crash site and starting cleaning it up. I stayed the night on the sight. Crash Site 1 was fairly easy to pick up. We started at the top and worked our way west to get them the farthest away from the LZ. We had to cross the creek with the bodies. Mike Toth did an excellent job pushing the Air Force personnel to do the job as quickly and as thoroughly as we could. At Crash Site 1, we took them across the creek and consolidated them. The first bird took eight bodies. There were 12 bodies on that sight. Mike Toth and I went over to Crash Site 2. We had to land approximately 400 meters away and walk down to the site. It was a lot more difficult over there. That's where I met up with Captain Fraser and Sergeant Mallowry who had flown down out of Incirlik. They already had the majority of the bodies in body bags there. We brought them the body bags that we had left, which weren't very good. We got the rest of the bodies from that Site.

After the bodies were consolidated, it was determined we didn't have the personnel or the lighting conditions to carry them up. I think it took us 3 to 3 1/2 hours to get all the bodies hoisted up. We couldn't lift two bags at once because they were too heavy. I was on the next to the last bird out of there. John Cooley stayed there with the vehicles that night.

I went back out the next morning. There were a bunch of Air Force investigators out there. We spent most of that day out there. I think we came back about 1430.

On the day of the accident, I personally saw 6-8 holsters with no weapons. I did ask one of them if they had taken any weapons. They said they hadn't. John Cooley arrived with an interpreter and he had the interpreter tell the locals it was a disgrace to steal anything. I just went back to my duties. I did not keep any kind of personal notes or a log. I did make a sheet of where some of the bodies were that I picked up at Site 1. I passed that on to Captain Kent. I think it had the positions of six bodies at Crash Site 1.

The Air Force personnel there the second day were very professional.

At Crash Site 2, for example, the doors were a good 300 meters down the draw. There was no way we could have seen that at night. There were no human remains down there in the draw because we did do a thorough search. On the second day, I was shocked at the magnitude of how far the debris was.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions)

LARREAU

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of STAFF SERGEANT ROD P. LARREAU as given, and sworn to, before the Aircraft Accident Investigation board.



SCOTT C. BLACK, Lt Colonel, USA
Legal Advisor

LARREAU

TAB V-074

DAIGLE, CONNIE S.

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**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY
OF
PRIVATE FIRST CLASS CONNIE S. DAIGLE
COMPANY C, 6/159 AVIATION
APO AE 09096**

The interview was conducted by Lt Colonel Scott C. Black at Pirinlik AB, Turkey, beginning at 0902 hours, on 20 April 1994. A standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14.

EXAMINATION

My duty position with Eagle flight Ops is operations. It entails making sure that the pilots of each mission gets all the proper equipment that they're supposed get before takeoff. We also monitor the radios whether or not they have to turn back or if they make it, we contact people and let them know. We also give them paper work called SPINS, that's all the information they need to know for the day. SPINS are Special Instructions. It's a code word letter and number for the day. That is pretty much what we do, we just monitor the radios and make sure they get whatever they are supposed to get.

On the 14th of April 1994 I was performing those duties. I was involved in a few of the activities surrounding the accident. From the beginning of my day I did what I was supposed, by giving them all their proper equipment that they are supposed to have and seeing that they received a dash one rebrief for the weather and contacted everyone that's supposed to know that they took off. About 1030-1100 I got a call from JOC, I think it was Lt Col Witcher asking me what flight plans Eagle had planned for the day. We have itineraries for each day of what we are supposed to do and I told him of that and places where we are to go.

Periodically I kept hearing Cougar trying to contact Eagle One between 1100 and 1300 hours local time. Mr Henry had come in to get his stuff ready for his flight to Incirlik and I asked him what would it mean if Cougar was trying to contact Eagle and Eagle didn't respond. I was informed that happens alot because they could possibly be out of range or Cougar could be down for a moment. I've been assigned to Ops since March 15 of 94. In my experience this seemed unusual especially when they called me and asked if the flight was friends of the Eagles, I really didn't know what was up.

My shift ended at 1:00 but I came back about 2:00 and that was the time they found out something was definitely wrong with the Eagles. Specialist McCarthy, PFC Harvey and myself started to create a time line of what had happened that day. Soon after that we started getting phone calls and annotated those calls in Zulu time. The next thing that stands out in my mind is we couldn't get any kind of information out. We knew something was wrong. We knew Eagle

DAIGLE

was down and what we heard from the news was two Iraqi planes shot down the Eagles or two Hinds. I heard this about 1600 local time over CNN news. We never ended up closing that day. Aircraft from Incirlik started looking for the crash site. They found crash site one and had a hard time finding crash site two but evidently found it. They properly identified them as being Eagle one and Eagle two. We monitored the situation and then the Air Force sent a team out to evacuate the bodies. We did not do anything else to support that mission we were on standby.

I was not involved in the mission brief and I did not talk to any of the individuals before they left for flight line. Communication was available over the radio, it goes either Eagle or Eagle nets or the Eagle switch or else we could call them on their PTT line before they take off. The only information I relayed to them was the weather and new void time and I think I relayed it to Sgt Beachler. The only unusual thing that stuck out with me was the flight plans and Cougar trying to contact the Eagles. I did not take any personal notes or logs. The only log was of the time line after we brought all that down we burned all other stuff so it couldn't be picked out of the trash. When ever we started taking notes before taking the time line, we wrote them down on a piece of paper as they happened. We did a time line on the computer we just and then burned all the other information so it couldn't been picked out of the trash by anybody who didn't need to know. We didn't destroy anything that didn't get transferred to the time line.

(The standard witness caution was given, the witness had no questions and the interview concluded at 0915 hours.).

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of CONNIE S. DAIGLE, as given, and sworn to, before the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.


SCOTT C. BLACK, Lt Colonel, USA
Legal Advisor

DAIGLE

TAB V-075

DEWITT, TERRY A.

**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY
OF
STAFF SERGEANT TERRY A. DEWITT
COMPANY C, 6/159 AVIATION
12TH AVIATION BRIGADE, USAREUR**

The interview was conducted by Lt Colonel Scott C. Black, at Pirinlik AB, Turkey, beginning at 1048 hours, 20 April 1994. A standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14.

EXAMINATION

My duty position for Eagle Flight is a platoon sergeant but down here at Pirinlik I'm the acting first sergeant. My duties include making sure the individuals coming in and out have billeting and our distinguished guests have transportation back and forth to the airfield; briefings on the operation here to include touring the base. I also take care of the personnel with both finances and material needs, making sure the Air Force is providing the amenities that we should have; completing monthly reports on how much gas we use and our phone bill. I do get involved in mission briefings, and I also perform crewmember duties when needed.

I was on duty on the 14th of April 1994, but I wasn't performing any duties in connection with the preparation of this mission. We were informed that we had two four ship missions back to back which is the most we can fly. We were informed by Capt McKenna and Maj Young about three days prior to the mission. I then got all the enlisted guys together to make sure we had all our things together. We then started planning procedures as to what was required from SERV-AIR individuals and the crewmembers involved in this mission so we would not drop the mission. The two four ship missions were then modified mid-afternoon on the 13th of April 1994 by Capt McKenna to a two-ship mission. The order to cut back on the four ship mission came from Capt McKenna, who gets his orders from MCC, who gets his orders from Zakhu. We never know what our mission is until we reach Zakhu. Since we have been doing this job for three years, everything is basically routine. I did not have to prepare for the mission on the 14th of April. My responsibilities on the 14th of April had nothing to do with Eagle flight missions. I had Maj Netherland, Sgt Findley and Lt Aguilard who were leaving that day to go to Incirlik and then on to Giebelstadt.

CW2 Koch, one of our pilots, called on the phone and said he needed a vehicle because he hadn't heard from the two Eagles since 1000 that morning. I spoke with Maj Bethel who runs MCC about obtaining a vehicle. In the process of CW2 Koch leaving and me returning to get the vehicle we heard over SATCOM that two MCC aircraft had been shot down. We prepped an aircraft because we didn't know what the contingency mission was going to be until Maj Young came from Incirlik and informed us that our aircraft had been shot down.

DEWITT

I do not have any personal notes or logs or know of any other documents that might be valuable to the investigative team.

(The standard witness caution was given, the witness had no questions, and the interview concluded at 1100 hours.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of STAFF SERGEANT TERRY A. DEWITT as given, and sworn to, before the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.



SCOTT C. BLACK, Lt Colonel , USA
Legal Advisor

DEWITT

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TAB V-076

CONTROL WITNESS 34

**VERBATIM TESTIMONY
OF
CONTROL WITNESS 34
(MISSION DIRECTOR, CALL SIGN MAD DOG)**

COL AT LEE: The time is now 1030 hours on 25 April 1994. The persons present are the following: Control Witness 34, Major General James G. Andrus, Lieutenant Colonel Christian Velluz, Colonel Remzi Armen, Mr. David Brummell, Colonel Michael E. Fain and I'm Colonel William K. At Lee, Jr.

(Barbara Brigman was the court reporter.)

COL AT LEE: This interview is being conducted at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. This is an official AFR 110-14 Aircraft Accident Investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the crash of two U.S. Army Blackhawk helicopters and the possible involvement of U.S. fighter aircraft in the crash of these helicopters in the northern No-Fly Zone of Iraq on 14 April 1994.

COL AT LEE: This investigation is being conducted at the direction of General Robert C. Oaks, CINCUSAFE. This investigation is not a Safety Mishap Investigation conducted under AFR 127-4. The purpose of this accident investigation is to obtain and preserve all available evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary action, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Testimony before a Safety Mishap Investigation Board is given with the understanding that it can only be used for mishap prevention purposes and all witnesses are advised that the testimony will be treated in confidence.

COL AT LEE: However, testimony given in this accident investigation may be used for any purpose deemed appropriate by competent authority and may be publicly disseminated.

COL AT LEE: Do you understand the difference between a Safety Mishap Investigation and as an Accident Investigation?

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

COL AT LEE: Do you understand the purpose of this investigation?

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

CONTROL WITNES #34

COL AT LEE: Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: No, sir.

COL AT LEE: Your testimony will be recorded and transcribed verbatim so that a written record can be made available to the appointing or higher authority. For the benefit of the reporter, please avoid the use of acronyms or jargon. Speak slowly, clearly and loudly. Remember to explain your testimony carefully so that others who do not have your technical training will be able to understand.

COL AT LEE: As this is an official investigation, you are required to answer questions put to you by the board. You are further advised not to discuss classified information unless necessary to develop your testimony. If it's necessary for you to discuss classified information, you need to identify it as such.

COL AT LEE: Would you please rise so that I can swear you in.

The witness was sworn.

EXAMINATION

Questions by Colonel Fain.

1Q: To begin, would you give me a brief summary of your educational background to include civilian and military education?

1A: Sir, I have a bachelor of science degree in recreation and parks, a master of science degree in aerial space sciences, I have 1,000 hours in the F-4 in Europe and a 1,000 hours in the F-15 in the States and in Europe. I was a Liaison Officer for a year and a half. Since that time, I have worked, basically, on the staff in Europe and at Air Force Space Command.

2Q: How long have you been in the Air Force?

2A: It will be 18 years this September.

3Q: What is your duty title at your current duty station?

3A: I'm assigned to [Witness identifying material deleted (1 word)] Air Force DO as an action officer.

4Q: What type of duties do you perform at that location?

4A: We coordinate [Witness identifying material deleted (28 words)]

CONTROL WITNESS #34

[Witness identifying material deleted (17 words)]

5Q: What is your current duty assignment?

5A: I'm TDY here for the purpose of being an Airborne Mission Director. By virtue of my rank, I'm in-charge of the four people that perform those duties here for Provide Comfort.

6Q: How long have you been TDY to this assignment?

6A: Since the 12th of February of this year.

7Q: And to whom do you report?

7A: Directly to the CFAC DO, Colonel Richardson and Colonel Dougherty.

8Q: You've already stated that you supervise four other individuals and their duties; are you their reporting official?

8A: No. Actually, they report directly to Colonel Richardson or Colonel Dougherty. It's four total, and I'm included in that four -- so, it's myself and three others.

9Q: What are your normal duty hours?

9A: It fluctuates. It fluctuates with the flying schedule anywhere from a half an hour before the first take-off to about the time of the landing of the last aircraft. When we are the airborne mission director we go and brief with the AWACS crews and we fly with the AWACS and debrief with the AWACS crews.

10Q: Can you give me an idea of the total number of hours in each of those two types of instances, one where you performing ground duties and the other while you are airborne?

10A: For the ground duties, we normally split the day in half. For instance, today, the Mad Dog would go in half an hour before the AWACS take off. An example is at 0650 this morning, so he would be there at 0620 at least, and he would work until around noon time, whereas the p.m. Mad Dog would come on and work until the aircraft were within a 50 mile circle or if the weather is bad, he would stay there until they all landed .

11Q: Would you describe the word "Mad Dog"?

11A: Mad Dog is -- I'm not sure what you call it -- the letters stand for Mission Director; so, it's a call sign that we refer to.

12Q: When you are performing duties as the Mission Director or Mad Dog, where do you perform those duties?

12A: In the command post at the console.

CONTROL WITNESS #34

13Q: Would you describe for us the training program that you undertook to become qualified as a Mission Director?

13A: There is -- the regulations that are involved are to read local flying regulations, the rules of engagement, the ACO, -- Air Control Order -- any pertinent information that goes along with that like our closing and opening checklist, and any of the situation reports that would have happened. And, then we go into training a person on the ground first before we put him in the air. So, we use two Mad Dog tours to do that where he comes in and does an opening tour with an experienced Mad Dog, and then he does a closing tour with an experienced Mad Dog. Then, normally, we give him a day off to get situated, in-processed and things like that. Then, he goes up and flies. He flies as a Duke, which is a airborne mission commander twice. He has two rides; he gets to see one and then do one. Then, he is on his own, if everything went okay. Then, he is cleared off. Before that, he has to have an interview with Colonel Richardson or Colonel Dougherty who signs off his training paperwork. We document each one of those activities and then he is clear to go.

14Q: That signature that you described when you said "signed off", is that the certification process?

14A: Yes, sir.

15Q: Did you undergo or go through that training program as you described it?

15A: Yes, sir, I did.

16Q: And in your earlier testimony you said that you were also responsible for conducting that training program for new individuals; is that correct?

16A: I oversee it. I won't be the person that gives every person his training, but I involve myself in at least one Mad Dog tour and at least one Duke tour, if not more. An individual has an opportunity to raise his hand and say, "I don't feel comfortable with being a Duke yet." "I would like more rides." Then, we will give him more supervised rides until he gets to the point where he is comfortable.

17Q: Have you seen that instance occur?

17A: Yes, we have.

18Q: How long have you been certified to perform as Mission Director or Mad Dog?

18A: Since about the 22nd of February.

19Q: 22nd of February?

19A: Yes, sir.

20Q: What written guidance do you have available to you while you are performing duties as the Mad Dog?

CONTROL WITNESS #34

20A: We have all those documents that I described to you, plus we wrote up a little how-to book of our own, that we use to try to condense things where the important points to remember that are some of the things that may not be brought out in all the documentation that we have on how to react if something goes wrong with a schedule, a tanker doesn't take off on time and you need to reflow the day, or just generally how to do it. So, that is all in a book that we have at the command post that we can refer to right there.

21Q: Is that same information available as well to the Duke?

21A: Yes, it is.

22Q: Do you feel like the written guidance is clear, concise and easy to understand?

22A: Yes, I do.

23Q: Do you feel like your condensed version, the checklist that you are referring to using covers all of the material adequately to perform the mission?

23A: Yes, sir. As a matter of fact, I still use it today.

24Q: How do you receive your changes or updates to the guidance?

24A: Normally, we receive it through battle staff directives and we pick those up on our way in. The Mad Dog will pick them up before he gets out to the console. As the AWACS crew will have picked them up before the brief, if for some reason they don't have it, -- we always check with the command post to find out if they have any BSDs that may have come down after the AWACS crew have picked up for that night. If that is the case, we pick them up on the way out to the aircraft so that we have a copy of those on board.

25Q: Would you describe what a BSD is please?

25A: Battle Staff Directive, and it is used to change the air tasking order which basically directs aircraft to perform a certain mission in the area of operations.

26Q: Would you describe from the time you arrived at work for Mad Dog duties for a morning launch a normal sequence of events?

26A: Normally, we get there and check with emergency action cell to make sure there is no BSDs. We check out the classified -- we have a classified book that has the code word of the day in it, has the authenticator, has the air tasking order, the schedule, the flow sheet and all the pertinent information that is classified is contained in one book. We sign that out. We take it down to the desk. Normally, the maintenance controllers all sit down in front of us and normally we just yell that it is "Step, No Start", which means that

CONTROL WITNESS #34

the crews will step to the aircraft at the time that they are fragged on the air tasking order but not start. That is the standard on most days. Then, we sit down and check out all the radios; we turn them on. We go through our opening checklist, check the weather and then we wait for the AWACS to take off normally. Once they take off on-time -- normally, they take off 15 minutes early -- we get in radio contact with them which normally takes about a half an hour for their radios to spin up. Once they have spun up, we wait for them to get their system to operations normal, which means their radar, identification systems and their JTIDS -- I'm sure you know what the JTIDS are because we can't fly without those things. If those things all come up normally then we tell the maintenance controllers to launch as fragged in the ATO. If they do not come up normally, say there is a problem with one system or another then we have a term that we call ROLEX which means that we slip the schedule to the right in half hour increments; it could be for weather, it could be for equipment problems, it could be for any number of things. But, that is how we adjust the departure time or the start time of the fighters. Once that decision is made and the schedule starts to flow we monitor anything on the ground that may hinder the operation, we communicate with the Duke who is the airborne mission director on how it is going in the area to ensure -- that things are going as -- that the ATO is being executed as it was written. We also reel in any changes that may come up in take-off times all through the day. Monitor the weather so that the Duke knows what the weather is back at Incirlik, so that he can relay that to the aircraft out in the air of operations. We also act as a relay for Colonel Dougherty and Colonel Richardson to inform them if anything happens in the area, that we would need their decision on. Then we call them on either the telephone or via the brick, and get their opinion or decision on something that is happening out in the AOR.

27Q: In that decision making process, the last two individuals that you mentioned, what is their function and duty title?

27A: Colonel Dougherty and Colonel Richardson are the CFAC DO and the CFAC Assistant DO, in order.

28Q: You mentioned that you had passed changes to take-off times; how would you receive that information and to whom would you pass them?

28A: Normally, I received it from the maintenance controllers if somebody goes out to the jet and they have a maintenance problem and they are going to be late, then they would tell us. Then we would try to ascertain if he is going to be able to make his plus or minus take-off window, if he not, then we will coordinate a new take-off time for him or whatever it takes. If he is ground abort, then we coordinate that also. If he is not on the schedule, for instance the helicopters or other aircraft that are not on the board up in front of me then I can't see, then normally then I get those relayed through the joint operations center and I pass that to the Duke -- by SATCOM.

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29Q: What do you consider to be your most critical Mad Dog or mission director function?

29A: My most critical function as a Mad Dog is to be there for Duke in case something happens in the AOR to be able to support him if he runs into a situation that would involve committing U.S. or coalition forces. That is our primary function. The way I would do that the best is to be able to relay information quickly the CFAC DO and to relay that decision back up to the Duke. Then, as a secondary function just support him on weather decisions, reflowing the schedule, making sure the ATO is executed smoothly and safely.

30Q: You mentioned that you communicate with the Duke, you communicate with the CFAC DO, that you have communications with the JOC or Joint Operations Center; who else do you communicate with during the course of your duties as the mission director?

30A: Just about anybody I feel I need to talk to. The SOF is somebody that I talk to on a regular basis. The weather folks. I call up to Diyarbakir almost everyday on a regular basis to verify weather. We talk to Zakhu on a daily basis to pass them the word of the day, and normally we ask them how the weather is out there just to get confirmation if there is anything that could become a problem.

31Q: In your conversations with Zakhu, what organization do you talk to there?

31A: It's normally -- I'm not sure who he is, he is just a private that calls on the phone and I just ask him to look out the window and tell me if there are any clouds. So, I don't talk to anybody specifically.

32Q: Is this a technique that you have developed or is this written guidance?

32A: It is just a technique that we kind of pass amongst ourselves to -- if it's a weather day just to confirm what the weather man is saying, "Do you have this or is it something else?"

33Q: How do you communicate with these individuals -- generically?

33A: Mostly by telephone -- landline.

34Q: And with Duke?

34A: Almost exclusively the SATCOM -- Satellite Communication. As a back-up we have high frequency that doesn't necessarily work all that well, but we have used it in the past. If he is close enough for UHF relay.

35Q: Do you or anyone else at your location maintain logs of these communications?

35A: We do not maintain logs of every communication that we do. We maintain logs of significant events that happen during the day; how far we have had to ROLEX, if

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people ground abort, just significant events that might effect or the CFAC DO might want to know about.

36Q: What is the disposition of those logs?

36A: There is two logs actually. We have a sortie count, which we keep that we normally include what happens to the aircraft or the way they ground abort, air abort, inflight emergencies and then how many sorties we flew that day, how many were scheduled and how many were flown. Then we have another log that we keep there in the command post that is significant events for the mission director and the command post: how far he had to ROLEX, why he had to ROLEX, things such as this.

37Q: Would you describe for me the chain of control of the airborne aircraft when you are performing your Mad Dog duties, both up and down from you?

37A: As a mission director we have a direct line to the CFAC DO back up the chain. From Mad Dog out to the aircraft it goes directly to the Duke who is the airborne mission director. He is responsible for execution of the ATO in the area of operation. It ends in the aircraft. It goes from the Duke to the aircraft out there and they are responsible for executing their portion of the air tasking order as fraggged or they need to get clearance from the Duke to change.

38Q: One point of clarification, the control in AOR it would be considered tactical control, who is responsible for that tactical control?

38A: The E-3 -- AWACS is responsible for tactical control of the aircraft in the AOR.

39Q: Is that control directive control that AWACS provides?

39A: No, sir, it is strictly advisory and bandit calls.

40Q: What would you consider the Duke's responsibilities to be?

40A: The Duke's responsibilities are to act as the airborne mission director to ensure that the air tasking order is executed as fraggged. To respond to any situations. To ensure that the ROE is adhered to and executed as written. To respond to any situations that may need judgment, that is why he is an experienced individual, highly experienced, tactical individual that has flown fighters before. So, he is there to -- when he runs out of written guidance, then he is there to lend his expertise to the situation and make a judgment call.

41Q: Are you qualified as a Duke?

41A: Yes, sir, I am.

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42Q: Going back to your duties as a mission director, you discussed the ATO, I assume that means air tasking order?

42A: Yes, sir.

43Q: That is your schedule from which you operate?

43A: Yes, sir.

44Q: What is your responsibility with respect to changes to that ATO?

44A: If there are -- our responsibility is to attempt to execute the air tasking order as it is written, if something precludes that -- weather, aircraft maintenance problems -- then we are to reflow it to execute the intent which is to cover the area of operations vulnerability window with the available aircraft. If we cannot do that, then we bring everybody home and properly protect the coalition forces with concurrence of the CFAC DO.

45Q: You said that you have received changes from maintenance and you also mentioned from the JOC; do you receive changes from any other agencies during the course of your duties as the Mad Dog?

45A: We can receive changes from the intelligence folks, but normally that is coordinated closely with the Joint Operations Center and it should be coordinated with the CFAC DO; if it is not done we go and make sure that has been done.

46Q: When you receive a change, to whom do you pass those changes?

46A: As a mission director on the ground we pass the changes to the Duke who in-turn passes them to the affected aircraft in the air to execute the change.

47Q: If the aircraft that are affected are still on the ground, who would pass that information?

47A: Then I would pass that through the maintenance folks who sit in front of me, out to the jet if the pilots have already stepped to the jet, if they haven't, then I call the squadron operations center directly and talk to the senior pilot on duty to affect those changes.

48Q: During the course of your duties in a typical day as a Mad Dog, when do you first assume responsibility for receiving and passing changes?

48A: When we walk in the door in the morning.

49Q: When does your responsibility end?

49A: When the last aircraft is down basically.

50Q: Are you aware of Eagle Flights UH-60s on the ATO?

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50A: Yes, sir, I am.

51Q: Can you describe to me what you normally see with respect to the Eagle flights?

51A: They normally are entered in the ATO as -- the information is standard for everybody who is on the ATO -- their mission number. The only thing that is not standard on there is their take-off time, normally it was entered "as required" because we didn't know when they were going to take-off and when they were going to land. But, as a Duke airborne we would normally see them take-off from Diyarbakir. They have to fly at 8,500 feet to get into the AOR, and if we couldn't see them before that we always saw them at the gate when they entered into the AOR. They normally go to Zakhu and then from Zakhu they would have a mission to go out into the area of operations further. So, we would be able track them from there. Tracking on the helicopters was spotty at best because, obviously, it is line of sight and when they go behind mountains and stuff we can't see them anymore.

52Q: You are speaking from a Duke position at this time; is that right?

52A: Yes, I'm sorry. From a Duke position airborne on a AWACS. From a Mad Dog position we normally wouldn't know where they were in their mission profile.

53Q: Have you as Mad Dog ever been passed a take-off time that was not reflected on the ATO for the Eagle Flights?

53A: Yes, I have. It's an unusual situation, but I have been in the past.

54Q: What were your actions on the incidents when those were passed to you?

54A: We would call the Duke and say this was their take-off time.

55Q: What would you expect the Duke to do with that information?

55A: He would normally pass it to -- the E3 controllers -- the senior director sitting next to him and give it to him.

56Q: Who has tactical responsibility for the Eagle Flights in the tactical AOR?

56A: About where they go and what they do?

57Q: That's correct.

57A: The Eagle office back at Diyarbakir and the folks at Zakhu basically dictate where they go and what their mission is.

58Q: They provide them the mission once they are airborne, who is responsible for monitoring and tracking those aircraft?

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58A: It is supposed to be tracked by the E3, but it is very difficult to do that because the map of the area they are flying and their UHF radio contact with the helicopters is very difficult.

59Q: Let's take a situation where a retrograde from the AOR was required, who would be responsible for ensuring that the Eagle Flights received that information?

59A: We would try to pass that information over the UHF radio, and in absence of that we would have to use ground lines.

60Q: That would be passing the information; who is responsible for passing that information?

60A: It would be passed back from the Duke back to the Mad Dog, and the Mad Dog would pass it to the JOC and let the JOC call.

61Q: In the air, real time, if it were a time critical situation, how would information be passed to the Eagle Flights?

61A: They are supposed to be on the same frequency that everybody else is in the AOR and it would be broadcast on the tactical frequencies in the area of operations.

62Q: Are the Eagle Flight helicopters Have Quick capable?

62A: No. Well, they are, but they don't have the Have Quick capability which is what we use in the area of operations. They have Have Quick One, which is not compatible so they come up on UHF frequency -- clear frequency.

63Q: Where would they find that UHF clear frequency?

63A: In their tasking order.

64Q: Does the Duke monitor that frequency?

64A: No, sir, we don't. We monitor four frequencies and they can come up on one of those frequencies but we do not monitor their specific frequency.

65Q: If the Duke needed to coordinate or communicate with the Eagle Flights, how would he go about doing that?

65A: He would ask the senior director to have the AOR controller weapons direct person to call him and tell him to come up Duke frequency in the clear, because Duke monitors Have Quick, his own Have Quick frequency, his own clear UHF frequency. He monitors the AOR Have Quick frequency and then has SATCOM.

66Q: You listed those frequencies and you said that is who the Duke monitors?

66A: Yes, sir.

67Q: And you listed clear AOR frequency?

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67A: It's the Duke clear frequency. Then the AOR frequency is the Have Quick.

68Q: So, a point of clarification, the clear tactical AOR frequency is not monitored?

68A: That is correct. It is not monitored.

69Q: Back to your Mad Dog position, do you ever receive flight plan information? You alluded to the fact that the Eagle Flight sometimes leaves Zakhu for flight plans within the AOR, do you ever receive flight plans information on that movement?

69A: Not normally, no, sir.

70Q: Do you ever receive that information airborne as the Duke?

70A: Not normally, no, sir.

Questions by Major General Andrus.

71Q: Did you receive that information on the 14th of April?

71A: We received a call in the morning from the Joint Operations Center that a UN helicopter flight was going to be airborne, but it was in the southern part of the AOR and they were going to be down before our AOR time even started. That information was passed, but we were unaware of the specific flight plan from Eagle Flight.

72Q: Were you aware that Eagle Flight was or was not going to be in AOR on the 14th of April?

72A: Sir, we were aware that they were going to be in the AOR. We were unaware of their specific flight profile.

73Q: Were you aware that Eagle Flight was going to be in the AOR and flying in the AOR before the first fighters arrived?

73A: We did not have their take-off time, no, sir.

Questions continuing by Colonel Fain.

74Q: In an unclassified sense, are you familiar with the Operation Provide Comfort rules of engagement?

74A: Yes, sir, I am.

75Q: Can you tell me what directives govern those rules of engagement?

75A: The air controller governs them. The rules of engagement is written in the EUCOM message that outlines those. Then we have further clarification in the Mad Dog book on the rules of engagement.

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76Q: The information in the Mad Dog book, do you know the source of that documentation?

76A: Yes, sir. It basically all emanates from the direction of the EUCOM message, but the source is written here by the CTF DO and the CFAC CC of the CTF CC.

77Q: You reference a EUCOM message, can you be more descriptive as to the nature of that message?

77A: It's -- I'm not sure what the date/time group is, but it's a message that specifically talks about the ROE in the AOR how we were supposed to act and what our reactions should be to any incursions across the border or in the AOR.

78Q: Who has the authority to authorize the expenditure of offensive weapons or defensive weapons in the AOR?

78A: It depends on the situation, sir, and what specific rule of engagement applies to that specific situation.

79Q: Let me provide you with a couple of scenarios. A track emanating from south of the 36 degree line north bound in the AOR.

79A: Then the pilot can -- in the aircraft that is primary defensive counter air that day -- has the authority to expend ordnance against that track.

80Q: And he has that authority based on what directives?

80A: Based on the ROE as written in the EUCOM message and is further expanded in local directives.

81Q: Are there cases where anyone on board the AWACS could authorize expenditure of weapons?

81A: The Duke could authorize expenditure of weapons depending on the scenario.

82Q: Could you describe the circumstances where you might expect that authorization to occur?

82A: Coalition forces under attack and without getting into the ROE with specific if there is a clear cut case that violates the ROE then we are clear to do that. But, in most cases we would call back.

83Q: We will pursue this further a little later. Now, turning your attention to the events on the day of 14 April; were you on duty on 14 April?

83A: Yes, sir. I was the mission director on the ground the morning of 14 April.

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84Q: Can you tell me what time you arrived at work with respect to the first flight activities?

84A: Yes, sir. I'm not exactly sure when the AWACS took off that morning or a specific time but I was there. An hour prior to the take-off that particular morning and the day unfolded pretty much as everyday. As I said before, I was in communication with AWACS. We got notification of a UN helicopter flight in the AOR that morning which we passed. The rest of the morning passed fairly uneventfully. The schedule went pretty much as fraged until, obviously, around 1030 local which is about the time that we were just getting into the AOR. AWACS and the aircraft had been launched and they were all proceeding out to the AOR.

85Q: First let's talk about the UN helicopter. What type of information were you passed about that flight?

85A: Take-off time, landing time, how long they would be in the AOR and basically where they would be.

86Q: Do you recall what time they said in that communication that they would depart the AOR?

86A: 0555Z sticks in my mind, but I cannot be positive of that because we normally don't track that information.

87Q: From whom did you receive this information?

87A: I received it from the Intel itself -- intelligence cell -- which is right behind me.

88Q: To whom did you pass the information?

88A: I passed it to the AWACS when they came up SATCOM.

89Q: Who on the AWACS, do you recall?

89A: I thought I passed it to Duke, but I asked him and he doesn't recall. I may have passed it to Cougar which is the mission director, I'm sorry, the mission commander on board the AWACS for the AWACS crew.

90Q: Do you consider the Eagle Flights to be UN flights?

90A: It depends on what their mission is, sometimes they would be considered UN flights and sometimes they would not.

91Q: Would you expect to be told if they were UN flights?

91A: Yes, I would. Yes, sir.

92Q: Would you expect to see that information in the air tasking order?

92A: Specifically as a UN flight? I have never seen it in there before, you know, specifically designated as a UN flight in the air tasking order.

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93Q: Did you talk face to face, or on land line, with any of the aircrews prior to the launch?

93A: The Eagle air crews --

94Q: The Operation Provide Comfort aircrews?

94A: Yes, sir. I don't know which ones I talked to because I normally talk to quite a few, but, yes, I did.

95Q: Did you talk to any of the AWACS crew members or to Duke?

95A: Not before they stepped to the jet, no, sir.

96Q: Were there any complicating or extenuating circumstances associated with the early morning portions of this mission?

96A: No more than normal, sir.

97Q: Did you make your routine call to Zakhu on that morning?

97A: Yes, sir, I did.

98Q: Could you tell me the discussions from that conversation as you recall them?

98A: Yes, sir. I passed him the word of the day for the Have Quick radio, and I may have asked him about the weather but it wasn't supposed to be a bad weather day so I cannot be sure of that.

99Q: Did they provide you with any information during that conversation regarding the Eagle Flights?

99A: No, sir.

100Q: Did you have communication with the JOC that morning?

100A: Several times, yes, sir.

101Q: Did any of that conversation involve the presence or take-off times of the Eagle Flights?

101A: No, sir.

102Q: What was your awareness of the Eagle Flights -- and I believe you have probably covered a lot of that already -- on that particular mission?

102A: Other than the fact they were in the ATO and we knew that they were going to be airborne that day at some time, that was about it.

103Q: Would you consider being passed a take-off time -- whether you were as the Mad Dog or the Duke -- for the Eagle Flight change to the ATO?

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103A: Since they are always in the ATO "as required" I wouldn't consider it a change, I would consider it information that we would basically pass to the AWACS crew so that they could monitor it.

104Q: And you would only pass that information to the AWACS crew?

104A: Normally, yes, sir. We have passed it to the AOR if we thought it was going to be a problem -- we have done that in the past -- and said, "Oh, by the way there is going to be helicopters out there flying below you."

105Q: What would you consider to be a problem with their presence?

105A: Because, obviously, any aircraft in the AOR is liable to be engaged and we would want to make sure that they knew about friendlies in the area -- about all the aircrafts in the AOR -- so that they wouldn't run on them unnecessarily. It also goes for the UN missions and the higher headquarters missions that we can discuss later.

106Q: What knowledge do you have regarding requirements that must be met before the Eagle Flight can enter the AOR?

106A: Sir, according to the ACO they have to squawk. They have to be on frequency. They have to follow the procedures in the ACO and the air tasking order, which says they have to enter at a certain point, at a certain altitude, and then they are cleared to do their mission after that. They have to be squawking and listening to the proper frequency in the AOR.

107Q: Are there requirements for them to talk to anybody to enter the AOR or while in the AOR?

107A: They are supposed to be in continuous communication like everybody else with AWACS crew, however, like I said previously, it's very tough to maintain communication with the Eagle Flights based on their low flying. Normally, they can talk to them as they enter.

108Q: Is there a requirement for AWACS radar coverage to be available before they enter the AOR?

108A: Yes, sir. Like any other flight we would have to have radar. There are certain things that the AWACS have to have before they enter the AOR.

109Q: Is there a requirement for a fighter presence prior to Eagle Flights entering the AOR?

109A: There is a requirement to have the area swept by fighter aircraft to be sure there is nobody there that would present a danger prior to any Provide Comfort aircraft entering the AOR.

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110Q: Are you aware of any circumstances in which that requirement has not been met?

110A: I think the -- because Zakhu gets its supply from Diyarbakir those are termed administrative flights and those flights do not come under the preview of having the area to be swept prior to those guys entering. So, there are a lot of times when they fly to Zakhu to resupply those folks down there, and we may not even be there.

111Q: Do you recall how on the air tasking order on the 14th the Eagle Flights were listed?

111A: Yes, sir. They were listed like everybody else with "as required" take-off time.

112Q: Was their mission listed?

112A: No, sir. I don't recall what their mission said to be honest.

113Q: On the morning, to recap, on the morning of 14th April, were you ever provided prior to the incident any information regarding Eagle Flight?

113A: No, sir, not that I'm aware of. I want to try to make sure that I don't confuse this with the information that I got afterwards, because we got all that information, obviously, after the incident is kind of rubbed together.

114Q: Your communications with the JOC, you did not receive information, is that correct?

114A: I do not recall receiving any information on any Eagle Flight, if they were going to go past Zakhu or not that morning or what their specific mission was that morning.

115Q: With regard to your communications with Duke once airborne, what was the last time that you had communication with Duke prior to your knowledge of the mishap?

115A: There was a significant amount of time prior to the mishap. I'll say greater than 30 minutes. Certainly, we talked to each other once an hour even if there was nothing going on, just because that is the way it works out. But, I had not spoken with him in a significant amount of time prior to the incident.

116Q: Would you consider the communications that you had a significant amount of time prior to be routine?

116A: Yes, sir. That's the time when we have launched the fleet, the day is unfolding as it should and everybody is on their way out to the area of operations, and there is really not anything to communicate if there are no changes. So, it takes about an hour and fifteen minutes to get from here to there in the area and set up. So, if there is any weather or any problems out there it takes a little over an hour to realize that.

117Q: What was the first instance of communication you had with Duke after the incident which occurred at approximately 0730Z?

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117A: He made a radio call to me and said, "We have just shot down two Hind helicopters." and he gave me the coordinates.

118Q: Prior to that call you had no knowledge of an engagement in progress?

118A: There were no calls made, no, sir.

119Q: Could you describe the ensuing communications with Duke over the next few minutes?

119A: I called him back and asked him to confirm the information that he had just given me. I then called Colonel Dougherty who was the acting CFAC DO that morning. He told me that he was going to go by his house to get something, and that he would be at that number for a few minutes. His wife told me that he could not come to the phone at that particular time, and I told her that I needed to communicate with him quickly, very quickly without telling her what had happened, and if he could call me back. He called me back approximately two minutes later, and I asked him to come into the command post which he did. Then I started the process of notifying the appropriate people when something like this happens, and at that time we were under the impression that it was an engagement to two enemy aircraft, so I was making notification based on that to the JOC and with the chain of command.

120Q: During these communications that we are discussing immediately after the incident, were you aware of the presence of Eagle Flight in the AOR?

120A: We knew that Eagle Flights would be in the AOR that day. We did not know that they were already there or that they were actually there before anybody else got there which is highly unusual. So, no, sir, at that particular time we were not aware that Eagle Flight was in there. However, Eagle Flight had checked in with AWACS that morning. They had talked to them at some point.

121Q: Were you aware of that fact during the mishap sequence?

121A: No, sir, not until afterwards when we started asking questions.

Questions by Major General Andrus.

122Q: If Eagle Flight would have been cleared into the AOR before F-15s entered to sanitize the area, who would that clearance have been passed to?

122A: It should have been passed -- well, AWACS should have known it, and as a result Duke should have known it and as a result the F-15s may or may not have known it, depending on where they were going and what was happening in the AOR at the time.

123Q: You say that Duke should have known it, how would Duke have received that information?

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123A: He would have gotten that information off of his scope, because normally AWACS puts Eagle Flights -- everybody who flies in the AOR is in the scope. So, they have a call sign and we use the first and last letter, plus their call sign; it's on the scope. Now, if they have landed at Zakhu or they are on ground, they normally put the call sign off to the side or if somebody is air refueling we put their call sign off to the side.

124Q: Again, in order for them to have been authorized to fly into the area before the F-15s they would have received that authorization from someone, who would have given that authorization?

124A: Sir, if they were going to Zakhu only they probably wouldn't have received authorization from anybody.

125Q: But, if they were going from Zakhu to some place else, who would have been required to have authorized that? Do you know?

125A: A specific authorization, sir, would normally not be required. They would normally talk to AWACS but they are on the ATO and we expect them to be there executing their frag mission as in the ATO. So, they would not call up and say, "Can I come into the area?" because we expect them to be there. We just don't know their take-off time.

Questions continuing by Colonel Fain.

126Q: If there were a mission that you were aware of and they were to launch from Zakhu to do that mission, what type of radio call would you expect them to make?

126A: I would expect them to try to contact AWACS and say, "This is Eagle Flight and we are airborne as fragged." which is what everybody else says.

127Q: What frequency would you expect them to make that call on?

127A: UHF AOR frequency clear.

Questions by Major General Andrus.

128Q: The ACO strictly prohibits flight in the AOR before the F-15 --

128A: Yes, sir, that's true.

129Q: Before the F-15 sweep. So, in order for them to fly in the AOR, before the F-15 sweep, would they not require authorization --

129A: Yes, sir. They would normally have to do that, and they would normally have to call back and get that from the command structure.

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130Q: Assuming that they received authorization from the command structure, how would that authorization be passed up the chain so that the AWACS and the fighters would be aware of it?

130A: We would normally be notified by the Joint Operations Center that Eagle Flight is going to be in the AOR prior to the AOR vulnerability window and here is the time that they are going to be in there.

131Q: So, to clarify that, the command structure would notify the Joint Operations Center, the Joint Operations Center would notify Mad Dog --

131A: Yes, sir.

132Q: Mad Dog would notify the Duke and the AWACS would then notify F-15?

132A: Yes, sir. Well, whoever made the decision that they were clear to fly in the AOR, yes, sir, that's the sequence of events.

133Q: Did you receive any information of that kind?

133A: No, sir.

Questions continuing by Colonel Fain.

134Q: During the 30 minutes prior to the incident, were you present at your duty station?

134A: Yes, sir.

135Q: When did you first begin to suspect or have knowledge of a problem associated with shootdown?

135A: As soon as Colonel Dougherty got there that was the first thing that he said was just confirm we got Eagle Flight and where they are supposed to be at.

136Q: Do you know what prompted that question?

136A: No, sir. I can only assume it was from the ATO.

137Q: Continue with your discussion of your knowledge or suspicion that there was a problem.

137A: So, I immediately talked to Duke and said, "Confirm you have a valid track on Eagle Flight and where they are." We expected them to be at Zakhu or in that part of the area up to the northwestern part of the area. They tried to confirm their whereabouts but they could not. In fact, we did that for like three and a half hours trying to find Eagle Flight and where they were.

138Q: "They" refers to who?

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138A: The AWACS. They had a track on them at one particular time. They had a squawk. In fact, at some point they came back and said, "We have a valid squawk on Eagle Flight and they are in the northwestern part of the area" which made us feel good.

139Q: During this time frame the picture that was available onboard the AWACS, was that picture transmitted or available in the command post or command structure?

139A: It is not the picture that is available in the AWACS; it's something less than that. You can track aircraft that are clearly squawking, that are at a fairly high altitude and that is all we get. You cannot ascertain who they are and what they are doing. They just come up as a little symbol, a little green symbol with a dash in front of it, and you know that it's an airborne aircraft who is squawking. That is all we get.

140Q: Do you have the capability to change or alter that function or make interrogations?

140A: No, sir. We can only call up and ask them "Why isn't there a picture?"

141Q: Did you receive communications from Duke after the incident to indicate that he was beginning to suspect a problem?

141A: No, sir. As a matter of fact, it was a long time before they realized that there was a problem. As time went on we became more and more concerned about Eagle Flight and our inability to find them. They were convinced that two Hind helicopters had been shot down.

142Q: And reconfirm for me during the period prior to the incident, you were not aware of an engagement in progress?

142A: No, sir. As a matter of fact, we had no knowledge at all. The first radio call was "We've shot down two Hind helicopters."

Questions by Colonel At Lee.

143Q: You said on the 14th of April when you came in you ran your checklist, checked the radios and weather; were there any anomalies, anything malfunctioning?

143A: No, sir.

144Q: You described the time period that it takes for AWACS to come up to speed to be able to perform its mission; at what point along that time line does AWACS become operationally responsible for the AOR?

144A: Once they are operational normal they head down track and they go into their orbit in ROZ 1, which is the restricted operating zone north of the Iraqi border. Once they get into that orbit they are operationally responsible for the AOR picture.

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145Q: Do they have responsibility while they are along the track after they have called "Ops normal" before they get to the orbit?

145A: They are responsible, basically, for as far as they can see to clear their flight path, and to do that for the fighters; to provide advisory control for the fighters enroute to the AOR prior to getting there.

146Q: Once they declare ops normal, if they receive information such as a radio call of someone entering the AOR or detect information on the radar screen affecting AOR aircraft, do they have any responsibility or obligation to deal with that information?

146A: Yes, sir, they do. I think this is an opportunity to stress that the role of AWACS out there is advisory, they are not directive as a matter of fact, the fighters in the AOR direct their own CAPS and AWACS provides what is called tactical control. We can't confuse tactical control with meaning that AWACS is anyway directive. They provide advisories on the threat. They provide advisories on traffic for deconfliction, and advisories for weather which are mostly provided by the Duke.

147Q: Understanding that, what is this distinction then in this advisory role that they have between declaration of ops normal and being in the orbit? Is there any difference between those two situations?

147A: They normally make an on station call when they get to their orbit and say, "We are on station ready to begin operations for the day." Because prior to getting there you can't really see the whole area of operations south of the Iraqi border.

148Q: I will give you a hypothetical. If while they were enroute to the orbit but had declared ops normal, to receive information about an aircraft updating the information that they had, would you expect them to record that information and to act on that information?

148A: Yes, sir. Normally, they would do that. Any aircraft that is flying out there, they normally pass information whether it is a Turkish aircraft, an Iranian airliner, if it impacts operations they pass it -- if it is one of our own aircraft, they normally pass it.

149Q: You referred to JTIDS, is it correct that is the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System?

149A: Yes, sir.

150Q: I may have misheard you, but would you clarify when you referred to Colonel Dougherty and Colonel Richardson which individual is the CFAC DO and which individual is the Assistant DO?

150A: Colonel Richardson is the CFAC DO and Colonel Dougherty is the Assistant DO.

151Q: The Assistant CFAC DO?

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151A: Yes, sir.

Questions by Colonel Fain.

152Q: Is it unusual for Assistant CFAC DO to perform the CFAC DO responsibilities?

152A: No, sir. They are, basically, interchangeable.

153Q: Was that the case on the 14th of April?

153A: Yes, sir.

154Q: Do you know the location and duties of the person identified as the CFAC DO on that morning?

154A: I can't remember, sir. He may have been flying. We didn't pay any attention to it. When they come in in the morning, we contact one or the other, and he will normally say I'm going to be on duty today and give me where he is going to be located and how to contact him if he is going to be moving around.

Questions by Colonel At Lee.

155Q: You referred to ROLEXing, and you described it as slipping at half hour intervals to the right, that means slipping one half hour for all flights?

155A: Yes, sir. Later in the day, yes.

156Q: You indicated that your communications to Duke are sometimes on HF radio and that it doesn't work that well, were you referring to equipment problems or the character of HF transmission?

156A: The character of HF transmission, sir. The equipment works fairly well, it's just because of the distance involved and atmosphere conditions it's very hard to communicate over HF.

157Q: Were you aware of any HF or SATCOM communication problems that would have interfered with Comm to Duke on the morning of 14th April?

157A: No, sir.

158Q: You referenced "bandit calls", does that refer to a hostile aircraft or an unknown aircraft?

158A: It refers to an unknown aircraft mostly, sir. There is a hostile aircraft out there that is referred to as "hostile" which means that we have to engage it as under the ROE.

159Q: When you were describing the duties of the Mad Dog and the Duke I understood you to describe your duties as being related to ground activity and passing information to Duke for air activity, is there any significance to a 50 mile radius of Incirlik Air Base

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159A: As far as the Mad Dog is concerned not really. The supervisor of flying is responsible for aircraft within the 50 mile circle, which is a local flying restriction. We normally support the SOF in the execution of his duties for communication because we have a direct link to the maintenance folks and hence all the stuff that goes on down on the ground on the airfield, if a barrier is needed or an aircraft tow is needed we can fix that much quicker than the supervisor of flying can, so we normally support him in his duties, but we are responsible for ground activity.

160Q: Just very generally, what are the duties of the supervisor of flying?

160A: He is responsible for ensuring that the flight operations within the 50 mile circle are conducted safely. He makes weather calls on the alternate for the day, if one is required. If an aircraft emergency takes place, he acts in an advisory capacity to the pilot in the aircraft to make sure he can back him up on the checklist and ensure that he needs everything he has got to land the aircraft safely as far as barriers, emergency vehicles and things like that.

161Q: Does he have any role within the AOR?

161A: No, sir, not at all.

162Q: You were asked the scope of duration of your responsibilities in time and you indicated when you walk in the door until the last aircraft lands. You earlier indicated that there was a split shift arrangement with a Mad Dog beginning at noon time; does the morning Mad Dog then become relieved of responsibility at the time the second shift Mad Dog comes in?

162A: Yes, sir.

163Q: You indicated that there had been occasion when you had received information about a helicopter in the AOR and that it was an unusual occasion; was there more than one occasion other than the UN flight that you described?

163A: I don't remember, sir. Basically, the rule of thumb that we use is if there is unusual activity that we are not used to, that we pass that information. There could have been other times, but not very many.

164Q: You referred to an E3, that's the aircraft which flies the AWACS mission; is that correct?

164A: Yes, sir.

165Q: Can you give a sense of the ordinary range of a UHF radio on a tactical aircraft?

165A: It depends, sir. It depends on what kind of aircraft it is and the power behind it, weather conditions and where they are flying. Normally, the best that you can expect out

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of a UHF radio air-to-air is probably 150 to 200 miles and that's stretching it; sometimes that range goes down if you get in a mountainous terrain to down to 20 miles -- it just depends.

166Q: You referred to information on a UN flight on the 14th of April earlier in the day, did you have any information that that flight would or would not be an Eagle Flight?

166A: No, sir. They did not refer to it as an Eagle Flight.

167Q: But, it could have been or not been based on the information that you received?

167A: Based on the information I received, it could have been. They didn't refer to it like that. The take-off time was such that and the area that they would be operating in was such that I did not think it would be, because it was in the extreme southern portion and they were supposed to be out of the area well before we got there.

168Q: When you refer to an Eagle Flight, are you referring to a flight from a specific unit?

168A: Yes, sir, out of Diyarbakir -- the UH-60s that are stationed up at Diyarbakir that supports Zakhu.

169Q: You talked about the morning of the 14th when you came on duty you indicated that there were no more problems than normal, were there any problems which affected your ability to perform your duties?

169A: None, sir.

170Q: Were you aware of any problems that affected the ability of anyone else to perform their duties?

170A: Not that I'm aware of.

171Q: You made reference to "word of the day", can you very generally describe what that means?

171A: To make the Have Quick work it needs a word of the day. In other words, the frequencies that set how the radio hops around.

172Q: You were talking about if you were to receive information regarding an Eagle Flight take-off time you said you wouldn't consider it a change; you would consider it pertinent and pass that information?

172A: No, sir, I didn't say I wouldn't consider it pertinent. I said I wouldn't consider it unusual to receive that information. I wouldn't consider it a change to the ATO to receive that.

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173Q: I understood you to say that you did consider it pertinent and you would pass it?

173A: Yes, sir.

174Q: My question is, you said you would pass it to the AWACS crew, would you pass it to Duke or would you pass it to someone else?


174A: Actually, sir, I would pass it to Duke because he would be the one that I would communicate with.

COL FAIN: I think at this point we would like to take a break and reconvene in say 10 minutes.

(The AFR 110-14 board recessed at 1140 hours on 25 April 1994.)

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I certify that the above sworn interview statement, given by CONTROL WITNESS 34 to the Air Accident Investigation Board was recorded by me by stenomask and that the foregoing transcript is a true, accurate, and verbatim account of that statement.



BARBARA BRIGMAN, DAFC
Court Reporter
Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

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V-075

V-076

TAB V-076A

V-076A

CONTROL WITNESS 34

(The interview reconvened at 1216 hours, 25 April 1994. Staff Sergeant Charles has replaced the previous court reporter in this interview.)

COL AT LEE: The time is 1216 on the 25th of April 1994. All persons who were present when we recessed are once again present.

EXAMINATION

175Q: Continuing some clarification questions at this point. If the ATO reflects that there are Eagle Flights scheduled for the day, but indicates "as required" for the timing of the flight, is there any responsibility or requirement for the Mad Dog or the Duke to inquire further into those flights?

175A: There have not been prior to this. Normally, what would happen on a particular day would be the Eagle Flights would be listed there, and they would take off -- while we were in the AOR, we would watch them take off. We would try to follow them to the gate, and then to Zakhu; and if they flew around in the AOR, we would try to follow them as much as we could in the AOR and then provide advisories to the airborne fighters -- you know, if they went down to search for that. But we've been under a 10,000 foot restriction for quite a long time, so we have not run into the problem with them locking up low flying helicopters; and if they do, then we just tell them it's an Eagle Flight.

Questions by COL Fain:

176Q: I'd like to pursue that line of questions for a moment. You said that you've been under a 10,000 foot restriction in the AOR. When did that restriction go into effect approximately?

176A: Sir, I'm not sure when it went into effect. It was in effect when I got here, and I'm not positive how long it's been in effect.

177Q: When did that restriction become deleted?

177A: Just -- probably a few days before the incident, about -- probably a week I guess.

178Q: Have missions been flown in the low flying areas in that week by aircraft under control of AWACS?

178A: Yes, sir, they had.

179Q: Does that information come out on the frag, when aircraft are scheduled into the low fly areas?

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179A: Yes, sir. You will not go into the low fly areas unless you are scheduled, and it will be on the frag. And that's how you're supposed to execute your mission.

180Q: What is a deconfliction plan for aircraft flying within the low altitude structure?

180A: First of all, you're scheduled for a specific time, and you won't go down there unless you are scheduled for your time. So there should be no fighter conflict in the AOR, in the low altitude fly area; and if there is, you know, we would deconflict that before we'd let anybody in there.

181Q: How would the fighters deconflict from the Eagle Flight traffic if they were operating to the east of Zakhu?

181A: The helicopters, per the ACO, are not supposed to go above 400 feet, and that would deconflict them in altitude right there because the fighters are not supposed to go below a certain altitude, depending on what it is in the ATO, and sometimes it changes. It could be 4500 feet, it could be 1000 feet. It depends on what their mission is, but in no case would they be able to descend to a level below 400 feet ATO.

182Q: In the period before the 10,000 foot restriction was lifted, would it be unusual for an airborne fighter with an air intercept radar to detect low altitude traffic?

182A: No, sir. That's their best part of the job, and we have called out low altitude traffic to them before. There have been instances where they had said, "I've got an helicopter on the radar," and we say, "Well, it's an Eagle," because we know that it was him.

183Q: And how would you know that it's an Eagle Flight?

183A: Because if we're in the AOR, we -- Prior to an Eagle Flight coming into the AOR, as I said, he had to climb up to a fairly high altitude to get in there. And at some point in there, he talks to us and he's squawking, and so we're able to mostly follow him if that takes place.

184Q: As the Duke, do you ever recall hearing calls from the Eagle Flights when they took off out of Zakhu, to go east of Zakhu, report any type of destination, route, or flight, or other flight following information?

184A: No, sir. And since I don't listen to that frequency normally, I wouldn't hear that. They may have passed that to the AWACS controller who, if it became a problem, could pass it to the Duke. But, no, sir, I've never run into that. I have before called out traffic to an airborne fighter that they had locked up a friendly aircraft.

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185Q: To clarify the question on the 10,000 foot altitude restriction. If at any time AWACS or a fighter would have detected an unknown track below 10,000 feet, while that restriction was in effect, would they still have been allowed to effect an intercept and go below that 10,000 feet in order to properly identify the radar contact?

185A: Yes, sir. But in that case, they probably would have asked for clearance to do that. And depending on what the situation was, we probably would have -- As a Duke, I probably would have said -- cleared them down there to go look at it. But these 10,000 foot restrictions were fairly serious, they -- even when we had suspected movement of troops, and things like that; and stuff that we would want to know about, where I would normally assume that they would delete the 10,000 foot restriction to make sure we got good pictures, they wouldn't do it. So it's not a light restriction. In other words, the Dukes and the Mad Dogs do not take it as a light restriction.

186Q: So that would be a conscious decision to allow someone to go below the 10,000 foot altitude. Is that correct?

186A: Yes, sir.

187Q: With regards to the Duke flight -- or the -- I'm sorry, the Eagle Flights to the east of Zakhu, there's an area defined as a security zone. Were all of those flights, that you're aware of, conducted within the security zone?

187A: For the most part, yes, sir. They have a -- in the back of the -- They have routes of flight that are published that we have in our book, and they're supposed to go directly between points. In other words, they'll tell us they're going between whiskey and lima, or whiskey and oscar, something like that. And we assume that they're going to go in a direct line, so that's how we figure where they're going.

188Q: Have you observed those activities, the flights, when you knew the destinations they were departing and going to?

188A: No, sir. I mean, I've observed the flights, but I never knew exactly what their destination is. Sometimes they have destinations other than what's in their route of flight, and they have no way of passing that to us in the clear on the radio because they want to be tactical, so they'll tell us something like, "I'm going from Whiskey to Lima," but they'll really be going up north some place else.

189Q: You said that you did not monitor the clear AOR frequency; therefore, you would not hear the initial contact when it departed Zakhu. Who would you expect to be responsible for monitoring those transmissions and flight following the Eagle Flight within the AOR?

189A: The AOR controller normally has the clear UHF AOR "freq," the Have Quick AOR "freq," and couple other frequencies.

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190Q: Have you ever had instances where the AOR controller passed to you route or flight information for the Eagle Flights?

190A: Not that I remember, sir. I remember discussing Eagle Flights with the AOR controller. If something comes up, I've had them talk to me and say they're going to do this, or -- you know, this is an Eagle Flight, so that I know. But I can't remember specific instances.

191Q: Have you ever had route of flight information available to you as a Duke prior to boarding the aircraft?

191A: No, sir.

192Q: Even with UN flights?

192A: No, sir. Normally, that's passed once we're airborne.

193Q: Could you describe the sequence of events, beginning with a fighter call of an unidentified track at low altitude, slow mover helicopter type that eventually is determined to be friendly -- how that determination will be made, who would pass what information, the sequence of events associated with that.

193A: What should happen is the fighter should say I have a contact or a bandit. We refer -- it's kind of interchangeable. If it's an unknown aircraft that-- he'd pass "angels" altitude, and where he is specifically; and if he knows what he is, he'll tell us that. If he says it's an unknown aircraft of unknown origin, then he'll pass that information. And if we can help him out with identification as far as -- because we might know something that he doesn't, or know who that aircraft is, like it's an Eagle Flight, then we'll tell him that. He would pass that to the AOR controller on Have Quick frequency. I listen to that frequency as the Duke, so I would be involved in that decision making process. I don't talk on that frequency, but I would pass that to the weapons controller, and he would pass it to them. If it was a situation that's time critical, then I would get on the radio and say something to them. But, normally, that exchange would take place between AWACS and the fighters. They would go through all the identification assets available to them in the cockpit, and then they would tell us what they found, whether he's got a friendly squawk, a bad guy squawk, any other modes of identification that's available to him. And then -- then we would make the determination if we didn't already know what he was supposed to do with that, as far as going down to investigate or what.

194Q: What would be your actions if the call is made, there's no apparent presentation on your screen, but you knew that an Eagle Flight had been in the vicinity?

194A: Sir, if they basically gave me unidentified aircraft call, I would ask them to go investigate, as the Duke.

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195Q: And what would convince you of the identification of that track, what items would identify it for you?

195A: Hopefully, they would have got some kind of electronic ID prior to getting within visual range to try to confirm -- you know, eliminate possibilities as they went in there with their radar. But the last thing is visual identification. That would be the thing that would tell me -- now give me the information I need to make a decision.

196Q: And with a visual identification, with -- note by the pilot involved, with no other indications of any type, what would your decision be?

196A: I'm not necessarily involved in that decision. Once the pilot makes a visual identification, he has the authority under the ROE to go down his decision tree.

197Q: Under what circumstances would you then question, challenge, or veto that decision, based on information available to you?

197A: If I knew that there was a conflict, if I knew that there might be some reason for him to mis-ID, or -- you know, he indicates to me over the radio that maybe he wasn't sure what it was; otherwise, it's in the cockpit. The decision is made in the cockpit on that instance.

COL FAIN: Clarifications.

Questions by General Andrus:

198Q: Excuse me. Does the -- As a Duke, do you have access to a radar console on the AWACS?

198A: Yes, sir. We sit in front of a console. In fact, we have to go through a certain amount of training to learn how to work the console to -- obviously, not to the skill level of the AWACS controllers, but to bring up information that we use in our daily duties.

199Q: If you saw a brown return on the radar scope, what would that indicate to you?

199A: A brown return ----

200Q: --- If you saw a brown marking appear on the radar scope.

200A: We normally code them -- I would be unsure of what it was, probably. If it's not red -- You know, they color code "bad guys" red. If it's one of our guys, they would color code it brown, or something like that.

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201Q: Prior to symbology being placed over a radar contact, do you know what color that radar contact would appear on the scope?

201A: Normally, the way I set up my scope is that I -- I have an IFF indication and a radar indication, so it would come up as a green paint for radar, and then there's a yellow kind of -- I guess you'd call it brown paint for an IFF indication. And those two things are super-imposed on one another on the scope, and then the AWACS controller controls the placement of symbology. I have no control over that.

202Q: If you saw an IFF paint at the location where fighters were indicating a radar contact, what action would you take?

202A: It would indicate to me that that IFF paint was a friendly IFF paint, or at least there's something down there that we might not know about it, but it's at least an indication that there's somebody flying around down there.

203Q: With that IFF paint appearing on your radar scope, would you as the Duke take any action to determine what that IFF was?

203A: I would ask the weapons controller to do that. That's ----

204Q: And with an IFF paint appearing at a location where the fighter is indicating that they had a contact at a location that they were making an intercept, would you be required to give any guidance to those fighters?

204A: Ah-hh.

205Q: --- Either to knock it off or to continue?

205A: It depends on the situation, sir. The best confirmation that we have -- or the bottom line is eyeballs, and all this electronics stuff is great, but more often than not, it doesn't work as well as we'd like it to. And I would probably go with -- ask them to go investigate, and ask them what it was.

206Q: If you had a positive IFF return on an airborne aircraft, would that raise any doubt in your mind as to whether or not that airborne aircraft was hostile?

206A: I would certainly want them to investigate it and get close enough to be able to tell me what that aircraft was because an IFF paint would not come up on a bad guy.

207Q: And if the IFF paint had a positive code, and the fighters call that as hostile aircraft, what action would you take?

207A: I'd ask them to reconfirm and go look at the aircraft again because flying in a fighter at 450 knots, passing over helicopters at 450 knots -- passing over helicopters at 130 knots, it's a

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physical limitation on your eyeball that you cannot assimilate a lot of information, so I would ask them to make several passes.

208Q: And if they positively identify the aircraft as a Hind helicopter, and you had showing a positive IFF mode -- code, what action would you take as the Duke?

208A: Friendly or bad, sir? A friendly IFF?

209Q: Positive IFF, friendly code.

209A: Sir, I'd ask them to monitor the flight to see where they're going. There should be no case where the positive friendly IFF code came up off a bad guy. It would put a question in my mind as to what was going on.

Questions by COL At Lee:

210Q: What information would you pass to the pilots, the fighter pilots, under those circumstances? Positive, friendly code on the scope. You said you would ask them to investigate further, or ask them to monitor the flight. What information would you pass to them?

210A: I'd tell them that we were getting a friendly squawk out of it, and they needed to ensure that that was a hostile.

211Q: Would you expect anyone else onboard the AWACS aircraft to make that radio call or provide additional information?

211A: I'd tell them we were getting a friendly squawking out of it, and they needed to ensure that that was a hostile.

212Q: Would you expect anyone else onboard the AWACS aircraft to make that radio call or provide additional information?

212A: Well, if -- At the point -- They wouldn't be talking to me at this point anyway. They would probably be talking to the weapons controllers, and the Duke would have to interject in there, and basically take control from the weapons controllers which we don't like to do because we're responsible for traffic separation, we're responsible for control. And that's not our job, and we're not trained to do that, so everybody is reluctant to get on that frequency. In the case of a shoot down, obviously, that's an important -- that's a -- that would be reason enough for me to jump on the radio and start asking questions. So initially, they would have been talking to the AWACS controllers, and then I would have definitely -- probably gotten on the radio in that case, and give him more direction if I thought direction was required.

213Q: You talked about receiving information regarding Eagle Flights in your Mad Dog capacity?

213A: Yes, sir.

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214Q: If you did receive such information, would you enter that into the Mad Dog log, significant events file?

214A: Significant events that happened to the Eagle Flights, or just pass information like takeoff time, and stuff?

215Q: You're the Mad Dog, information comes into you -- here's a takeoff time, or any information about an Eagle which hadn't previously been available to you. You had indicated, I believe, that you'd pass it on to the Duke. Would you record that information in the log?

215A: Not normally, sir.

216Q: And why not?

216A: As I said, the frag -- you know, we don't normally pick up times for any of the fighters that take off from here. If they're different from what they are, we don't normally enter them in the log because that's tracked by the maintenance controllers, and it's also tracked -- the Eagle Flights tracks their own, like if they're not taking off on time, or they haven't made -- they do that themselves. We would just write the information down on a piece of paper. Normally, we start out with a legal pad like you have there, and we just write things down, information down. At the end of the day, it gets thrown away normally.

217Q: In this case of the UN flight earlier on the 14th of April, as you passed the information to AWACS, did you report that in the log?

217A: No, sir. I wrote it down on one of those sticky yellow pads, and I threw it away probably 30 minutes after I wrote it down.

218Q: You indicated earlier that you passed it to AWACS. You thought it was to Duke, but he told you subsequently he didn't recall receiving it. Do you have any recollection of who it was if it was not Duke?

218A: No, sir, I don't. It would either have to be Duke or the MCC, the mission control that ----

219Q: Do you recall specifically what you said when you passed that information about the UN flight?

219A: I passed the flight, the takeoff time, the AOR time, and the coordinates they would be working in.

220Q: Do you recall what time you passed that information?

220A: It was fairly early in the morning after I'd gotten there because I got that -- but it was after AWACS had taken off. I'm not sure what their takeoff time was, so -- but it was well before

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0730Z because I had time to write it down, leave it there for awhile, pass it to them, and then throw it in the trash. And, sir, it's not really true that the only person that could have answered me would have been the MCC. It could have been anybody on AWACS that's listening to the SATCOM radio and -- because they just identify themselves as Cougar, and unless I have voice recognition, I'm not sure who it could be; so I couldn't really say that for sure it would have been the MCC. It could have been any of those guys that listen to SATCOM radio.

221Q: If someone were to answer your call, would you expect it to be someone acting in the position either of Duke or the MCC at the time the call is being made?

221A: I would expect that; yes, sir. Most of the time that's what happens. If the Duke is on another frequency -- because he listens to four radios, plus he's got three internal nets that he listens to, so it gets very busy sometimes. And if you're talking on one radio, you can completely miss radio calls on other ones. And at that time of the morning when they're bringing radios up and down, and stuff, you really don't know what the situation is. So yes, sir, I would expect everybody in that capacity to answer.

222Q: You said that the air picture, that you had available in the command post, indicates to you only high aircraft?

222A: I think it would probably -- a more accurate description would be aircraft that are squawking and in contact with the AWACS would come on that. Would an Eagle Flight ever be able to come on there? I think if they were high enough to have a good squawk on AWACS, then their data could be passed.

223Q: If there as a good squawk in the AWACS for an aircraft, would you expect it to appear in the command post code?

223A: To be honest, sir, I'm not sure how that is -- you know, what level of information you need to make the one at command post work, but I know that the level of information available in the command post is much, much less than the one you have in AWACS. We don't get any kind of raw paints, we don't get any kind of -- just, you know -- I feel like somebody actually has to put the symbology up on that scope before it will work.

230Q: Do you recall ever seeing helicopter traffic in the AOR on the command post code?

230A: You cannot distinguish, sir, between traffic in the AOR on the scope in the command post. You don't know if it's a helicopter, an F-15, an AWACS, a truck with an IFF transponder on it.

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Questions by COL Fain:

231Q: Do you have communication available to you, tactical communication with which you could correlate those tracks?

231A: Not with any degree of -- I can call the Duke and say, "Okay, who is this guy here, and who's this guy here, and who's this guy here."

232Q: But you are not receiving Have Quick tactical transmissions from the AOR?

232A: Oh, no, sir; not at all. It's well outside their reach.

Questions by General Andrus:

233Q: What is the purpose of having that scope in the command post?

233A: I'm not sure why it was originally put in there, sir. It's nice for me to have because I look over there, and I can tell as they move in and out of the area, you know, what it kinds looks like; and on weather days, I can say, "Okay, we're out of the area now," and stuff like that, but that's all I use it for. I'm not sure why they have to have it there.

Questions by COL At Lee:

234Q: You referred to the CFACC. Could you explain who that is?

234A: Sir, that's the component air commander, Air Force commander that is in charge of the flying operations which come under the CTF, of the Combined Task Force.

235Q: Combined Force Air Component Commander?

235A: Yes, sir.

236Q: And the CFACC DO is the director of operations, working for the CFACC?

236A: Yes, sir.

237Q: You were talking about an aircraft helicopter, specifically, that took off and then landed at a point in route, and you used the phrase "someone may put it off to the side."

237A: They can take the -- AWACS has the capability, or a limitation it may be, of once a aircraft stops moving or lands, or is in a certain location for a long time; they can take the symbology and put it off to the side of the scope, and it won't move anymore. And if that aircraft takes off, the symbology won't move with it, and you won't really know where that guy is unless you track him down again and attach that call sign to his specific squawk.

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238Q: You talked about the authority of the Mad Dog and the Duke. You indicated for some of the situations, you would need to contact command personnel to take actions. Under what situations would you believe that you had authority to intervene and give specific command-like direction?

238A: The specific cases where I would not hesitate in making a command decision are coalition forces come under attack, if SATCOM goes out and we have a situation develop that would require a decision to prevent loss of coalition aircraft, or endangering people on the ground, then I would make a decision in those cases. And we have had SATCOM go out during a search and rescue, and the Duke had to make all those decisions by himself, and he did a good job.

239Q: In the situation where you had a positive friendly -- that is, you were convinced that it was a positive friendly; do you believe you would have the authority to call knock it off, to tell the fighters to disengage?

239A: Definitely. Yes, sir. And the air -- the air space control order, and all the guidance we have says that the Duke has the final say. He's a direct representative of the CFAC DO; and if he tells you to do something, then you will do it.

240Q: And in the case where you had a possible friendly, do you believe you'd have the same authority?

240A: To tell the aircraft to knock it off?

241Q: To tell the fighter aircraft to knock it off.

241A: Yes, sir. I believe that I would have that authority.

242Q: Do you think what you described as your understanding of the authority that you have is shared by other people performing the Mad Dog function?

242A: I believe so, sir. We normally get together once a week with the DO for Mad Dog meetings. We also get together to just basically talk over "what if" situations because to be honest, this is not a cut and dry mission that we're performing, and there are situations you can get into that it takes a little bit of thought in what you would do. And the last thing that we want to do is obviously commit somebody on an aircraft that's not the enemy, or do something outside the Rules of Engagement, so the way we handle that is to try to -- "what if" the situation is. And we came down to the most cases because -- because the capability of the AWACS is not as good as I had always thought it was to determine hostile or friendly, we pretty much all decided that if we saw a track out there that was not a definite origination from QS, or some other airfield, that we were pretty much in the VID scenario. In other words, we would send a fighter in there to go look at that aircraft to ascertain its nationality and type.

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243Q: The Mad Dog meetings that you talk about, are those documented?

243A: Yes, sir, they are.

244Q: Would you give me your perception of the frequency and quality of the meetings within the last 3 months or so.

244A: Are you talking about the Mad Dog meetings we have with the DO?

245Q: Yes, that's right.

245A: Yes, sir, They normally happen every week. There was -- I believe one week that we didn't have it, Colonel Richardson had to go TDY and Colonel Dougherty, but mostly we got together because it's always scheduled on Thursday before the DETCO meeting, the detachment commander meeting which I also attend, so he's normally there, either Colonel Dougherty or Colonel Richardson is normally there for that meeting.

246Q: The discussion regarding the VID scenario as your primary means of identifying an unknown track, was that a single meeting event where that decision was brought to a conclusion, or was it something that evolved over several meetings?

246A: It's something that evolves over several meetings, and it was as a result of us meeting together as Mad Dogs, just talking about tactically what we would do in that situation, and then we raised it at a Mad Dog meeting. And I specifically mentioned it talking to Colonel Richardson by himself and saying, you know, "We're kind of forced into a visual identification because we can't really tell what --you know, AWACS is not going to be the last word on whether an aircraft is hostile. It does -- It would not be good enough for me."

247Q: And is that decision or discussion documented in any type of directive or policy?

247A: I don't believe so, sir.

248Q: Okay. The understandings of authority that you recited for us apply equally to Mad Dog and to Duke?

248A: Yes, sir.

249Q: And the discussions that you just referred to, and discussed now with Colonel Fain regarding their evolution, was the person who was the Duke on the 14th of April present during those discussions?

249A: Yes, sir, he was. I probably need to clarify something, is that under the Rules of Engagement, we're allowed more latitude than that, but we had all discussed it. In most cases, we're going to try to pull back and regroup and not allow the situation to get out of hand. In other words, we did not want to commit our forces and put them in danger unnecessarily. And if

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we didn't commit our forces, we wanted to make sure that we would get our objectives. In other words, whether it was a target on the ground or an airborne target, we would want to maximum our fire power and not put ourselves in any undue danger by doing that. So in most cases, we had all decided to -- it was pretty prudent to at least draw back, and if there was time involved -- there was time allowed to call back here and get directions from the CFAC DO, which he had told us on numerous occasions that was his desire, unless obviously tactical events precluded us -- at time precluded us from doing that.

250Q: When you were describing the sequence on the 14th of April. You've been talking about efforts by AWACS to locate Eagle Flight. You said at one point, they recorded a valid squawk on Eagle Flight.

250A: Yes, sir.

251Q: Was that report before or after the engagement?

251A: That was after, sir; after we asked them specifically to go and find Eagle Flight

252Q: You used the term "squawking" when you were referring to what was available on the command post codes. That refers to what, a "squawk"?

252A: A squawk refers to an IFF, or an identification - friend or foe, emanation that comes from the black box in the aircraft. Whether or not that is what they use for the display in the command post, I don't know.

253Q: You used the term "frag." Does that refer to fragmentary order?

253A: Yes, sir.

254Q: You were talking about the sequence of communications between AWACS and fighter aircraft who are attempting to identify a bandit, and you said -- you described the call that the fighters would make, telling you about the presence in the location, and you said if we have information, we would pass it. If you didn't have any information regarding it, what would be the response?

254A: Investigate, visual investigation. At that time, if we didn't have enough information to declare that bandit hostile, then we would be forced into a visual identification to ascertain who it is.

Questions by COL Fain:

255Q: In your earlier testimony, you said that you would not be talking to the fighters -- in that case, yourself. So who would you relay this investigate desire to.

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255A: Sir, at that particular -- depending on the situation. If it was a situation that I thought was endangering to the fighters or to AWACS, or the some of the tankers, I would probably get on the radio and do it myself. In the case of the helicopter, I probably wouldn't get on the radio. I'd relay it through to weapons control.

Questions by COL At Lee:

256Q: When General Andrus was talking to you about the color codes on the scopes and the significance of those color codes, were the codes that you were referring to standard codes that would appear on the AWACS scope, or the command post scope, or any others?

256A: I'm -- You can put different colors on different scopes, and a lot of them have different techniques for doing that. On the scope that I'm on, I normally just keep everything off, except for the green radar return and the yellow or orange-ish color IFF return, and then AWACS determines what the color is for the call signs. The red ones are bad guys, and ours are yellowish, brownish kinda thing; and they can put anything they want up there, so I don't ----

Questions by COL Fain:

257Q: To further clarify. The scope that's in the command post, does that appear to be just a reproduction of the data that's available in the AWACS as in appears in the AWACS, or does it appear to be a synthetic reproduction, not resembling the actual format and colors of the AWACS scope?

257A: Yes, sir. It is a synthetic reproduction. It is not the picture in AWACS, and I'm not sure how they synthetically reproduce, but it can be off from the picture in the AWACS. In other words, I would never be able to use that for any kind of a determination of where actually somebody is. I can just use for a general vicinity type of thing.

Questions by COL At Lee:

258Q: The three colors -- green, yellowish-brown, and red; those colors are standardized?

258A: They seem to be. I have never asked AWACS about that. I just ----

259Q: Have you ever seen anything, other than those colors, being used for those purposes?

259A: No, sir.

Questions by General Andrus:

260Q: When I asked the questions, I was specifically referring to the AWACS scope that you

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would have available to you when you were acting in the capacity of the Duke on the aircraft.

260A: Yes, sir. And the colors that normally come up on my scope are the ones I've described -- the green, radar return; the yellowish, IFF return; and then red for bad guys; and then they can have like an off color, you know, light brown type of return for the good guys.

Questions by COL Fain:

261Q: I have a question regarding the responsibility for control of the AOR by both Cougar and Duke, and that is with respect to their frag or scheduled station time. Are the responsibilities for either Duke or AWACS to provide control of the AOR prior to that ATO station time?

261A: No, sir. As a matter of fact, you're not supposed to really allow anybody in there prior to their time. They're supposed to meet at plus or minus 5 minutes, and we pretty much try to stick to that. And the way we approach it, that we've discussed, is Dukes and Mad Dogs -- is although it's a little bit beyond our job description, is that our responsibility extends to making sure that whole thing happens safely and efficiently. So if something is mis-scheduled, or there is something in the frag that does not make sense, we would normally fix it on the spot and coordinate back through Mad Dog to make events flow smoother in the AOR. So if there's an AOR time that starts -- well, prior or I don't have enough coverage for my defensive counter air, or my Weasel aircraft, then we'll fix that, and then re-coordinate that.

262Q: I note that on the air tasking order, the 14th of April, that the F-15 flight that first entered the air space had an on station, or AOR time of 0720Z, the AWACS had an on station time 0730; so in that case, the F-15 would be in the AOR prior to the actual printed on station time of the AWACS. Was the AWACS responsible for "picture" information, and was the Duke responsible for control of the F-15's between the period 0720 and 0730; and if so, is that a normal procedure?

262A: I'd like to answer that one backwards, sir. Yes, it's a normal procedure. We're required to have the fighters do a fighter sweep of the area before anybody can go in, including AWACS. So before we can even declare on station time, before we can even let anybody pass Derek which is a point that's about 75 miles prior to the jump point -- in other words, getting into the AOR -- we have to have fighters out in front of us. And as a personal technique, I like to get them out there about 50 miles, so that while we're going to the wake up -- or not to the wake up, but our on station in ROZ One, the fighters are doing a combined weather sweep and an AOR sweep to make sure there's no bad guys in the area. So that's the normal procedure, whether or not Duke or AWACS would be in control of the situation before they got on station, the only people that

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should be in the AOR prior to us being on station are the F-15's. And in that case, they're solely responsible once they get in. They've got the onboard avionics to be able to respond to anything in the AOR -- in many cases, much better than AWACS. As a matter of fact if I had something in the AOR that happens, my first reaction is to take a F-15 and point it at it because he can tell me a much better -- give me a much better situation update than AWACS can ever do with its radar. So I depend on those guys really to give me an extra set of eyeballs out there.

263Q: Okay. Are you aware of special mission activity that occurs in the AOR prior to the arrival of the Provide Comfort forces?

263A: Not always, sir; no.

264Q: Have you seen instances where that occurs?

264A: Yes, sir.

265Q: Does Duke or AWACS controllers have any responsibility for that traffic?

265A: No, sir. We have a Turkish controller onboard and since I don't speak Turkish, I don't really know what they're saying to each other. But he supposedly would tell us if they're going to be -- where they're operating, what altitude they're operating at; and if it interferes with our operation, then we normally leave.

266Q: Is Duke aware of the departure of those aircraft, so as to deconflict arriving Provide Comfort forces from those aircraft.

266Q: Normally, I track them pretty close. It's a rare occasion that they are there before we are. They normally come up after we're airborne and leave, you know, before we leave. But, yes, we try to track them fairly closely.

Questions by COL At Lee:

267Q: I'm still trying to get a point clarified, and I'm sorry to "beat the same horse." You've explained that the first F-15 flight in sweeps the area throughout the front, and you understand their systems are better than yours for that purpose. Do you or -- First, do you believe that while they're performing that function, even though AWACS has not arrived at ROZ One and has not met its on station time, do you believe that you have no responsibility to the circumstances that develop in the course of that sweep?

267A: No, sir, I don't believe I don't have any responsibility. I do believe that we can be of limited value to the F-15's because we can't see what he's seeing. At that point, we're probably - you know, right on the edge of our radar coverage, especially down low. So if he picks something up that's down low, we probably wouldn't be able to see it, so ----

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268Q: Understanding that the quality of the information you get may be limited by those circumstances, are the functions and responsibilities of the people on the AWACS, including the Duke, the same under those circumstances as they would be after you have arrived at ROZ One orbit

268A: No, sir. I ----

269Q: Sorry, the aircraft is going over.

269A: No, sir. I believe that if I'm airborne and there's a fighter airborne, then I'm responsible as a Duke from the time I take off to the time I land, and as long as I -- It's just the quality of information that I have to make my decision.

270Q: And do you believe that that view is shared by other Dukes?

270A: We have talked about that. I don't think I've ever put it in those terms, but my approach to this job is that we need to be aggressive and not allow situations to develop that are beyond our control. So if we have to go beyond our purview of our job description to try to control the situation, then do it, and we'll get beat up when we get back home, but not to -- to try to maintain complete control of the AOR.

271Q: When you say "get beat up when you get back home," do you mean assume the risk of being wrong?

271A: Correct. And that was probably the wrong word to use. It was more that the DO would have not made the same decisions as we have, and there's been several weather decisions that we've made that he didn't necessarily agree with, but -- And the fact that he doesn't agree with it doesn't mean that we wouldn't make it again if we thought that safety of flight were protection of our -- you know, you got -- executing the mission safely, is in jeopardy or just we didn't want the potential for conflict to come in.

272Q: From your observation of the AWACS crews, as they are moving from the orbit where they are full up to ROZ, is it your perception that they share the same view of responsibilities to aircraft in or near the AOR, during that time frame?

272A: I would have to say not as much as the Duke. They -- When they call ----

273Q: --- For their respective duties.

273A: Yes, sir. Not as much as the Duke. They look to the Duke, as they should, for guidance when they get on station, then they're ready to accept the aircraft into the AOR. Until they get on station, they are still limited by what they can see, and they -- in fact, they will not accept responsibility until they get into a location that they can say, "Okay. Now, I can see everything I'm supposed to see. Bring on the fighters."

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274Q: I asked you about responsibility for fighter traffic under the "first in sweep" circumstances. Is your description of the Duke's responsibility the same for helicopters who may be entering the AOR during that same time frame?

274A: We are responsible for all aircraft in the AOR. That's a part of the flying operation. Our involvement in that portion of the operation is not as much -- has not been as much in the past as with the fighters because they have a different mission, they're hard to talk to, and they let -- and they change their mission on a daily basis -- or actually on an hourly basis. So our involvement in their flying is clearly not as the same level as a fighter would be.

Questions by COL Fain:

275Q: I have a final area that I'd like to discuss, and it involves Rules of Engagement, as you understand them. Would you describe for me the conditions in the AOR in which you believe the use of deadly force is authorized.

275A: (Paused.)

COL AT LEE: Could I take a recess at this point. The time is 1310.

(The interview recessed at 1310 hours, 25 April 1994.)

(The interview reconvened at 1313 hours, 25 April 1994.)

COL AT LEE: The time is 1313. The individuals who are present during -- when we recessed are present, with the exception of Major General Andrus who has left the room.

Questions by COL Fain:

276Q: I'll repeat my question. With regards to the Rules of Engagement, as published, could you list for me and explain the circumstances in which you think the use of deadly force in the AOR is authorized?

276A: Yes, sir. According to the ROE, the use of deadly force is authorized in the AOR if coalition forces are threatened, [Classified portion deleted (47 words)]

[Classified portion deleted (51 words)]

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[Classified portion deleted (42 words)]

277Q: Are there provisions regarding medical aircraft?

277A: Yes, sir, there are. The medical aircraft is the exception to the ROE.

278Q: And who in the AOR, or with communications to the AOR, has the authority to authorize the use of deadly force?

278A: The primary people in the AOR are the pilots in the cockpit. If they are engaged by a ground site, or they are engaged by an aircraft -- an airborne aircraft, then they are authorized to use force to obviously save themselves. Beyond that, the line of authority goes from the aircraft to Duke; Duke back to the CFAC DO, through the Mad Dog, as a communication means.

279Q: There are three categories of aircraft that might be found in the AOR from friendly to unidentified to hostile. Can you tell me the steps needed to verify each of those three conditions for those aircraft?

279A: Yes, sir. I guess the easier way to do this to make it most clear, would be to just start with the worst case, and that's an unidentified aircraft. If you find an unidentified aircraft in the AOR, the means we use are all onboard, electronic identification devices, to include their IFF transponder, whether they're squawking a friendly squawk, whether they're squawking an enemy squawk that comes out of an enemy transponder; any onboard capabilities available from the F-15's, we would use those to try to identify the aircraft. Then we would use capabilities in the AWACS which are much the same as onboard the F-15; in fact, the F-15 is better than that. So if I had to choose between one or the other, I would choose the F-15. And then, as a last resort, we use visual identification to confirm what the aircraft is.

Questions by COL At Lee:

280Q: Is there any requirement to verify or correlate a track for this identification?

280A: In terms of an unidentified aircraft?

281Q: Yes.

281A: Yes, sir, there is. There is a requirement to go find out who he is, and what he's doing, and identify him.

282Q: A positive visual identification, as a hostile by an aircrew member, has what effect on the Rules of Engagement?

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282A: It basically discounts all the Rules of Engagement that we -- that are above it. In other words, all the means that we went through to get an identification are discounted when you have a positive visual identification. So even if you've got a good guy squawk from a SU-27, when you made the visual identification, then he becomes an SU-27 and then he comes under the engagement rules of a hostile aircraft, but he's declared hostile.

Questions by COL Fain:

283Q: And one last question. Were a Iraqi aircraft, such as the SU-27 that you described, to be identified, but showing the appearances of being in distress; would he be engaged?

283A: No, sir. We'd -- If he was not performing hostile, or looking hostile -- and that would have to mean that he would have to be doing something that would make him positively not hostile. In other words, if he was flying at speed in excess of 300 knots, and maneuvering his airplane, then I would more than likely direct the fighters to engage him, if they hadn't already. If he wanted to be -- If he was defecting for some reason, then I would expect him to be in the area 250 knots or below, with his gear down, doing everything he could to try to contact us, which would mean not necessarily flying directly north, but maybe flying in a triangle which is the international signal for distress. Then I would have him go in and try to contact them, talk to them, obviously taking precautions and having one aircraft in trail with them, ready to -- being locked up and ready fire missile, should he decide to do something.

284Q: Does the ROE allow the pilot to engage and destroy the aircraft described in this situation, which is positively identified as an Iraqi military aircraft?

284A: [Classified portion deleted (4 words)]

Questions by COL At Lee:

285Q: Do the ROE allow a pilot to engage if he had a positive identification of a particular type of aircraft; for instance, the SU-27 or a Hind?

285A: It does not distinguish between type of aircraft, [Classified portion deleted (7 words)]

286Q: What in your mind is necessary to identify an aircraft as a Iraqi military aircraft, as opposed to only a military aircraft?

286A: I would, first of all, require that the type of aircraft be distinguished. In other words, a helicopter, Iraqi helicopter. would not be a good enough identification. It would have to be like a Hind or Hip, and I would, ask them for some kind of markings on the aircraft because the Iraqis are not the only ones that have those types of aircraft in their inventory.

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Questions by COL Fain:

287Q: As a Duke, would you be concerned with an identification that consisted of the call, "I have two Hind helicopters."

287A: Yes, sir; not because I would doubt the identification necessarily, but because I would be a little bit unbelieving. You know, we've been flying here for a lot years, and it's not very often that we get a military aircraft north of the 36 degree line that isn't -- haven't done it by mistake or isn't on purpose just trying to get us excited. So to have somebody that far north, flying in the AOR, I would ask them to identify it.

288Q: Is there a possibility that a Hind aircraft, at the position of the incident on the 14th of April, could be a Hind aircraft of another nation, other than Iraqi?

288A: Yes, sir.

COL FAIN: Okay. That's all the questions that we have.

COL AT LEE: Do you have any further information, statements, or evidence which you wish to present?

WITNESS: No, sir.

COL AT LEE: You're reminded that this is an official investigation. You're ordered not to divulge the nature of the investigation or the questions, answers, or discussions included in this interview with anyone, unless authorized to do so by the Board President, Major General Andrus, CINCUSAFE, or higher authority. If anyone, other than a member of this board, should approach you regarding your testimony or the matters discussed here, you must report it immediately.

Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: No sir.

COL AT LEE: The time is 1324, and this interview is concluded.

(The interview terminated at 1324 hours, 25 April 1994.)

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REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I above sworn interview statement given by **Control Witness #34** to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board was recorded by me by stenomask. Words contained within brackets, [], indicate language that has been substituted at the direction of the Board, to avoid the release of classified information which could not be downgraded and/or personal details which would disclose the identity of military members directly involved in the incident. The substituted language accurately conveys the essential meaning of the original language. Except as so noted, I certify that the foregoing transcript is a true, accurate, and verbatim account of that statement.



JANET R. CHARLES, SSG, U.S. Army
Court Reporter
Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

V-075

V-076

TAB V-077

V-076A

DONOVAN, JOHN C.

V-077

SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

STAFF SERGEANT JOHN C. DONOVAN, III
23d Special Tactics Squadron
Hurlburt Field, Florida

The interview was conducted by Lt Colonel Black at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey beginning at 1436 hours, 23 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14 and the witness was sworn.

EXAMINATION

I am the deployed NCOIC of Special Tactics. I'm a pararescueman.

On the 14th of April 1994, I traveled to the crash site in my official capacity. I went to the crash site on an MH-60 helicopter.

As soon as we landed at the crash site, I deplaned with Colonel Hunt and Colonel Zahrt and Airman Mulloy and myself. All started moving toward the crash site area. Colonel Hunt was immediately surrounded by a number of Kurdish people and as I was viewing the crash site, the most significant aspect of the crash site that this board would be interested in is the fact that I noticed a video camera on scene at that time. It was in the possession of a male but I can't describe him. The feeling I have, if I was to say who I thought it was, it would be some kind of -- not a local indigenous person but more of a white Caucasian who was there in either a peacekeeping capacity or a European or Australian. None of the official U.S. party that I went in with talked to this person that I'm aware of. When I first got there, he had a camera pointed down to the center of the crash site basically and that's what -- there was a lot of people there and he melted into the crowd as I was further investigating the site. In retrospect, I should have contacted him and seen what he was up to but I was pretty much in awe of the whole site.

At that time I got back with Colonel Hunt and suggested that we postpone further recovery until the morning due to the lack of daylight and the fact that he was assured by the Kurds there that the site would be secure. He agreed with me and we started to press on toward that objective and five minutes later he was ordered from higher up headquarters that we would initiate the recovery immediately and we pressed on from there. At that point, I brought out the remaining body bags that were on my aircraft, positioned them near the crash site, and began

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recovering the bodies.

We recovered all twelve bodies at the first site and I was flown up to the second site where there was already several Army and Air Force personnel recovering the bodies there. There was five of the fourteen that were bagged and it was evident that the landing site that I got put into for site two was not going to be an effective recovery site for the bodies, so I went up and down several ridges to find an alternate landing site and noticed that when I went down the ravine, there was a small creek that had a -- not a landing area but a suitable recovery area where we could bring the bodies to and do a hoist recovery.

The operation took about eight or nine hours by the time we got the bodies recovered along with all the equipment used and all the personnel that were inserted as well as the personnel that were inserted on the ground that drove in. I believe we flew several of them back as well. So by the time everyone left the site, it had to have been eight or nine hours.

When we arrived, a lot of people were gathered around the crash site, and I felt that there was a potential that they had already sifted through several things because it was obvious that it was several hours since the mishap.

I did not see any specific evidence of tampering at the crash site. A crash site is a splatter of miscellaneous and you would never know if something had been tampered with. I would guess there was about sixty to seventy people at or near crash site one when we arrived. There's a road that was up next to the crash site and there was a large number of people there. There was a few people scattered in a circular circumference of the crash site itself. I would say between seventy and maybe even up to a hundred people initially. Suddenly it was evident that a lot of them were gone as soon as sunset came and there were maybe twenty or thirty people left and they helped us move the bodies to the helicopter.

I think I tried to attempt a few comments with the people but the language barriers were so evident. The people that could speak English that were on site there were speaking with Colonel Hunt.

Along with the video camera, I believe I saw another individual with a regular camera. They were not a part of our team that was in there. I did not diagram the scene that evening but I could probably draw it (attached) right now. I know where certain numbers of bodies were positioned. I couldn't tell you where all twelve were. I could tell you where the ones I recovered were. I can tell you how I envisioned the aircraft basically broke in half.

Like I was saying, there was a large section of the aircraft, the tail section, and what appeared to be the main body was cut in half and displaced several feet from it. The crash site was a mess. There was nothing distinguishable other than the fact that I saw a large area of metal separated and another large area of metal. Close to what I believe was the tail of the aircraft were

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four bodies. There was one that was thrown probably two hundred feet from the site up ahead of it and I believe most of the rest, if not all the rest, were in the fuselage area of the crash site.

When I got up to crash site two, they had begun recovering the bodies there. When I went up there along with two SF personnel, we brought additional body bags. At that time I took team leader responsibilities and coordinated with the helicopter to fly an alternate way of extracting the remains and I didn't physically bag any from the second flight.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions.

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of John C. Donovan, III, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation board.




SCOTT C. BLACK, Lt Colonel, USA
Legal Advisor

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SSGT JOHN C DONOVAN

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EXFIL



V-075

V-076

TAB V-078

V-076A

WALKER, ROBERT HUGHES

V-077

V-078

18 11-

SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

ROBERT HUGHES WALKER, CAPTAIN
55 Special Operations Squadron
Hurlburt Field, Florida

The interview was conducted by Lt Colonel Scott C. Black at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, beginning at 1318 hours, 23 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14 and the witness was sworn.

EXAMINATION

I am assigned temporary duty to Incirlik Air Base, Turkey in support of PROVIDE COMFORT. We provide rescue coverage for the Operation PROVIDE COMFORT aircraft. I'm an aircraft commander of an MH-60G Pavehawk.

I was serving in that position on the 13th of April 1994. We have three crews and we'll rotate through day and night alert, so we always have two crews on night alerts. I was one of the night alert crews on the 13th of April and I was the designated flight lead crew for that week.

On the night of the 13th, I don't believe we had any flight training scheduled so any duties performed by crew members would be performed after three o'clock. Myself, I don't believe I went into work at all that day. So I essentially stayed in crew rest the entire day of the 13th of April.

I'm on the night schedule so I try to stay up late. I probably went to bed about two in the morning and got up about nine-thirty or ten o'clock in the morning. I had a short workout at the gym, ate a meal and was told by Major Shaw, who is our mission commander, to have our flight suits on, something might have happened. He told us that about twelve-ten local.

At about twelve-thirty local, we were beeped and the message was, "Report to SOC 3 immediately." SOC 3 is our operations facility on the other side of the runway. SOC stands for Squadron Operation but I don't know what the "C" stands for. After I was beeped, I gathered my crew, made sure we had the other crew available, we rallied at my room and then moved to our

WALKER

vehicles and drove straight to our operations facility. We have a crew of four.

I was the aircraft commander, captain, I was also flight lead. I have a co-pilot, he was a first lieutenant, Mike Geragosian; Staff Sergeant Shawn Nelson was our flight engineer. He operates the hoist and also has a machine gun in his window that he'll operate and he runs performance planning figures, power available, power required. The last crew member is Staff Sergeant Troy Derocher. He's the aerial gunner. He'll operate the gun on the left side, operate our SATCOM radio and perform any other duties needed around the cabin.

After rallying in my room, we moved to our vehicle and then drove straight to our operation facility, about a ten minute drive. The operations facility is on the far side of the runway here at Incirlik Air Base.

After we arrived, I got all the crews together in our planning room to get a quick update brief from Major Shaw. At that point we were briefed that two F15s had reported shooting down two Hinds. We were also reported that Eagle Flight was missing at this point. We didn't receive much more Intel than that.

I sent the flight engineers and gunners out to take care the airplanes immediately, just to get them prepped for launch. I kept the co-pilots back to prepare mission kits. Mission kits would include standard maps and navigation logs and other pertinent information that we put together any time we need to fly into northern Iraq. We have those prepared so we don't have to do detailed mission planning when an individual mission comes up. We should be able to just pick these up and launch without any prior planning.

I tried to get a weather update and an Intel update for myself and the other two aircraft commanders. Those were in our operations facility. We have Intel in that facility and we have a weather person that's just assigned to the Special Operations forces here on this base.

Essentially it was VFR weather with ceilings that weren't going to be a factor for our altitudes, winds that were relatively light and very little, if any, moon illumination. Those were pretty important factors for us. The Intel report -- we assume alert at the beginning of a week. We get an Intel report that's a little more detailed about what's going on in the AO so we just ask for updates. Essentially there were no new troop movements or missile movements and he informed us of that. Then aircraft commanders stepped out to help prep the airplanes and launch.

We moved out to our aircraft. There were some delays getting Turkish approval for launch. Those were worked inside the operations facility and I was updated over the radio.

We have copies of the ATO in our operations facility and as part of prepping that mission kit, we have everything there, but we also add an ATO to each mission kit since they change on a daily basis. The ATO comes to our operations facility from the CTF. We have several on file

WALKER

there everyday. An ATO is an Air Tasking Order. It's just the tasking order that defines who's flying in the AO that day, what call signs they're going to use, take off times, what squawks. It'll also have code words in the back, frequencies, instructions on who to speak with, and that's essentially it. There was nothing unusual about the ATO I received that day.

We launched at 1500 local. Leading up to that, we're tasked to be able to launch two birds for SAR alert. We have three on station. The decision was made to try to launch all three. We had a crew that was doing maintenance test flights that morning. They were able to finish their maintenance test flights prior to our launch sequence, upload weapons and make it by our 1500 departure. Our 1500 departure was driven more by our ability to get our weapons loaded and on board our aircraft and get the Turkish Liaison Officers out to our aircraft and receive launch permission from the Turkish authorities rather than us shooting for a specific time.

At that time my thought processes were we knew that two helicopters were down, we knew Eagle Flight was missing, we didn't know who it was. I was thinking more along the lines of rescuing possible survivors than anything else at that point and that's why we were pressing to try to get off as soon as we possibly could.

Apart from my crew, we'll always carry additional team members. At this point, inside the operations facility, it was decided that we would have two pararescue men and those are Air Force trained medical personnel on each aircraft. We also take a security team of SF. I believe we had two SF on Chalk Three and then on Chalk Two, we added the Joint Special Operations Task Force (JSOTF) commander, Colonel Hunt, our commander, Colonel Zahrt and a special forces communications specialist who also flew on Chalk Two. I was Chalk One.

Launch was just our standard take off departing eastbound. We're restricted to fly within fifty nautical miles of Incirlik normally, so for most of us, this was our first trip out of that circle, but when we come in country, we orient ourselves with the ATO, with our mission kits, and have a briefing on the procedures for the ATO, and that's essentially what we did.

We take off, standard ATC, talking to tower and approach, out to the fifty mile circle. Once we're enroute, we try to establish communications with the AWACS, Cougar, on their enroute frequency which we were able to do about halfway through our trip.

There was nothing unusual about our comm link up with Cougar that day. In fact, they were very helpful. We had just sent a pilot over to brief some AWACS crew members a couple of days before that and explained to them what we're expecting and what they can expect from us and one of the informal parts of that briefing was just telling them that anytime we launch on a mission we have a lot of communication coming in and anything that can filter that out would be much appreciated and AWACS seemed to keep their communications to us to a minimum. They were helpful. We had poor satellite communication radios in our aircraft and we had one in Chalk Three that could really communicate back to our operations facility so we were using AWACS to

WALKER

relay requests for intelligence, requests for information about any type of fighter cap over us and they were very helpful in that respect.

Enroute there was some question of whether or not we were going to stop in Zakhu and pick up some team members there. Eagle Flight had inserted a special forces team there about a week prior. Because of impending darkness and the possibility of there being survivors on the ground, I elected to continue. I passed that on to Chalk Two that had Colonel Hunt on board as the ground mission commander and he concurred with that. It's a little confusing any time you have a ground mission commander, an air mission commander and a flight lead. Essentially I think what happened is I made the decision and he made the decision and ultimately it's going to be his decision. In that situation, sometimes there can be problems with command and control. This decision was made probably about a half hour to forty-fives minutes before crossing the border into Iraq. I did not communicate my decision to the MCC at Zakhu because we didn't have direct communication with them and I did not use Cougar in that capacity at that time.

The reason we were able to make that decision when we did was, up until that point, we did not have any approval to perform aerial refueling from the HC -130s and that was going to necessitate us going to Zakhu for gas, if nothing else. We then had approval to air refuel in Iraq so we had set up an air refueling right at the border, just minutes before border crossing, probably ten to fifteen. We received approval to air refuel in Turkey and we immediately set up a rendezvous and, in fact, had hooked up with the tanker probably about three to four miles prior to border crossing and crossed the border on the hose and dropped off after Zakhu enroute to the site.

We're still pressing to the site. We think it's Eagle Flight but we're not sure at that point. We were requesting information. We have spider route, which is pre-planned routes we have through Iraq so that we can take advantage of the intelligence that we know and have a route set up so we don't have to plan a new route for each mission, and then we can depart from that spider route enroute to an objective area like the crash site. And that's what we did in this case. Going by the most direct means possible, we got there a little bit before sunset and while there was still some light and that helped us spot the crash sites.

I believe when we talked to Zakhu, when we were passing by them, I believe that's the point where we were told that it was definitely Eagle Flight. I know we received that information right about the time we were at Zakhu and I believe it came from one of the combat controllers on the ground. He called us on the radio. We knew when we got to the site it was Eagle Flight on the ground.

We arrived at the site about ten to fifteen minutes prior to sunset. I have a time line that was prepared by all of the crews together just to try to recreate for ourselves exactly the sequence of the events. This represents the best guess of the aircrew for the most part. We have some hard times that we were able to record and kind of work backwards from that. Nobody directed us to

WALKER

do this. We just got together as a group so we could recreate the events as they happened, just for any after action reports and for flight debrief.

We arrived on the site at 1530 Zulu. I set up a plan whereby I would be providing security and the coordinates we were given prior to launch had the crash sites on either side of a valley. I was going to have Chalk Three search the north side of the valley, Chalk Two search the south side of the valley, and I was going to be patrolling the valley looking for the choke points just to provide some type of security for the entire formation. As we passed over, Chalk Three immediately spotted both sites and we did a couple of passes around the valley just to see if there were any enemy. We found several Peshmerga patrols all over that valley and at that point we elected to land. I believe the JSOTF commander directed his aircraft to land. He was put down in the lower crash site, the one we designated crash site one.

The JSOTF commander is the ultimate commander of the air assets which would include the MH-60s, the HC-130s, and the Army assets which would include special forces and the Air Force pararescue and combat controllers would also fall under his command.

Peshmerga would be the military arm of the Kurds in that region.

The first bird in was Chalk Two. That had the JSOTF commander and his communications specialist. That communications specialist was equipped with a tactical satellite communications radio. We inserted him on the road just above the site. That turned out not to be a very suitable landing zone for multiple helicopter operations. We moved Chalk Two, the second aircraft, down to a landing site that was about fifty to a hundred meters west of the crash site that we designated crash site one, and he inserted the Air Mission Commander, Colonel Zahrt and his two pararescue men at that point. We directed Chalk Three to try to find a landing zone near crash site two and he found one above that crash site and inserted his two special forces and his two pararescue men. Then, with the area secure, I had the other aircraft take off to make a few more security passes and I landed in the second landing zone near crash site one and I off loaded my two pararescue men, Technical Sergeant Talcott and Senior Airman Malloy.

Donovan was on Chalk Two with the JSOTF commander and the air mission commander. After I landed and discharged my two pararescue personnel, we started looking at fuel loads, trying to get some direction as far as a plan of action on what instructions we had as far as disturbing the crash site or picking up the bodies and trying to get some more Intel assessments through AWACS.

Essentially it worked out over time that Colonel Hunt, on his satellite communications radio was able to get probably the best comm link back, and he directed us that the first priority was to airlift the bodies. The second priority was to airlift equipment and get the team back to Zakhu. I'm not exactly sure when in that sequence that we were told that the bodies needed to be in Diyarbakir by that night, but that happened fairly early on.

WALKER

Colonel Hunt made the decision that the ground team was going to focus its efforts on site one first. There were twelve bodies around that site and they're working at night; but apparently the Peshmerga had already identified the location of each of those bodies, so that helped a lot in finding those bodies in the dark.

While that was going on, I picked up the remaining bodies on site one and directed Chalk Three to begin at site two. Just the situation at the site, there was no suitable landing zone near the area where the bodies were to be found and it was just going to be an impossibly long time to transport those bodies to a landing zone, so we elected to use our Stokes litter.

The Stokes litter is a litter that we can deploy out of the helicopter that the pararescuemen, when they're performing the medical duties, can put somebody in there to stabilize and keep them from moving and from injuring themselves further. The Stokes litter is equipped so we can attach it to our hoist hook and hoist it up into the helicopter. The process didn't take very long at all to lift and load the remains. In fact, it was a surprisingly short time for a Stokes litter. We were able to come to low hovers, somewhere in the range of ten to fifteen feet. We'd lower the Stokes down, the pararescuemen would have the body bag there and we'd immediately load it on the Stokes litter, strap it on and send it up the hoist.

We completed the entire process probably about 0200, local Incirlik time. At that point Chalk Two started loading equipment and team members on his aircraft and when I returned, he left to go back to Zakhu to drop off the equipment and team members he had on board. I picked up a load of team members at that point and flew back to Zakhu while Chalk Two flew from Zakhu back to the site to pick up the remaining team members we had on the ground. Once he ensured that the last remaining team members were picked up off the site, he flew to Zakhu.

When we arrived, I would guess that there were sixty to seventy Peshmergas on the ground. There were very many there, and it was very hard for me to see them all from the air. They had already been through the site. In fact, when we put -- especially from site two because they were -- that team was a little separated from the rest because it was just the two pararescuemen and the two special forces while we had all the commanders down at the lower site.

There was a ground team from Zakhu on the ground at the site. It was reported to me that two civilians and six special forces were on their way. I never saw those individuals but we did get a comm link and were notified over our radios when they had linked up with our ground team; and that was a concern of ours, that we could effect a linkup because, essentially, it's going to be done at dark. We didn't have good communication with them and we didn't have a plan of linking up with them. We were concerned that there'd be a hazard to both teams if they met in the dark.

Apart from the U.S. personnel, I didn't see anyone else out there with cameras. Most of

WALKER

the time during the operation, it was very dark and I wasn't looking for that, but I did not see anything like that.

We got into Diyarbakir. We left the airfield, got to the base, got settled in there probably about 9:00 a.m. local time. They fixed some beds on the floor of the gymnasium for us to sleep in and we each got about one to two hours sleep. There's no air conditioning, it was very loud and we slept as long as we could.

We went to the MCC after that just to try to get some news on what we'd be doing that day or the next day. We were told we were not going to fly the day of the 15th and we were given a take off time of something like 0830 local in the morning the next day, that we were going to be flying. We were not given the specific mission that we were going to do. It turned out that we were going to fly the investigating team out to Zakhu and the site.

We tried to rest that night in the gym and to get set up for an eight-thirty launch. When we got to the aircraft, apparently there had been a message at the MCC that our take off wasn't until about eleven o'clock which turned out for the best because some fuel problems and maintenance items that we thought we had arranged to be taken care of weren't taken care of at that time, so we were able to get set up for an eleven o'clock launch or possibly ten-thirty launch with the investigation team members.

That day we flew the investigation team to Zakhu while some of the members went to what we call the Zakhu house with the MCC to take care of some of their business and we started trying to ascertain exactly what we were going to have to do on site so we could plan out fuel loads and the like. And then we flew the investigation team to the sites, landed, shut down to just auxiliary power units to await the completion of the team's business there.

I really don't think I have any more information that would help as far as the investigation. Our communications with AWACS were minimal and were strictly information that we needed. Things we saw on the site, we only had that initial fifteen or twenty minutes of daylight and then after that I think most of the aircrew focus was just concentrating air flows out of the different landing zones and making sure we didn't hit each other, making sure we had adequate fuel, making sure we had power available to perform our mission and we weren't really concerned with the site and the things going on around it, except so far as it related to us and how we were going to get people in and out.

Flight plans are filed for us by our operations facility. I do not know if that included the route of flight once we entered the TAOR. When we arrived at the border and were with AWACS, we did not give AWACS a route of flight to the site. We received some threat indications over our APR 39 that night, after the mission was over. Our APR 39's reliability is sometimes called into question. We didn't receive any RW indications on the way inbound that night. On the way outbound, when we were in Turkey flying near Syria, we received indications

WALKER

from the Syrian side from our equipment that would indicate some type of missile threat.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of Robert Hughes Walker, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation board.



SCOTT C. BLACK, Lt Colonel, USA
Legal Advisor

WALKER

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TAB V-078A

V-076A

WALKER, ROBERT HUGHES

V-077

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SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

CAPTAIN ROBERT H. WALKER

The telephone interview was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Scott C. Black at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, beginning at 1615 hours, 16 May 1994. The witness was located at Hurlbert Field Air Base, Florida. The witness was reminded of the earlier advisement given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and reminded he was still under oath.

EXAMINATION

I am Captain Robert H. Walker. My present duty assignment is Hurlbert Field Air Base, Florida.

In recalling my recent tour at Incirlik Air Base; in particular, my activities flying in the AOR and in the TAOR, I cannot remember what the Code would have been for Mode I in the AOR. That was written down in ATO, the Air Tasking Order. I believe that stays fairly constant. We would write those down on our knee board and load those in before takeoff.

I flew a SAR mission on the afternoon and night of 14 April 1994; however, I do not recall the Mode I Code that I utilized in my transponder on this mission. I also do not recall whether the Mode I Code had to be changed at any time during the mission. I do not believe that the Code had to be changed. I had never flown into the TAOR prior to the 14th of April. I know that there were certain codes that were applicable only to the TAOR. We had people in that formation who had flown into the TAOR prior to that, and we were all well briefed on the procedures. I do not recall that we would have to change Mode I squawks, though. Mode II would be turned on inside the AOR. On Mode III, we had a certain squawk for our local training area, and then we would all be up one squawk for the TAOR. I believe Mode I had a different squawk for fixed wing and rotary wing. I don't recall if that squawk was different for the training area and the TAOR; it probably was different. As we were crossing the border into Iraq, my co-pilot announced when he changed all the transponder squawks appropriate to the TAOR, as we had written down on our keyboard. My co-pilot was First Lieutenant Mike Garagosian. He's presently here in Florida.

I do not recall any specifics in the ATO about changing Mode I Codes prior to entry into the TAOR. I know there's several sections that mentioned -- well, actually, I do know that there was a TAOR Mode I squawk. There is a line on the ATO that had

WALKER

that, and I believe it had the base number, and one other bit of information. There are three numbers with the slashes separating them; one was the base number, and the other was a Mode I squawk for the tactical AOR.

I can't recall anything else that might be of help to the board. It has been a few weeks since I've had to try to recall that information about the squawks. That is usually information that we write down, so I don't have it right on the top of my memory right now.

I don't have any further information, statements, or evidence that I wish to present.

(The standard witness caution was given, and the witness had no questions.)

The interview terminated at 1630 hours, 16 May 1994.

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of **CAPTAIN ROBERT H. WALKER** as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.



SCOTT C. BLACK, LTC, U.S. Army
Legal Advisor

WALKER

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V-076A

KENT, JEFFREY L.

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SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

**JEFFREY L. KENT, CAPTAIN
A CO 2ND BN 10TH SPECIAL FORCE GROUP
FT DEVENS, MA 01433**

The interview was conducted by Lieutenant Colonel Black at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, beginning at 1022 hours, 24 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14 and the witness was sworn.

EXAMINATION

I am TDY to Incirlik AB, Turkey, as a Company Commander. I have six teams which are 12 man teams capable of doing a large variety of missions. One of the missions is combat search and rescue.

On 14 April 1994, part of my company was at Zakhu, Iraq. At 1200 hours we were told that two aircraft were shot down and that it might be our two Eagle Flight helicopters. My crew and I began to do mission planning to go to the crash site. We arrived at the crash site at 2000 hours that evening. From 2000 hours until 0600 hours on 15 April 1994, we located and placed the remains in body bags and exfiltrated the remains back to Zakhu.

I was present in Zakhu when the Eagle Flight came in to do their mission. I was at the helicopter pad when the aircraft departed to go on their mission. The normal procedures for the MCC is when the Eagle Flight helicopters land at the MCC helicopter compound, they determine who is going to go into the helicopters that day. Once the helicopter arrives and lands, the pilot will depart the aircraft. We have a briefing room that is set up with an aerial map there at the compound. They will do a quick air brief, there will be a manifest and Colonel Thompson will brief the pilots on where he's going that day. They left the briefing room, the passengers loaded the helicopter, the pilots and co-pilots got into their seats, turned the blades and they departed within a half hour from touching down. In my opinion this was not a hurried departure; it was standard, normal operating procedures. I was not present in the briefing room when they were briefed on their flights. Normally, the only ones in the briefing room are the ones that are going on the flight, and none of my men at the MCC compound were present in the briefing room.

KENT

I have flown with Eagle Flight before. I have flown with Eagle Flight where I have monitored their conversations with other personnel and aircraft. I usually ask for headsets because I'm interested in what is going on, as I am a civilian pilot. I have never heard them talk to AWACS. I have heard them talk to departure control, as the flight proceeds there is a controlling agency that picks them up, and then on the final phase of the flight, I always hear them being picked up by MCC.

I don't know what agencies you could talk to concerning who they talked to while flying in the AOR. They are talking on the radio when they are going to land, but who they are talking to, I don't know.

I arrived at the two crash sites at 2000 hours, on 14 April 1994. In fact, there were trees that were still burning at Crash Site 1 when we landed. We labeled them Crash Site 1 and Crash Site 2. Crash Site 1 is the crash site which is right next to the road. The terrain there is fairly level and is surrounded by ridge line on its north and south side. The debris scattered approximately 200 meters to 150 to 200 meter area. My impression is that when the missile hit the helicopter, it immediately exploded and the debris settled down right where it is presently sitting. Crash Site 2 is located approximately 800 meters to the east, in a very steep terrain area. The debris there was scattered over a 300 meter area. One of the doors was found about 250 meters west of the crash site. Again, it looked like the missile hit the aircraft, but the aircraft did not explode immediately. The aircraft went into the right bank and impacted on the east side of the ridge line. The only thing that we touched and moved at the two sites were the bodies. We did not police anything while we were there. I took photographs the following day. The positions of the bodies were not marked because we perceived the area to be a high threat. We were outside of the security zone. Our mission was to locate the bodies, police them up as quickly as possible and get out of the area. We worked the sites until 0515 hours on 15 April 1994.

I would say that normally MCC determines which village you are going to go to the night before. Major Sanders, who is the MCC Operations Officer, puts the request through whatever channels he needs to do to make sure that the flight planning is done.

In the flights that I took with Eagle Flight from Diyarbakir to Zakhu, it is possible that Eagle Flight made transmissions to AWACS, however, I never heard a transmission made to Cougar. It is possible that transmissions took place, and I didn't hear them. I don't listen to everything. Normally, I just sit in and listen to their pre-flight Ops and their departure Ops. Then, I normally start looking out the window and watching the terrain.

KENT

I did not see anyone with a camera at Crash Site 1 nor Crash Site 2 on the 14th or the 15th of April 1994.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of JEFFREY L. KENT, as given to the Aircraft Investigation Board.


SCOTT C. BLACK, LTC, USA
Legal Advisor

KENT

V-075

V-076

TAB V-080

V-076A

DOUGHERTY, MARK E.

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V-078A

V-079

V-080

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TESTIMONY OF

**LIEUTENANT COLONEL MARK E. DOUGHERTY
39TH OPERATIONS GROUP COMMAND
Incirlik AB, Turkey**

COL AT LEE: The time is now 1017 on 26 April 1994. The persons present are the following: Major General Andrus, Colonel At Lee, Colonel Fain, Lieutenant Colonel Velluz, Colonel Armen and Staff Sergeant Thelma I. Harris.

WITNESS: Lieutenant Colonel Mark Elliott Dougherty.

COL AT LEE: This interview is being conducted at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. This is an official AFR 110-14 Aircraft Accident Investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters and the possible involvement of U.S. fighter aircraft in the crash of these helicopters in the northern No-Fly-Zone of Iraq on 14 April 1994.

This investigation is being conducted at the direction of General Robert C. Oaks, CINCUSAFE. This investigation is not a Safety Mishap Investigation conducted under AFR 127-4. It is an aircraft accident investigation conducted under AFR 110-14. The purpose of this accident investigation is to obtain and preserve all available information and evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary action, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Testimony before a Safety Mishap Investigation Board is given with the understanding that it can only be used for mishap prevention purposes and all witnesses are advised that the testimony will be treated in confidence.

However, testimony given in this accident investigation may be used for any purpose deemed appropriate by competent authority and may be publicly disseminated.

Do you understand the difference between a Safety Mishap Investigation and this aircraft Accident Investigation?

WITNESS: I think so.

COL AT LEE: Do you understand the purpose of this investigation?

WITNESS: It's a legal investigation to try to determine the reason for the shoot down.

COL AT LEE: Yes, and it may be used for any and all purposes. Maybe, and in all probability will be publicly disseminated.

WITNESS: Okay.

DOUGHERTY

COL AT LEE: Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: Not at this point.

COL AT LEE: Your testimony will be recorded and transcribed so that a written record can be made available to the appointing or higher authority. For the benefit of the reporter, please avoid the use of acronyms or jargon. Please speak slowly, clearly and loudly. Remember to explain your testimony carefully, so others who do not have your technical training will be able to understand.

As this is an official investigation, you are required to answer questions put to you by the board. You are further advised not to discuss classified information unless necessary to develop your testimony. If it's necessary for you to discuss classified information, you need to identify it as such.

Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: Okay, I'd have to think about those classified points at times, I guess.

COL AT LEE: If you find that you have spoken of something, which you later realize is classified, if you would identify that fact to us, we'll be able to deal with it.

WITNESS: May I have a piece of paper and a pencil just to jot those kind of things down.

(The Legal Advisor provided the witness with a pad and pencil)

COL AT LEE: The witness has been provided with those materials. If you have no further questions, I'll put you under oath.

Would you please rise so that I can swear you in.

(The witness was sworn)

EXAMINATION

1Q: State your name and grade?

1A: Mark Elliott Dougherty, Lieutenant Colonel, USAF.

2Q: And your organization?

2A: 39th OPS Group.

DOUGHERTY

3Q: And your station?

3A: Incirlik Air Base, Turkey.

Questions by Colonel Fain:

4Q: Could we begin by you providing us with a brief description of your educational background to include civilian and military education?

4A: I graduated honor graduate degree at Miami University in Oxford, Ohio, comprehensive social studies, I think was the title of my degree, Bachelor of Science. Then I went to Squadron Officer School in Residence; Armed Forces Staff College by seminar and I've got a Masters Degree in Public administration from Golden Gate University and that was, you know, over a couple of years, night school weekends, that kind of thing. Then I just finished National War College a year ago at Fort Leslie J. McNair in Washington D.C.

5Q: Okay, would you provide me with a broad overview of your military experience to include your time in service?

5A: I entered the service in 1973 after college. Went to pilot training, flew F-4s for eight years after that, at MacDill, Bitburg, Ramstein, Seymour Johnson, Homestead. Then I went and flew A-7s and F-117s and Mitsubishi at Nellis for four years. Then I went to the TAC Staff and Requirements, and Black World requirements, DRB for three years. Went to F-16 RTU and to MacDill for six or three month T Course, which is a training course for previously qualified fighter guys. I went to Kunsan, where I was the assistant OPS officer for about six to seven months.

Then I was pulled out of there to be an aide on the joint staff for the vice chairman, Admiral Jeremiah for sixteen or seventeen months. Then I was in the joint staff to finish out my three tour -- two year tour. Then I went to school for a year at National War College and then I was assigned here.

6Q: And what is your current duty assignment?

6A: I'm the Deputy OPS Group Commander.

7Q: And how long have you been in that position?

7A: Since the end of July last year, so about nine to ten months.

8Q: What do you consider your basic qualifications for that position? That can be based on experience, training, et cetera?

8A: All the above. Everything from fighter background to War College, I guess, staff experience.

9Q: What training have you received since your arrival at Incirlik with regards to your position here?

DOUGHERTY

9A: The kind of training most mid-level to senior officers get which is on the fly -- on the job. Maybe OJT is a good way to describe it, on the job training. Nothing in the formal way except the procedures that we developed since we've been here that I've been a part of. That's a formal education process, I guess.

10Q: Did you have an orientation with respect to the regulations and directives that govern the operations -- Operation PROVIDE COMFORT?

10A: In that -- My responsibilities to a certain degrees, so I tried to learn them.

11Q: To whom do you report in your current capacity?

11A: Douglas Richardson, the OPS Group Commander.

12Q: Do you supervise individuals in your position?

12A: As far as -- Am I their rater, no we have -- the Colonel is the rater for the people in our chain, but we have people who work for us on our behalf, Mission Directors, Mad Dogs and Dukes, who essentially are under my supervision or Colonel Richardson's supervision hourly.

13Q: Do you have a written duty description or any type of guidance for what your specific duties are?

13A: In our Officers Effectiveness Evaluation, we have the duty title, and I guess that's as formal as we have. That sort of tries to capture the essence of the duties here.

14Q: What are your normal duty hours?

14A: Usually about 7 in the morning. We start off the day with a maintenance meeting that I try to make, on Monday, Wednesday, and Fridays. Most of those days I'm in between 7 and 7:15. Then the other days, it depends on if I'm flying. I probably don't get in much later than about 7:30 most days. Then the evenings are anybody's guess, but I would suspect 6 to 7 on the long days.

15Q: Where do you normally perform your duties?

15A: In the operations building, building 362, here on base.

16Q: What in your opinion is your most critical duty?

16A: Overseeing the Operation PROVIDE COMFORT flying operations, make sure they're safe effective, efficient to a certain degree, in my Deputy role. Then, probably my flying opportunity is my second. When I'm flying that captures my attention pretty well.

17Q: In the discussion of regulations and directives that govern your operations, you said that they were your responsibility to a certain degree. Can you give me a feel for the type of regulations and the level of regulation that you're discussing there?

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17A: Well, the type would be the kinds of regulations you might expect in any flying organization that guide how big organizations do things safely and effectively. The 55 series Manuals that apply at every base you've ever been, we have one.

18Q: Are those wing level, group level, or above wing level regulations?

18A: Well, our -- the one that guides our local flying 55-1, is a wing level regulation, tied in with Turkish regulations that we've hammered out over twenty-five years here at Incirlik. And it essentially guides everything that's not Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.

19Q: Do you have CTF or Combined Task Force directives that are the basis for these regulations?

19A: No, sir, CTF, Combined Task Force are separate from 55 series regulations. They're -- Most of their guidance comes out in the way of policy letters and directions from the Commanding Generals.

Questions by Colonel At Lee:

20Q: How would you define your area of responsibilities as it is associated with Operation PROVIDE COMFORT and the CTF organization?

20A: Well, we wear a couple of hats here at Incirlik, and under CTF, our organization is the air component of the Combined Task Force, and since it's sort of a one component show here at Incirlik, we are the warfighters I suspect of the CTF and we are the CFAC, operation guys. And we are known locally as the CFAC/DO, and the CFAC/ADO, based on joint regulations. In our other hat, our 39th hat, I'm the OPS Group Deputy and my boss is the OPS Group Commander, under the new Air Force objective wing concept.

21Q: When you said CFAC, that refers to Combined Force Air Component Commander?

21A: In CFAC with one C, is the Combined Forces Air Component and then we put a slant ADO or DO when we're defining Colonel Richardson or me. The CFACC with two Cs, is Colonel Emery, or Colonel Kula now, who is two hatted also as Wing Commander and the 7440th Composite Wing Commander Provisional Commander.

22Q: In your "hat" or area of responsibility as the CFAC/ADO, do you have responsibility for the development of the CTF directives and procedures relating to Operation PROVIDE COMFORT?

22A: Yes sir, and specifically when it comes to executable guidance to the aircrews. That's where we -- that's our main job is to take policy and broad guidance and turn it into executable guidance in the form of Aircrew Read Files here.

23Q: Do you input into the creation of the broad guidance or do you function primarily in the execution of the guidance that comes down from the CTF level?

DOUGHERTY

23A: Often times we're asked and enter into discussions about the broad guidance, so, that when it comes out it's in a digestible form. It depends on the day, the particular issue at hand. It depends on if it's something being worked at the Colonel level or at the Brigadier General level. But often times we're brought into the discussion, maybe more of a sounding board than anything, but they bounce things off us constantly, yes sir.

Questions by Colonel Fain:

24Q: With regards to the OPC or Operation PROVIDE COMFORT daily flight activities, what do you consider the CFAC/DOs or ADO's responsibilities?

24A: My primary responsibility when I've got the "Brick" when I'm sort of watching the operation, is to provide a command link to our operations airborne over Northern Iraqi. The way we have it wickered here, by wickered I mean, the way we have it orchestrated, is our eyes and our ears for the daily operation based on our Air Tasking Order is to have a Mission Director, both on the ground in the wing operation center, and a Mission Director airborne, we call him Duke on board AWACS.

To make sure that the operation goes according to our Air Tasking Order which is a document that everybody reads, understands and guides their actions. And here in Turkey it's a Air Tasking Order that is approved and turned into a schedule by our Turkish host and then we fly that schedule according to their direction, they approve it.

25Q: Who is responsible for developing that Air Tasking Order?

25A: Our organization has a mission planning cell that builds the Air Tasking Order.

26Q: By, "our" organization, you mean the CFAC/DO Complex?

26A: Yes, sir, that's right.

27Q: Could you describe for me the ATO building process?

27A: There will be guys that you'll probably interview that can do it in much more detail and more -- and better.

28Q: A broad overview will be fine?

28A: Okay, we -- Some of what, some of the re -- the ATO has evolved since, well, from the beginning since DESERT STORM/ DESERT SHIELD, PROVEN FORCE. And it's one of those or -- one of those living breathing documents that constantly adjust to the threat primarily, to the local guidance, both the host nation and Commanding Generals, and to our force structure. And from guidance from the joint staff in our command chain in the various MODs of the different countries that are in the coalition.

So, all of those inputs work themselves into the ATO, because that's the -- that's the

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vehicle we use to describe flying operations in very fine detail to the pilots and aircrews of the different airplanes. So, having said that, it's a -- it's like any Frag and Frag is an ATO in our lexicon, that you've ever seen, except we transmit it by hand primarily to all the organizations in the CFAC who are resident at Incirlik. We don't send it out over the wire like you do in most commands and at most operations. Ergo, it's something that can be worked almost real time. We try to use a 48 hour cycle to build it, so that we can distribute it and have everybody have their copies when it comes to executing the mission.

But we can receive inputs as early as nine o'clock the day before and have them in the Air Tasking Order for the following day if we -- if all the inputs are not captured in that one document, we also have tools that we use to get information out, nearly real time and I can go into some more detail if you'd like, but that's sort of the broad brush of how we develop an ATO.

29Q: Let me ask you a couple of specific questions, where do you receive -- from what organization do you receive the inputs to build that Frag?

29A: We receive -- Our primary input is C2 at CTF, the Intelligence people. Their requests are almost always honored if it meets operational sanity checks. And primarily they make a reconnaissance request from their need to have a good picture of the order of battle over our area of operation.

30Q: Do you receive inputs in building the daily schedule from the individual units involved?

30A: Never, unless it's to us in another form which is our DET Commander's meetings where they bounce things off Colonel Richardson or me. Then we absorb that input and then enter it into the ATO cycle to make life better for them. But they never ever send inputs into the Air Tasking Order shop. If they do, they're deflected towards us.

31Q: If a unit, after the nine o'clock in the morning the day prior, that you described, was unable to meet the tasking, due to aircraft availability or aircrew availability, how would you enter that input and change the Air Tasking Order?

31A: We have a series of vehicles that I did not describe before, but I alluded to, Battle Staff Directives are the primary way we transmit information. These are written pieces of paper that we actually write our handwriting on and we distribute them or attach them to the ATO after it's distributed or before it's distributed either way. And people look at the ATO, and then the changes to them would be in -- the changes to that particular day's ATO would be in the Battle Staff Directive.

Another way to do that, would be to send information over a system called Sentinel Byte, which is sort of an on line computer E-Mail system, electronic mail that can be -- information can be sent to the various Intelligence hosts at the Squadron Operation Centers from the Joint Operation Center, the CTF/JOC, or from our CFAC/IN, or CFAC Intelligence Office,

DOUGHERTY

and they type it over. It's read out on the Sentinel Byte system and that is briefed to the aircrew before they step to fly.

32Q: If you received a late change, would it be normal for you to pass that information to the JOC that you described to disseminate?

32A: Yeah, our -- the last tool that we have is just radio calls from the ground. Maybe a phone call from me to the Mad Dog position, the Mission Director. SATCOM up link to Duke, the Mission Director aboard AWACS, who calls the information out over the radio, the secure, rather the anti-jam voice radio UHF, which is ultra high frequency radio to the crews that are actually orbiting in the area, and that's real time. And we've done that on occasion for a late breaking Intelligence or for things that simply got missed in all our other steps.

33Q: Are you familiar with the MCC, the Military Coordination Center and the Eagle Flight operations under that organization?

33A: Yes, sir.

34Q: Are flights by that organization included on the Air Tasking Order?

34A: They had not been to the degree that we wanted them to in the past, and I'll try to explain that. We have a -- We have a block in our ATO for Eagle Flight operations. And we always have Eagle Flight operations entered into the ATO. However, it's generally entered as required.

The reason being is that the Eagle Flight, UH60s do not fall under the CFAC purview for command and control like the other airplanes that support OPC do. My understanding is that the MCC Forward Commander, usually an Army Special Forces or FAO Colonel. FAO, is a Foreign Area Officer. Most of these guys speak Arabic, that's why they're stationed there, has the tactical and operational authority to move those flights around where he wants them. And they are at his beck and call to respond to his needs in the Zakhu forward area.

35Q: As he moves those flights and forces around does he have the responsibility to provide that information to any other agencies?

35A: I think up until we have tried to tighten this up since the accident that I don't think he felt compelled to inform the CFAC, certainly of any moments or changes in the UH60. But, I think he kept the Joint Operation Center involved and aware. But, I'm not in the JOC daily, so I don't know the real answer to that.

36Q: Have you received or do you receive on a regular basis information from the JOC regarding Eagle Flight activities?

36A: We -- I have to say that I don't know that, because it has not been a particular issue with us before, because things worked so smoothly and operated so smoothly with them that they were never a SPIKE on our scopes, you know, they didn't appear as problem areas. We thought we had deconfliction guaranteed with altitude with the procedures that they follow.

DOUGHERTY

They do follow every procedure we have in our Air Tasking Order and in our procedural ACOs, which is one of the primary ways we get information to our crews, through the ACO.

37Q: Have the presence of the Eagle Flights been an object of discussion at any of your meetings?

37A: They're always an object of discussion in our maintenance meetings at 7 o'clock in the morning because their stats are reported along with all the other airplanes. So, the discussion surrounding Eagle Flight essentially has been with maintenance and how we can help them get maintenance to that forward area, and it's been a real success story, because they've kept almost a hundred percent availability of their aircraft down there. It's generally been six airplanes for the nine or ten months that I've been here. Despite the fact that they're thousands of miles away from Giebelstadt, and are working in an almost austere situation there at Diyarbakir.

Questions by Major General Andrus:

38Q: Where do you get the helicopter inputs to put into the ATO?

38A: Well, before now sir, since it's been as required, it's, you know, generally the specific inputs that would be useful for us to brief to our crews -- have not been in the ATO, but in my experience, since I've flown here since February, we've had an Army GLO working in SOC2, which is where the F-16s hangout and the F4Gs and the Harriers. We had been briefed every morning as I step to fly by the Ground Order Battle Person, sometimes a GLO, sometimes an Air Force Intelligence Expert on UH60 flight activity. And they draw a picture for us in the AOR and they sort of draw a box of where they expect to do their operations.

So, in my mind the information had been disseminated on where they were going to be and what they were going to do. I was completely satisfied that I knew that UH60s would be underneath our operations or UN helicopters, which they also brief or any other odd unusual activity out there.

39Q: Getting back to the question on the ATO, You previously indicated I believe that you did have some helicopter information in the ATO?

39A: Yes, sir we always have some information.

40Q: And where does that information originate from? How does it get to you, so you can put it in the ATO?

40A: The UN helicopter that's in the ATO originates through message traffic. However that happens, I'm not positive, but obviously some UN, UNPROFOR, or somebody sends it forward to the JOC who forwards it to us. I suspect that most of our information would come -- in fact, I know that our information comes through the JOC to be entered into our ATO process. It does not come directly to our current operations.

DOUGHERTY

41Q: So, any UH60 information that would come to you to be entered into the ATO, you're saying goes through the JOC and is passed from the JOC?

41A: As I understand it, yes sir, because they have not been part of our current operations scheduling process up until last Monday.

42Q: According to your understanding are the UH60s required to comply with the guidance contained in the ATO?

42A: Yes, sir.

43Q: And are they required to comply with the guidance contained in the ACO?

43A: Yes, sir.

44Q: Do you know if, in fact, they have been complying with that guidance?

44A: My information would be second hand. If I answer this question, I want you to know that I'm not sitting in their cockpits everyday. From one source, which would be the AWACS source is that their -- they would say that the compliance is hit or miss. But, I think that's basically because these guys are out of communications with them because of their low altitude, that we drive them down to by ATO and ACO.

They sometimes don't pick up their "Squawks" so they may think they're not complying, but I think, again, is because their transponders are not picked up in deep valleys. They -- The times I've flown on them, and the times I've heard them on the radio, they seem to be complying exactly with our Air Tasking Order and our Modes and Codes and their Squawks and with the procedures that we've outlined in the ACO for deconfliction.

Questions by Colonel Fain:

45Q: Going back to your testimony that as a pilot you received the information regarding the Eagle Flights. What type of aircraft were you flying?

45A: I was flying with them one time on board the UH60 to Zakhu. Other times I've flown on AWACS, and then I'm a F-16 pilot, so I fly in the TAOR, as a F-16 pilot.

46Q: Your reference to receiving a briefing from the Intel personnel or the GLO?

46A: Yes, sir.

47Q: In what capacity did you receive that briefing?

47A: As a line pilot, stepping to fly?

48Q: And what type of aircraft?

48A: F16.

DOUGHERTY

49Q: What was your primary area of concern regarding the Eagle Flights as an operational F-16 pilot flying in the AOR?

49A: Almost none. They were -- They enter into the enroute structure, going from Diyarbakir to Zakhu, and to the Gate One where we enter Northern Iraq. They are deconflicted by altitude as per our ACO. They squawk just like anybody would in Turkey, their Modes and Codes for aircraft control. And then they drop down rapidly to Zakhu Base, to the landing field there.

Now, once they get into Northern Iraq, because they stay at such low altitudes and we are prohibited at this time from flying very low at all, and have been for most of my stay here, based on threat and other considerations, they've not been much of a factor at all in our thinking. We're glad to know where they are, but that's it.

50Q: The northern portion of Northern Iraq, contains a security zone. There is no security zone, if you're familiar with that term listed below that?

50A: That's right.

51Q: Would you expect to find the UH-60s operating in either, or, or both of those areas?

51A: I would expect to find the UH-60s operating primarily in the security zone, but I would not be surprised to find them operating east and southeast of Mosul, near Irbil, Salah ad Din, and some of the mountainous areas there where the Kurds still hold sway in Northern Iraq.

52Q: Prior to 14 April, do you have knowledge of flights in that area?

52A: Yes sir, just in conversations with CTF people and understanding their mission to a certain degree out there.

53Q: When you received your briefings as an operational F-16 pilot where did you receive those briefings?

53A: In SOC2, Squadron Operation Center Number 2.

54Q: Can you tell me what organizations are in that SOC?

54A: Yeah, the organizations of resident in there are the Harriers, the GR7s, they're the airplanes that the Harriers more specifically are referred to. The F-4G, Wild Weasels, the F-16 from whatever unit represents the F-16, and it's also a brief facility for the Turkish F-16 or F-4E pilots if they choose to use it.

55Q: Where are the F-15C and F-15E aircrews?

55A: They're resident in SOC1, Squadron Operation Center Number 1, which is two hundred yards away.

56Q: Are you aware of information passed to them? Do they have the same information as was available to SOC2?

56A: Only in the fact that I took the briefing from the Intelligence Officer in our mission report

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from the mishap and what he told me, I think you have as a matter of record, was that they did not brief the UH-60 Eagle Flight whereabouts in the detail in SOC1, that we received in SOC2. I think because we had a Ground Liaison Officer, an Army guy who understood that mission and understood in his mind that it needed to be advertised better.

57Q: Would you consider the information regarding the flight activities of the UH-60 is more valuable to the F-16 or air to ground aircrews, or to the Air-to-Air aircrews?

57A: I would find them -- The reason that they're briefed in detail, and I'm not trying to be -- I'll answer your question, but I'm not going to say yes, or no. The air to ground guys, because they can go into the low fly areas and do training at low altitude, are keenly aware or they anticipate -- I'm sorry to be evasive, but they want to know about any activity in their operations, either at their altitude or below.

The Air-to-Air guys tend to spend most of their time up high looking for fighter type aircraft. High fast flyers or medium altitude flyers from Iraq to keep the No-Fly-Zone pure. So, their information has been focused on that kind of target, that kind of activity. But, I still think that the information on Eagle Flight activity is important for the Eagles and whoever else acts as air defense fighters, because they are responsible for delousing the area of any enemy activity before our high value assets enter the areas. Delousing means, to make sure there's no Iraqi fighters hiding in the deep valleys up there, that want to spring up and attack our AWACS or Tankers.

58Q: Do we have a system -- Do you have a system in effect to advise the aircrews early in their training of the presence of the Eagle Flights?

58A: We brief all incoming crews on OPC and the CFAC, ROE and OPC, and as part of that we talk about Eagle Flight and the -- well the Army Forces is what we call them, and we describe to them, what they are and where they are, and the kind of roles and missions they have. But, we also don't spend much time talking about them, because they are almost entirely a CTF asset, and work independently of the CFAC.

59Q: Is it your impression then that the F-15 crews are aware of the presence of the Eagle Flights during daily operations?

59A: Absolutely.

60Q: Prior to the 14th of April, are you aware of any HELO helicopter operations outside the period that they would receive AWACS coverage.

60A: I'm sorry, I'm not tracking you.

61Q: That would be in a time frame. AWACS is on station at a given period of time based on the Air Tasking Order, are you aware of helicopter activities in the AOR outside of that period of time that AWACS is on station?

DOUGHERTY

61A: Yes, sir, their admin runs by UH-60s from Diyarbakir to Zakhu occur independently if required of AWACS coverage, because Zakhu depends on UH60s for their -- that's their life line for supplies, everything basically from food to medicine to resupply of their operation down there.

62Q: Are you aware of operations East of Zakhu from Zakhu in periods when AWACS coverage is not available

62A: I'm not personally aware of it. I would not be surprised if they had -- as a matter of course in their mission, made visits outside of AOR or outside of AWACS coverage because we lose so much AWACS coverage, so routinely, due to JTIDS down links, weather, maintenance, that -- they may not be able to conduct their mission effectively without sending missions East of Zakhu, without AWACS coverage. But I don't know that for a fact, I'm guessing, that, yes.

63Q: Do you know if Eagle operations or the MCC is aware of scheduled AWACS coverage and or cancellations or changes to that coverage?

63A: I know they're aware of scheduled activities because they get the ATO. The ATO is sent to Diyarbakir for the Turks to turn into a schedule. They also get a copy of the MCC rear, there at Diyarbakir or Pirincli, and I'm using Diyarbakir and Pirincli almost synonymously. I have not seen their operation except for their runway shack there at Diyarbakir. And so, the Eagle Flight guys get their information, the ATO from the MCC Rear, daily. Changes to the ATO or to our area coverage, I'm not sure how that information is passed or if it's passed.

64Q: Do you have a direct line that you use with Eagle operations at Zakhu?

64A: No, sir, we did not before the 14th of April.

Questions by Major General Andrus:

65Q: You indicated that regarding the Eagle Flights operating into and out of Zakhu?

65A: Yes, sir.

66Q: Prior to AWACS coverage being available, would you address the same situation with the helicopters operating in those areas prior to fighter aircraft being available?

66A: I wouldn't go there without having had the sweep made. And that's sort of the understanding for -- if I understand it. Then this -- Some of this information is stuff I've understood in the last week or so.

I may not have been conscious of it before, but as I understood it, they were prohibited by General Pilkington's direction from going East of Zakhu in the TAOR without having AWACS coverage and that means by definition that they'll have a fighter sweep before AWACS coverage because we never let the AWACS get into harm's way without having a sweep by the DCA fighters before hand.

DOUGHERTY

67Q: As the CFAC/ DO, were you aware of the helicopters violating then that guidance and operating in the AOR prior to the fighters sweep?

67A: No, sir. In fact, I think that would have been in -- that would have been directly against the ATO guidance by definition.

Questions by Colonel Fain:

68Q: CFAC/ DO has TACON, Tactical Control of the air operations in the AOR. Is that true for periods when AWACS and scheduled OPC traffic is not available?

68A: I think that we don't have control of anything out there unless we have OPC as an entity, airborne over Northern Iraq. So, I think the answer to your question is, yes that's true, we don't have TACON over that TAOR when we're not there. Now, we may have responsibility for it, but if we're not there we don't really have much control over it.

COLONEL FAIN: I suggest we follow up for clarification and then take a short break.

Questions by Colonel At Lee:

69Q: Probably a good place to try and clarify right there. You indicated earlier in your testimony, that it's your understanding that the CFAC does not have tactical control or responsibility for the Army operations within the AOR. The question we just asked you kind of suggests the contrary with -- and the answer to the question. Can you clarify that please.

69A: Well, I guess the best way to start this thing would be to define tactical control and I haven't been able to find it in twenty years and I don't know if anybody has. And it's really a muddy mess in a coalition. And I brief this to all the crews when they come through is, if -- and I -- we have slides that show basically U.S. Air Forces are in the 7440th Composite Wing Provisional. This is a hand-me-down from the war. This is the way we essentially put the 7440th Wing Commander in charge and had jurisdiction, disciplinary jurisdiction over troops under his command.

Here, the 4th TAC Fighter Wing Provisional in Saudi Arabia and other places -- In order to -- that's full of bumps and warts with American troops but it essentially works and everybody sort of understands that everybody lumps together under a provisional combat wing, (Aircraft flying over the building so the interview came to a brief pause.)

70Q: You were talking about the organization of the 7440th Composite Wing Provisional. Before you go on with that explanation, were your comments at this point, referring to the DESERT STORM time frame organization?

70A: DESERT STORM/DESERT SHIELD; and PROVEN FORCE. And we've kept that organization intact since then. It has not fundamentally changed in its concept since we built

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those units up in the fall of 90. I think probably the 7440th may have come a number of months after that, but essentially it's been in place for three to four years at least.

In that concept, the forces fall in on a composite wing and what I was saying, was the American forces, it's a fairly well understood concept. Now, in a coalition with a composite wing holdover from the war at a base that was a WTD base with a skeleton, a permanent party manning and our other hat is the OPS Group. We have lots of different, sort of odd pieces here, but the foreign coalition members and the Special Operations Command, and the Army and the Navy fall a little bit outside of that definition of the 7440th Combat Wing Provisional that I described for Americans.

They're not totally a part of that. I mean, they come to our meetings. They pay attention to our guidance. They do essentially what we ask them to do and are very disciplined troops. But, I think that they're -- they don't really have to listen to us but they do and that's the beauty of a coalition, is that it works. Basically, because people want to be a part of it, not because they're forced to be a part of it.

We don't try to force American values, American thoughts on all the coalition members because we understand that it's a -- it takes four to tango in this case, and we try to do that as carefully and as effectively as we can without destroying the coalition. Our job is to keep the coalition together, that's our guidance.

The Special Operating -- The Special Forces by law are different from us. They work for many different masters when a war hits, so they're an unusual case. The Army Forces and the Navy Forces are distinctly different. And then the coalition members are another subgroup of that force structure that's outside of our total preview.

71Q: Let me back up, explain if you would the correlation between the 39th Wing and the 7440th Composite Wing Provisional?

71A: The 39th Wing Commander, Colonel Kula, is also the 7440th Composite Wing Provisional Commander. He is the commander of two units. The primary reason for the 7440th Composite Wing is to provide the commander the stick, the disciplinary stick if required to discipline troops under his command at his installation in Turkey. And those people can be drawn from anywhere and often are, primarily Europe but a lot of times ACC Forces from the United States. And also, staff members that we draw from all over the globe to support our operations, both in the CTF and the CFAC.

72Q: Is it accurate to say, then, that on a day to day basis, reference to the 7440th Composite Wing Provisional, is limited to disciplinary concerns and operational flying issues are handled under the 39th Wing Organizational Structure?

DOUGHERTY

72A: No, sir, I wouldn't say that. I would say that we under the 7440th are entrusted as the CFAC to the CTF and that's our goal. I mean that's what we try to do, is we try to serve the CTF when Operation Provide Comfort is in operation and it has been for over three years now.

Our Air Force side, the 39th Wing just happens to be sort of a fortunate structural concept -- constructed that people fall in on it understand, which makes our job as the CFAC and the 7440th Wing much easier, because people know that they have to go to five meetings. They have to go to SOF meetings. They need to go to DETCO meetings that we call. They need to pay attention to written regulations and guidance and all those things that people understand in Air Forces, they just fall right in on it and hear it, it exists.

And the best part about this is that the 7440th and the 39th Wing are permanent party people who have the corporate memory. Instead of most JTF or CTF operations it's all TDY and you keep reinventing the wheel and losing the picture of what's been before. We help keep that consistent and that's the beauty of falling in on us here at Incirlik. It's confusing and I appreciate the difficulty with you understanding it. I don't fully understand it nor does anybody. It's a moving picture, it moves all the time and we grow and live and breathe.

73Q: To clarify a couple of pieces, you were talking about the SOF Army and Navy Operations being different and distinct?

73A: Right.

74Q: Do they fall within the 7440th Composite Wing Provisional?

74A: No, sir, not in my understanding.

75Q: With reference to the tactical control, understanding that it's a muddy area, I need to understand your understanding?

75A: Okay.

76Q: As for the CFAC's authority over Army aircraft in the AOR, what is your understanding of the tactical control or the effective control the CFAC is authorized to exercise over them?

76A: In that they -- we develop procedures for deconfliction and for safe, smart tactically sound operations. We do that and we expect them to follow that, but we don't have the authority, I think, to enforce that they do. Much of what we do is by the good graces of the coalition members and the various units that are attached to us for OPC.

77Q: Like to limit this discussion at this point, to just U. S. Army aircraft operations?

77A: Okay.

78Q: And I understand your comments that you just made to apply to those, is that accurate?

78A: It does, yes sir.

DOUGHERTY

Questions by Colonel Fain:

79Q: When discussing the authority to affect their operations, who do you believe has the authority within a chain that you also have contact?

79A: The CTF Commanding General, the ultimate authority.

Questions by Colonel At Lee:

80Q: Do they believe that there is any distinction in the picture you've just described between Army aircraft operations generally, and Army aircraft operations, referring to airborne aircraft in the AOR?

80A: I'm not tracking you, sir.

81Q: You can look at authority over Army aircraft operations in at least two ways. One way being general authority over how they do business, where they're based, how they're provisioned, what rules they follow on a day to day basis. Another way of looking at tactical control or responsibility is, with reference to actual flight operations. In this case making reference to entry from the Gate into the AOR, airborne aircraft maneuvering within the AOR?

81A: Okay, I got you. I would that the CFAC has no authority over that except what I described earlier with procedural things that they follow, nor any necessarily any responsibility for their operations. Because that falls primarily under MCC forward, the Commanding Colonel out there at Zakhu or by extension to the CTF Commanders.

82Q: If you were aware of failure of the Army aircraft to follow the procedures that have been promulgated, what do you believe would be the authority of the CFAC to deal with that situation?

82A: I think probably almost none, but we would certainly have a major voice and we would express concerns, reservations or whatever to the Commanding General. That would be -- or at least through the CFAC or directly to him, either way. It depends on the time lines that we were working with.

83Q: Now, what is the source of the understanding that you just related. Why do you think that?

83A: Well, I guess in a sort of simplified version is I don't see the DET Commander at any of my meetings. He doesn't call me and I've never, until this accident I've never met the DET Commander at Eagle Flight. When they come through and they often do, rotating back and forth, they never come to the CFAC, they go to CTF Headquarters and visit with them.

That's true for MCC rear and MCC forward. The only reason I know any of those guys is because I took a trip out there one time and, in fact, the reason I took the trip was to better understand how the front end of the spear works here at OPC.

DOUGHERTY

Questions by Colonel Fain:

84Q: With regards to Eagle Flight or MCC operations going to the CTF Headquarters, what would you consider to be their point of contact for communications with CTF Headquarters?

84A: The Joint Operation Center, they're tied in by data and voice and UHF and SATCOM to the JOC, there at CTF, and they talk to them all the time.

Questions by Colonel At Lee:

85Q: Have you ever had any direction or indication from the CTF to include the Joint Operation Center, indicating that they had an opinion or a view different from the one that you have related?

85A: To include the Joint Operation Center?

86Q: Have you ever received any communications or directives from the CTF, which could include communications coming through the Joint Operation Center to you, suggesting that their view of the CFAC's responsibilities towards Army aircraft was different than the one that you related?

86A: Not specifically sir. I know that as the Deputy, listening and being parts of parts -- parts of conversations with Colonel Richardson and having him talk about some of his thoughts on operations with General Pilkington, he's always been interested in having one boss for the air show around here and that would be the CFAC/DO, or actually the CFAC Commander, Colonel Kula.

And that's an Air Force mind set, not necessarily the mind set of a coalition or an Army Joint, not an Army, but a joint setup. It's evolved out of our thinking in the Air Force and since it's an air component specific theater, who like to push that kind of thinking through, and it was not realized before the 14th of April. But I don't have any details on how far we'd formalized that construct.

87Q: Colonel Richardson would be the source of information on that or a source?

87A: He might be a better source on that kind of thing, yes sir.

Questions by Major General Andrus:

88Q: Does the JOC come under the 39th Wing?

88A: No, sir.

89Q: Who does the JOC answer to?

89A: It works for C3 at the CTF, Colonel O'Brien at this time, and for the Commanding General and the Chief of Staff.

DOUGHERTY

Questions by Colonel At Lee:

90Q: Some of these are just clean up of terminology. ATO refers to?

90A: Air Tasking Order. Sometimes referred to as a Frag, in other theater as an ATM.

91Q: You referred to the C2 at the CTF?

91A: C2 is a -- in a coalition force, C2 is like J2 or Intel, and CTF is Coalition Task Force.

92Q: You talked about using the Sentinel Byte, E-Mail system to distribute late breaking information?

92A: Roger.

93Q: The Joint Operation Center is connected to that system?

93A: Well, no sir, C2 right next door shares a wall with the JOC and their C2 shift worker is connected to that system, and he works for the JOC Chief at the time on a, I think eight hour shift is the way they work it, twenty-four hours.

94Q: So, they would deliver effectively -- The intelligence representative would deliver whatever information to the person running the -- that operation?

94A: Yes, sir and he'd disseminate that information. It would be picked up instantly on all the screens at the different JOCs -- SOC's, excuse me, and also at CFAC IN, which is in our operation.

95Q: Is the Eagle Operation on that system?

95A: I do not know.

96Q: Do you have any information as to how they would receive information disseminated over Sentinel Byte at all?

96A: I suspect they could get a hard copy faxed to them but I don't know. They may have Sentinel Bite but I know PTT lines, that's Turkish telephone lines between here and Diyarbakir often don't have the Baud rate to accept data transmissions, so that might be a difficult thing for them to do, particularly secure data transmissions.

97Q: And that was Baud rate, B- A- U -D?

97A: That's a term I use at my peril because I don't know what it means, otherwise, except that when you try to push secure data through lines that won't receive it, if it's a step down from, let's say, civilian lines to an AUTOVON or a DSN network. You can't cram that many molecules in a line and that's what I understand Baud rate to be.

98Q: I think we defined it along the way but, GLO refers to Ground Liaison Officer?

98A: Yes, sir.

DOUGHERTY

99Q: Meaning representative of the Army to the Air Force?

99A: An Army, they -- most fighter wings have a GLO stationed with them and this GLO is TDY down here.

100Q: You refer to a UN, and I believe you said, UNPROFOR?

100A: I use that to -- the UN has a thousands different acronyms for the different areas. When you say, UNGCI in Northern Iraq. I don't know what they're calling them in the central part of the country. But, they're UN observers that are on the ground or flying in helicopters or doing whatever they do and I don't know what it's called in Central Iraq.

101Q: You talked about flying with the Eagle aircraft and observing their procedures, how often did you do that?

101A: Once. You can't get down there very easily. They guard -- It's a small house, it doesn't have much room and your justification for going down there has to be a pretty good one. And we're encouraged not to overload them with visitors unless there's a real good reason.

102Q: In one part of your testimony, you referred to a prohibition keeping Air Force aircraft from flying low, and in another part of your testimony you spoke about the F16 pilots having a greater interest because they fly in a low level structure?

102A: Yes, sir.

103Q: Would you explain the apparent difference in those comments?

103A: Oh, I see. Since the helicopters are restricted to 400 feet and lower. And at one time in this area of operation, we had airplanes at 250 feet or lower, depending on their national guidance. I think that the Brits were down to 100 feet at one time, and I know the French were down to about 250 feet at one time.

And that altitude has moved around over the years. The lowest they've flown in the low structure since I've been here is a 1,000 feet and we've been restricted by JCS guidance and the coalition forces have gone along with this to 10,000 feet for a good chunk of the time I've been here, except in some areas and those are normally in the security zone. And we have two low fly areas, North and South and we are still -- we don't often go down there, we don't go very low.

We certainly don't get within 500 feet of the helicopters, but if you're at a 1,000 feet and you're doing ridge crossing and you come along somebody, a helicopter who's also doing a ridge crossing, you may get closer than our deconfliction procedures anticipate. So, we want to know about any traffic down there, because you don't like to get surprised in low altitude structure by anything.

104Q: Do you recall when the 10,000 foot restriction was lifted?

104A: I can track you through based on our Aircrew Read File items blow by blow on that moving train. It's been -- it's threat driven and it changes sometimes weekly.

DOUGHERTY

105Q: It did not apply on the 14th of April?

105A: It applied, yes sir, but when you're doing an intercept you go anywhere you need to. You don't -- restrictions on, low fly restrictions are just for training and for normal day to day operations, not for combat opportunities or combat operations that need to go wherever you need to go. Do you understand what I'm saying there?

106Q: I do. Did the 10,000 foot restriction apply to a tactical situation?

106A: No restriction would apply to a tactical situation, if required, you go where you need to be.

107Q: You were talking about briefing incoming crews on Operation PROVIDE COMFORT and the role of the organization, and you said, we briefed them?

107A: Uh-hum.

108Q: Is there a single briefing for all aircraft personnel coming into Operation PROVIDE COMFORT?

108A: There's a -- we tailor the briefing depending on who we're talking to. We have a little bit different briefing for AWACS crews than we do for fighter crews. We brief units when they swap out, generally to catch people who have not been here before and those that are -- especially from the stateside units, guard units for example, that came over for Christmas relief last year, we give them a special treatment to try to get them to fully understand why we're here, what we do and our primary gouge is the Rules of Engagement. And, then to make sure their life here is quality, and what we can do to help them.

We don't get a hundred percent of the people that come down through here. But we do get all of the big units swap outs and we fill up our briefing room with people. We do that always with the AWACS, always with the fighter crews and we get, American fighter crews and sometimes we get -- I take a fuzzy, because four or five of us do this briefing, but I don't know, I've never briefed a French rotation or a British rotation or a Turkish rotation.

109Q: People who do the briefing, you said there are four or five of you, who are they?

109A: Colonel Richardson, me, Colonel -- Lieutenant Colonel Mike Pinter, who I think you interviewed last night. Captain Bags Wilson, who is our weapons officer who leaves Saturday, PCS, and Major Larry White who is the current operations Flight Commander. And, then on occasion, Major Underwood, who is sort of the DO of the Squadron, the OPS Officer of the Squadron. It's not an official billing, but that's the position he fills.

110Q: You were talking about the organization and the wing, and you referred to the WTD?

110A: WTD, Weapons Training Detachment. For years Incirlik was a fair weather place for people who leave central Europe and come down and fly low levels, bombing missions on a bombing range, supersonic Air-to-Air activity over the water, and get training that they couldn't get in Germany or the Netherlands, or England.

DOUGHERTY

COLONEL AT LEE: That's all I have.

COLONEL FAIN: I recommend at this point, if there's no other questions, that we take a short break.

[The interview recessed at 1127 hours, 26 April 1994]

[The interview reconvened at 1140 hours, 26 April 1994.]

COLONEL AT LEE: The time is 1140. The same individuals who were present when we recessed are once again present.

Questions by Colonel Fain:

111Q: I have two questions or two areas to cover based on earlier testimony. With regards to your comment on the manning, the skeleton manning of permanent party, can you describe what you're talking about in that comment?

111A: Yes, sir. In Incirlik for years and I'm talking back to my experience as a Lieutenant down here on weapons training detachments out of Germany, Incirlik had a sort of just a small Corps group of people that ran a Base while it waited for fighters to come down from England or Germany and Spain to train or to sit on strike alert.

So, you'll find that, that same Core group of people exist today. Even though we've overlaid, we've doubled the base population with TDY troops and increased the operation from a Squadron or smaller size weapons training detachment operation, at irregular intervals, to a major combat operation in a coalition force with four countries represented.

112Q: Your skeleton manning refers to permanent party personnel?

112A: Yes, sir. We've got, you know, we've got one guy that's our weapons and tactics officer, our training officer and our stand eval officer, and our special projects guy, he's one guy. We have one fellow who's our current operation, he's does all that. And we have one, OSS Commander now.

We have traditionally worked around here with just one OPS Group Commander or equivalent. We have since brought a place for me as the Deputy and we've hired a lot of TDY people to help us in our Frag shop, our MPC. And in some of our other activities that we absolutely couldn't get done because of the crush of the wartime commitments.

113Q: It's my understanding that the TDY personnel fill out the rest of the manning. Is that, well, first is that correct?

DOUGHERTY

113A: There's two types of TDY personnel. Ones under a joint billet and one's under augmentees to the 39th Wing and we have both. But primarily, we have augmentees to the 39th Wing. We draw them from all over the world for a 120 days at a pop or less.

114Q: Who determines the manning required for those billets?

114A: The primary driver on manning is C1. This is the personnel people in the CTF.

115Q: Is that manning, as it currently exists, adequate to do the mission?

115A: Uh, yes sir, I guess so. We're doing it. I would say that you'd never have enough but we have -- I think we've got our frag shop wired with the right number of people and the right amount of time here for consistent understanding of things. I think we have our mission directors just about right, although I could use one more, I think.

And I could use all of them to stay a 120 days. Some of them stay less. There's a constant struggle between major commands on how many days their people will be left to do these duties, and in some cases the time was a 180 days, they'd split it and two people would go 90 days. Now, we've got it as a hard requirement for a 120 days for one person.

116Q: What's the advantage of the 120 day rotation schedule vice a shorter rotation schedule?

116A: Well, we're in a constant training environment around here. In fact, as I first came into this job I watched Colonel Richardson spend hours and hours and hours training people on the same things, week after week, after week, and it required it. And it completely ate up our time because everybody turned over so rapidly.

Since January of this year, we've had the, I think it's called Palace Tenure, but I'll have to take a hazy on that, I'm not sure, has brought people in for a 120 days at a pop. But, until April of this month, the -- different commands around the world had not agreed to the 120 days. So, it should be from this month on, we should get people for a 120 days, drawn from other sources besides USAFE, because we essentially were eating up our USAFE assets at a rapid rate and now we're getting them from everywhere.

117Q: Okay, now I'd like to move to another area. Regarding the briefing of aircrews arriving at Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. You made reference to a mass briefing for certain units?

117A: Yes, sir.

118Q: You also implied that there was a difference for individuals that had previously been in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, can you explain that to me?

118A: We catch all the major rotations of bodies and brief them and I'll give you an example. When the rainbow coalition of guard, F16 pilots came from Richmond, Sioux City, Sioux Falls and Buckley, back December 5th I think, last year, they all came in and we catch them the day

DOUGHERTY

they get here before they completely collapse because of the time change, and we read them in for about forty-five minutes to an hour and a half depending on questions and other things.

Tell them why they're here, what we're all about and give them, what you would expect in any new operation particularly if you entering a combat operation. The kinds of things that you would want to hear about when you got here.

Now, that's the formalized briefing. For us, we know that units all have crossover briefings when one leaves and another takes its place, they have ADVON teams that come in and explore things. Look into the operation and give feedback to their units and then they brief them as a unit when they get to the operation.

When the F-16 units transition in through here, and there's been four of them from Europe in my experience, when the mass change out of bodies occurs we catch the main group. But they move people through almost weekly in one-zs and two-zs, with either aircraft swap outs in one-zs or two-zs or in just body swaps for whatever reasons. And we don't always catch them in the mass briefing and we know that.

119Q: Those briefings are given within the individual unit, is that correct?

119A: Well, the mass briefing that we give is given up in our conference room outside our door and people come to us. Otherwise those briefings, those transition briefings or those change out briefings of the small groups of people are -- if they occur, they occur informally, I'm not aware of how they do it.

120Q: So, there is no form of standardization of those briefings that's documented and in effect?

120A: No, sir, not that I'm aware of. We, of course, have ARFs that they have to read, background notes, Squadron standards. Much of what we do here is pretty rote, so all the units have three or four pages of Squadron standards that they live by and the 480th is just a shade off of the 23rd Squadron and the 23rd is a little bit different from the 512th and the 526 does things a little different from the other Squadrons.

So, as attached flyers here we learn all the different squadron stuff and it's passed down pretty constantly. And we have -- the ACO has been translated into pictures by the guard units. So, what we do when we go out to the area and how we get back safely and it's all -- everybody carries those things in their pilot aid and I think it works pretty good.

121Q: Does the OPS Group maintain a file of those briefings?

121A: Oh, yes sir, it's a briefing that we have, both in the OSS, the Support Squadron and at the OPS Group, end of the building.

DOUGHERTY

Questions by Major General Andrus:

122Q: Now, that is the mass briefing that you give. The individual briefings that are given by the units are they maintained on file, are they at the responsibility of the individual unit?

122A: I don't know. I would just suspect if I was a unit commander, I would have a crossover with my guys either orally or written. And I suspect they get them in a -- they have a briefing room down there and the chairs are set up looking forward like someone is giving a briefing all the time and they capture changes, and adjustments, and things that are new since you've been down here last, that kind of stuff.

123Q: Does the OPS Group mass briefing address the ROE?

123A: Oh, yes sir. That's the central focus of the briefing.

124Q: Is that a standard ROE briefing with standard SPIKES?

124A: It's a briefing that has not changed appreciably since I've been here.

125Q: Is that the only means for providing ROE briefings to the inbound aircrews?

125A: No, sir, they're required to read the ARFs, the Aircrew Read File. In ARF 183 one of the oldest and longest standing ARFs has the -- has six pages of ROE in it.

126Q: You have the mass briefing to instruct inbound aircrews on ROE, and I believe you indicated that not all aircrews attend that mass briefing?

126A: That's true.

127Q: So, how do you ensure that the aircrews that do not attend the mass briefing understand the ROE?

127A: They have to read the ARF. In the Aircrew Read File number 183 has the ROE as the subject of the ARF.

128Q: If the ARF is sufficient to instruct people on the ROE, then why is the ROE briefed in the mass briefing?

128A: I think it's a good idea, it reinforces it. It's something that's different for these guys. Some of these people come from Bosnia Herzegovina where they have a tortured ROE. Some have spent time in southern watch where the ROE is a little different. And when they come here they need to see the specific OPC modifications that we made over the years.

129Q: Said another way, if it's a good idea to give it to most why would it not be a good idea to give it to everyone?

129A: We couldn't catch everybody coming through here or we would be doing nothing but briefings and we do give it to them through the ARF.

DOUGHERTY

130Q: Has it ever been done in the past where everybody was briefed on the ROE?

130A: I don't see how it would be possible, sir, just with all the moving of the bodies in and out of here.

Questions by Colonel Fain:

131Q: And the limitation to make it impossible is what?

131A: Our time, the numbers of people we have and the number of bodies that rotate in and out of here. Every -- Probably everyday someone comes in and out of OPC. The flying units, probably every other day, maybe every three days. And they come in with -- in their airplanes or they come in on MAC Transit or they come in on Chartered flights. We don't require to be informed of everybody that swaps in and out. We would be chasing personnel issues all day long if we did.

But we solved that by putting the ROE in the ARF and making that a -- guys have to sit down with it and, in fact, the areas, for example, their first day down, they're required to sit and study the Aircrew Read File and other Squadron level handouts before a guy to get comfortable with the ROE and with the normal procedures down here.

132Q: And is that study or review of the ARF documented?

132A: I think in the Harriers' case, that study is and I know that the ARF, they signed off the ARF, just like you would in any fighters Squadron for the FCIF, Flight Crew Information File. It's sort of what an ARF is, but it's different because we're a coalition and we call it an Aircrew Read file. They also have to study and understand the ACO, both Volume I and certainly, in Volume II is the longer one that they -- we briefed that in our standard briefing too.

133Q: What document or direction requires them to do that studying?

133A: Well we have a "no go" system, "go, no-go". And we do not let a pilot step for his airplane unless he's signed off on all the information files and read files that have to be done before he flies. And that includes critical action responses or bold phases for the different airplanes. ARF items that are no go, and all of our ARF items are go, no go. And other squadron level things that they decide is go, no go, like sign out and the local flight sign out log.

Questions by Colonel At Lee:

134Q: Other than the ARF is anything done to achieve standardization between the detachments and regarding what is said about the ROE or other theater procedures?

134A: The ACO and it's described as the -- there's three different names for it, I've seen over time, but it's essentially procedural guide for operating in an OPC. I don't know the name of it. I think it's Air Coordination Order, I think is the right name for it, but maybe we can look that up.

DOUGHERTY

But that's a document that has been developed over the years and it's really been worked hard since June of last year when Colonel Richardson came on board, because we wanted to avoid WOMS and WOMS being, words of mouth and other things that weren't written and weren't documented.

We've done I think an excellent job of making sure that what we do here is documented because it's too difficult in a coalition environment where English is not the king language -- it's not the -- it's the operating language but it's not always understood. We write things down so it's understood by everybody and it's, in fact, better, particularly for the French guys and the Turks to sit and read it and visit with it and understand it and talk about what we're saying.

If they got it just by voice trail or by orally, they'd miss it and, in fact, we would miss it. So, you need to look at those things hard sometimes.

Questions by Major General Andrus:

135Q: Do you have any way of following up to ensure that the guidance written in the ACO is complied with?

135A: Various ways, I think primarily the best way we have is that most of our essential commanders are flying this operation, unlike some operations. Colonel Emery, Colonel Kula, Colonel Richardson and I and our weapons officer, and General Pilkington fly on a routine basis. We fly at the MS rate which is Mission Support rate, somewhere between four and five sorties a month. We eat up about ten to twelve percent of the sorties in the fighter Squadrons, primarily in this case the F16s to do that.

We understand the language, we understand the restrictions when we lay them on the people out there. We know what the guys are doing out there because we fly on their wings and we see them make mistakes just as well as we see them do things right. That's the primary way. The secondary way, is we have feedback from our SOFs our Dukes, or Mission Directors, our DETCO. Those of us in the supervisory roles, we talk constantly on how we can make things better. We have DETCO meetings every week twice, 1600 in the afternoon. It used to be 7 in the morning but we moved it to 1600, and we may move it back, but we get together, with just the DETCOs and we vent anything that bothers us and we change procedures with our ACO.

We've had a basic ACO republished since I've been here and we've got Volume I, excuse me, Change 1 in the works rights now very close to being published. And I guess the other feedback we get is from AWACS and from our Turkish controllers and our Turkish radar operators out in the area to see if we're following the procedures that we told them that we're going to follow. Then CTF Commanding General also helps us keep boundaries on how we operate.

DOUGHERTY

Questions by Colonel Fain:

136Q: We'll now move on to another area, were you on duty on the 14th of April?

136A: Yes, sir.

137Q: In what capacity?

137A: I was the -- I'm the acting DO right now. We've had a change, I think our change of command was on the 13th or the 12th, where Colonel Emery gave up the wing to Colonel Kula, and I'll have to check that date. Let me look in my pocket and I can tell you exactly (reaching in left side pocket to retrieve a notebook). The change of command was on the 12th, so when the command changed, Colonel Kula was now, who was the Vice Wing Commander fledged up to Wing Commander.

And in order to make sure that things didn't fall apart at the highest level at the wing level, they brought Colonel Richardson my boss, who is still the OPS Group Commander up to sit in and sort of hold the stick for the Wing Commander when he was flying or when he was away. And I was, and am, the Acting OPS Group Commander, although, I'm still the Deputy. I'm not legally responsible for the group, but I'm the only guy sitting on that end of the building and everybody's coming to me for guidance and stuff when Colonel Richardson is wrapped up at Wing. So, I was on duty both figuratively and literally.

138Q: Was Colonel Kula on station the morning of 14 April?

138A: I think he was in Izmir at a change of command or someplace, Akinci. Let me look and see if I've got it in my notes (reaching in left side pocket to retrieve a notebook). The Akinci change of command was on the morning of the 14th, so I think Colonel Kula was off post. In fact, I'm sure he was, because he showed up in Blues and a tie when I first saw him and that's where he had been, coming back from the Akinci change of command.

139Q: On the morning of the 14th when did you report to work?

139A: Probably 7 o'clock or -- I don't know if I can find that out, but I can -- I usually come in somewhere between 6:30 and 7:30, depending on the day's activities. And that day I had the "stick", and I would -- what I'd normally do, is I'll look at the first fighter takeoff and we can find out when that was and I'm usually there just before the first fighter takeoff, and that is somewhere between -- I don't know what it was, I'll have to look and see.

140Q: Would you describe to me the events of that morning prior to 0730Z, 10:30 local, which was the time of the incident?

140A: We have a mission director that I talk to all the time that's on duty in the Wing Operation Center and we call him Mad Dog. And [CONTROL #34] was the on duty Mad Dog. He's also our chief -- our head Mad Dog. He's a Lieutenant Colonel in charge of the Mission Directors. He was sitting on the console in the WOC that morning.

DOUGHERTY

COLONEL AT LEE: Excuse me, if you'd just refer to people by their duty title, such as Mad Dog or Duke and we will understand that we're referring to the person on duty at that day and time.

140A(cont'd): Okay. My normal routine would be to call him from home when -- around the time AWACS takes off, because he's in when AWACS takes off. And that wakes up most of the people around here, and that's the key to me to check-in to see how the weather is. To see if there is any significant delays. And I don't remember right now if there were any significant delays or anything out of the ordinary that morning. But then, I'd call him from home and sometimes Colonel Richardson does too. We often double team him but it depends on if one of us is flying. Neither of us were flying that day.

I went in and talked with him on the phone to get sort of a feeling for what the day looked like. If there was any Battle Staff Directives that came down with the Air Tasking Order that changed significantly what we do. And if it's on the ACO and on the Battle Staff Directives, then he has the ball, he has the stick. He is now in charge of the activities as long as they don't get outside of Air Tasking Order boundaries.

Once they are outside of that then he has to talk to me or Richardson or Kula or Emery; or Pilkington. Somebody in the command chain to make a decision on whether to proceed or retrograde forces or whatever. So, there was nothing in my knowledge that was unusual that morning. In fact, I went over to my house to meet with the maintenance people who were doing some maintenance on my house, at about 10 or 10:15. And my normal routine is to tell the Mad Dog where I'm going and that I'll be on the "Brick", and that I'll -- I gave him my home phone number which he already has, and then I talked to him on the UHF radio in my truck to off touch that. So we're constantly in communication.

In fact, I think it was about 10:30, I got a call from Mad Dog that told me critically, that something was up and we had a shoot down. And that's when I left and was in the WOC within about five minutes of that to see what was going on.

141Q: On the morning of the 14th prior to the call that you referred to that told you of the shoot down, were you aware of any Eagle Flight activity in the AOR prior to the arrival of the first fighters?

141A: No, sir, I probably would not have been either.

142Q: And the reason for the latter statement?

142A: Since we're not tied in as well as we probably want to be with Eagle Flight activity. If there are changes to their schedule which I understand occur all the time. I'm not positive if they always contact the JOC and I know that they don't call our current operations to tell us that things are changed or moved around.

DOUGHERTY

So, it would not surprise me to know that they were different than what was fragged. It does surprise me, and going back to my previous statement that they would have entered the TAOR before we had our fighters sweep.

Questions by Major General Andrus:

143Q: Excuse me, you had indicated that if there were something different from the Frag, that you would be notified on that, so that you could take the appropriate action?

143A: Our ATO, our Frag usually has "as required" for their activities in the TAOR. Admin flights probably go pretty much normally I'm suspecting to Zakhu. They change -- When they change their reasons for doing -- takeoff and landing in the helicopter in the TAOR, I think they notify the JOC on either radio or by data transmission. But, they would never in my experience call the CFAC, and we're in a different location, and told us.

144Q: If the CFAC is responsible for ensuring that the Frag is complied with, is there anything that has been put in place to ensure that the CFAC gets the information necessary to comply with that responsibility?

144A: Before the 14th sir, or since then?

145Q: Before the 14th?

145A: Only that the lines were "as required" in the ATO. So, I suspect the answer is not well enough.

146Q: So, if there was a situation as there was where the helicopters were flying in the No-Fly area, prior to the fighters sweep, contrary to higher headquarters guidance, that would have been the responsibility of the CFAC to correct that. And if I understand what you're telling me, the CFAC had not received any information to indicate that, that was taking place?

146A: Sir, we did not know that they were in the area before operations began. But I also submit that we may not have been made aware of that on numerous occasions in the past and I'm just not aware of how they -- how they orchestrate the changes.

The MCC works those airplanes as part of their sort of kit. That's their own airplanes to operate, to service their administrative needs, and to move them around to the various villages and places that they want to visit that are not reachable by a HUMVEE and land cruiser.

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147Q: If the information was passed from the MCC to the JOC, to the best of your knowledge, was there any provisions made or any procedures written or any guidance provided that would have required that information to be passed from the JOC to the CFAC, so that you could carry out your responsibilities?

147A: I see what you mean now. The way I would -- The way I think I understand it and the way I think it would happen or work is that if the JOC was made aware of a change to Eagle Flight activities especially in the TAOR, that they would let us know either written or verbally in a timely manner so that we would know that there's a change or an adjustment or modification to the ATO.

In that case, and I don't know if they were notified, I would suspect the JOC controller would call the Mad Dog would is my -- our representative for that day's opportunities or activities to -----

148Q: ---- That would appear to be the logical thing ----

148A: ---- Yes, sir ----

149Q: ---- However, do you know of any guidance or written procedures that would require that and to make that happen?

149A: I know about it as it applies to the OPC forces that operate out of Incirlik, Air Base. And I'm not sure that we have an air tight, in fact, I'm positive we don't have an air tight system with those kinds of perturbation to the schedule when it applies to Eagle Flight.

We have received information of their activities in the past, and the GLOs get the information to the pilots when we go to step to fly. So, I suspect that, that routinely is passed from the JOC, through either Sentinel Byte or to the Mad Dogs, but I don't know if they got the information that day. I'm not aware of that.

I know that we had lost track of them in the hours that ensued. We tried to regain track of the guys but we had -- they were often out of radio contact as they sat down at various villages. So, it didn't surprise us that we couldn't get in touch with them. In fact, we had a holdover IFF transponder at sometime in there, that was still existing on the scopes, so we thought maybe they were still airborne.

Questions by Colonel At Lee:

150Q: If the Duke or the Mad Dog through the Duke had knowledge of a situation, such as Helos entering the area prior to the fighters' sweep, would you have expected that to be passed to you?

150A: I would expect it to be passed to the aircrews first and foremost and then I would anticipate that the Mad Dog would be aware. But, I don't know if he would call me and I don't

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think I would require him to call me, specifically on a change to the AOR to the ATO as long as it was within and met the commander's guidance.

On this particular incident since he was out ahead of the fleet, he may have given me a call, but I have never received a call on anybody except UN helicopter activities out there, that surprised us with a late breaking visit or flight above 36 North. So, we have not had much experience with them and ----

151Q: ---- But again, I'd go back to your statement that the CFAC was responsible for ensuring that the ATO is complied with -- you indicating that the CFAC has never been made aware of any situation such as this which was clearly not in compliance with the ATO -- that is, helicopters flying in the area before the fighters. How would the CFAC ensure compliance if there was no provision for ensuring that the CFAC was aware of noncompliance?

151A: That's a loaded question sir, and it's a good one and I don't have a perfect answer for you, but I'll try to give you my best gauge. MCC is an operation that's not under the purview of the CFAC as we understand all the other air operations.

152Q: Not referring to the MCC. Assuming that the information had reached ----

152A: (No answer was given).

COLONEL AT LEE: ---- Excuse me General, could we take a brief recess.

MAJOR GENERAL ANDRUS: Okay, we'll come back to it.

[The interview recessed at 1215 hours, 26 April 1994]

[The interview reconvened at 1236 hours, 26 April 1994]

COLONEL AT LEE: The time is 1236 on the 26th of April. The individuals present in the room are the same as they were when we recessed with the exception that Major General Andrus has left the room.

Questions by Colonel At Lee:

153Q: At the time that we broke we were discussing CFAC's responsibility for contending with violations of the ACO or the ATO. The situation was being used as an example. During the course of some of the discussions was an Army aircraft going East of Zakhu into the AOR prior to the fighters' sweep occurring. And we understood you to say that in your view that would be a violation of the directives which exist if they were to do that?

153A: Laid out by the CTF Commander?

DOUGHERTY

154Q: Yes. If a Duke were aware of such a violation occurring how would you expect the CFAC's responsibilities for the AOR to be met under those circumstances?

154A: I would say that if the Duke was aware, if he was told, or if he discovered an airplane out there, that he would send the DCA fighters out there to find out who they were, if they didn't know who it was. If they knew it was Eagle Flight ----

155Q: ---- Excuse me, not referring to an unknown, if the Duke became aware that a U.S. Army helicopter was about to proceed or was proceeding into the AOR prior to the fighters' sweep, how would you expect the CFAC's responsibilities for compliance with the direction that, that not occur, to be fulfilled?

155A: I think maybe I can understand where the confusion was. That's a CTF Commander's guidance that the helicopters not operate out there without having the AWACS coverage. It's not in our ACO, although in the ATO it essentially restricts operation by it's own definition from occurring before we have the OPC package in the TAOR.

So, how would we deal with a violation of that, we'd warn the folks that were out there, that we had someone that was -- that we had Eagle Flight ahead of schedule in the area. And the last time we talked to them or had a transponder hit was in some sort of course geographic location. And I would not expect us to punish or debrief the thing with Eagle Flight. I would expect us to tell the C-3 at the CTF, and it would be probably his call whether or not that was the kind of thing that he'd bring up to the Commanding General.

156Q: Who's the CFAC on scene representative in the AOR under those circumstances?

156A: Duke.

156Q: And what authority would Duke have to give direction to the Army helicopter that reports in, indicating that they're violating the CTF Commander's direction?

156A: Interesting questions. I would not suspect that he would recall the helicopter based on Commanding General direction, for a couple of reasons. One, is that, we're not in the habit of controlling the Eagle Flight activities. Two, is that our chances of communicating with them are spotty at best. And, three, it's not -- Eagle Flight falls under a different sort of purview than the package that we launch off of Incirlik daily.

157Q: In your view would the Duke have the authority to recall the Army helicopter?

157A: No, sir I think that he might have the responsibility for letting the Army helicopter know that he was at risk because of Iraqi forces or some sort of Intel that only AWACS may be aware of and will do his level best to get a hold of the helicopter and turn him around or inform him of whatever contingency was going on. But as I've flown on AWACS and seen the operation out there I would say that Eagle Flight falls outside of my responsibility for command and control, it's a unique case.

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Yes, they're on the ATO. We expect people that are on the ATO to follow procedures and time lines, but when it comes to Eagle Flight, I'm not surprised when they're operating independently of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT.

157Q: What if any notifications would you expect a Duke to make in the situation that I've presented to you?

157A: I would suspect that he would advise the fighters that we have Eagle Flight activity in the TAOR and as a minimum, and sometimes if there was an airplane scheduled into a low fly structure at the front end of his area time, to let them know that someone was underneath the north low fly or someone was underneath the south low fly area.

158Q: Would you expect any communication back to Incirlik to any entity at Incirlik?

158A: No, sir. I mean, they SATCOM all the way -- all the time between Mad Dog and Duke and the JOC monitors that frequency at all times. And sort of informally or tangentially they may, a JOC might get interested because MCC has changed times or locations or route of flight. But, I wouldn't say that, that would SPIKE us to raise a flag and start talking to C-3 or anybody.

Questions by Colonel Fain:

159Q: If you had an occurrence of that nature, a violation of the ACO that was observed and it was handled inflight, fighters notified, no incident occurs, is there a process or would you consider notifying anyone up chain of the occurrence?

159A: In any violation of our guidance, regulations, policy, ARFs or whatever, if we're informed of it, we make a value judgment on whether or not this is one we float up to our bosses or we handle it at the Lieutenant Colonel level for example.

Violations of policy and guidance occur minute by minute out there. Some are willful violations, but most are not. And what we try to do is to just educate the people that some -- that come down under our sort of control, about the reasons why we have the procedures, why they should follow them, and please be aware, and everybody shakes their head "yes" and then we change over about a third of the guys the next week and then it's a reeducation process all over again.

Questions by Colonel At Lee:

160Q: When you say they occur minute by minute out there, are you describing a situation unique to Operation PROVIDE COMFORT?

160A: Any organization, any outfit anywhere in the world. There's guys that will try to maximize their training if there's going to be any training and we don't get much out there. There's going to be guys that are going to maximize the tactical environment. One guy's definition is that it would be tactically sound another guy's that says it's stupid. It depends on

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your interpretation and how you read weapon manuals and threat; policy; guidance; regs, everything. It's just the nature of being an aircrew flying combat sorties and combat airplanes.

Now, generally the guys are -- will default to the conservative position and generally they do. But you get guys down there on their fourth or fifth rotation through here that's seen it all before. Seen a much more relaxed and unstructured and unregulated environment, particularly just after the war. And those guys will push a little bit, because they've known better times down here and they don't, by definition, like to be constrained and restricted, but I understand that and so does Colonel Richardson and Colonel Emery, and Colonel Kula. And we try our best to treat the guys like they're adults and we don't always bring them to trial over every violation.

It's not the culture in a security police squadron for example, where they almost always sort of invoke 35-10 or UCMJ or something to control their guidance. We do it on a different plane, in a flying organization.

161Q: One last question in this area, you indicated that the prohibition on entering the AOR prior to fighter sweeps was CTF Commander's guidance, the Commanding General's guidance?

161A: As far as I know.

162Q: Who would you expect to be enforcing that or implementing that if it's not the CFAC?

162A: Probably the responsibility for conveying the General's policy and guidance is C-3 through his JOC. His shift workers that work as JOC controllers, that are in communication with MCC forward, MCC rear and Eagle Flight. But he's -- all C-3 is, is just a staff officer on the CTF staff. He doesn't have command in his title. He has lots of responsibility. I don't know how much authority he's got.

Questions by Colonel Fain:

163Q: Earlier we had discussed the events up to 7:30 on the day of the incident, would you give me ----

163A: ---- 7:30Z ----

164Q: ---- 7:30Z, that's correct, 10:30 local, would you give me a brief recap of the sequence of events involving you that occurred after 7:30, after your notification that there had been a shoot down?

164A: Okay, when I was called by Mad Dog at my quarters, where I was talking to housing maintenance on some things that they were doing with my house; here only the man in Turkey can be there for, the wife "doesn't count". My understanding when he called me was that we had shot down two Hinds, and I thought that was particularly unusual.

DOUGHERTY

A shootdown is a big deal anywhere. But a shoot down of helicopters were really sort of turning me for a loop because helicopters had not been an traditional threat in our theater. And I went over to the Wing Operation Center, and on the way I called Colonel Richardson on the "Brick" and asked him if he was enroute to the Battle Cab, because whenever something bad happens we form a Battle Cab here and have done that routinely for many, many reasons.

I don't know if he was involved or advised yet but he showed up just after I did. I got there and went right to the Mad Dog position which is one level below the Battle Cab in our Wing Operation Center and sat and huddled with the mission director and just let him give me a data dump on what had gone on. Meantime, up in my peripheral vision the Battle Cab was forming with Colonel Richardson and some others. I can't remember who exactly. And they waited to hear what I had to say based on the situation as best as Mad Dog knew it.

Mad Dog told me that there had been a delay in notification to his position because SATCOM was out and had been out for about twenty minutes and that's not unusual. We don't -- we can't stand it for very much longer than that because then we have to go to a contingency operation, but SATCOM has always, based on the atmosphere, a sort of a chancy proposition.

So, they were notified by Duke of the shoot down, I think about a twenty minute delay, which delays our notifications. So, we started -- we brought a Sergeant in to start taking notes on whatever happened from then on. He was one of the EA controllers from the WOC. The head Command Post guy, Major James he runs the outfit, had "seen this movie before". And he started this thing now. I don't know how useful his notes are but those would be pretty good to refer to on the exact times and sequence. I didn't write them down myself.

But Colonel Richardson and I then huddled after that and both he and I thought identically on this that this was really odd. And so, well, we called C3 and talked to him and asked him to tell us where Eagle Flight was that day.

165Q: Let me interrupt at that point, what made you ask specifically about Eagle Flight?

165A: I guess we might have asked UN helicopters or Eagle Flight, but helicopter -- friendly helicopter activity. We had -- In our experience and Colonel Richardson has come down here as a flying member of OPC out of Ramstein before he was a commander down here. We have never had a helicopter encroaching over the 36 line. It would be just about impossible for those guys, in our mind, to be up that far north. Because, you know, why would they go into a security zone. I can understand why they would be in GOI territory, the Government of Iraq Territory, but not in Kurdish controlled areas, they would be at risk to be up there.

166Q: Okay, specifically again with Eagle Flight, when did you become aware that an Eagle Flight was airborne or were you aware when you made the call to C-3?

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166A: The Mad Dog was aware, because he has the ATO. And in the ATO, and I'd have to look at it to be exactly sure, but I remember seeing Eagle Flight activities listed on that day's activity on, "as required" basis. So, no specific times but I think the time was specific from Diyarbakir to Zakhu, but I don't know if they were after that. I'm pretty sure they were not, generally they're not.

So, we wanted to make sure, because that's the worst thing we could think of. And so, we started down that rabbit path and got Rusty O'Brien, the C-3 involved.

167Q: Continue from that point.

167A: And they -- We know that they're hooked up with COM to the people who, in our mind command and control Eagle Flight activity in the TAOR. So, they started talking to them and we also talked to Duke to see if he had any contact with Eagle Flight.

That's when -- I think for some reason the time sticks in my mind it was 41 minutes after the hour. It must have been an hour after I got there. So, maybe 8:30, 8:41 is when they reported from AWACS a transponder hit, meaning a display from the UH60, which gave us a lot of real relief when we saw that. Come to find out over time those things -- those things can hang around on the scope and not disappear or they can just be frozen there from the last moment that transponder reported and I think that's what it was. Because it was not moving.

168Q: Let me ask a question again regarding -- another question regarding the contact with C-3. On the initial contact with C-3 did you make that call?

168A: I think so, I'm not sure.

169Q: On the initial contact did it become apparent that they were aware of Eagle activity on that contact?

169A: Yes, sir, I think they were aware. They're more aware of it than I ever am and one of the reasons was that it was a -- was this meeting with, I guess it was Barzani and some of the other Kurdish leaders, so this was a big deal. This was a security meeting that we sent our best folks to go to because it's fundamentally the job of the MCC up there to try and answer the questions that the Kurds have about their own security. And there were also NGO representatives to be there, and non-governmental agencies or organizations that provide security, or excuse me, charity relief and materials for the Kurds.

So, they were well aware of that. In fact, I think Monday of that week, Emery and the coalition commanders and General Pilkington had been out to that same spot on the helicopter and this was a sort of a repeat of that same -- the reason was a little different but primarily it was sort of a repeat of the same trip.

170Q: Is it your opinion that C-3 as an organization would have been aware of this incident helicopter flight prior to the morning of 14 April?

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170A: Yes, sir, but I am also of the strong opinion that C-3 and CTF CG were not aware that these guys were out in front of the push, the coalition forces being in the area. Let me say here, that I have also -- I'm also aware that MCC forces, helicopter forces, and ground forces, HMMWVs and land cruisers, sometimes work a little bit of their own agenda in the area, depending on who was in charge or who wasn't there.

We have had cases where the -- when the Commander was gone the Deputy Commander took the forces places they shouldn't have gone by direction of -- they shouldn't have gone, expressly against direction of the CTF Commander. I am not surprised and was not surprised that day at all that they were out in front of the forces, and I have become aware that it was -- I think against the direction of the CTF Commander, because he's been looking out after them for a long time. And I think it's important to know that these guys were not completely under our control even -- certainly not under CFAC control and we know that, but maybe not even reacting to the expressed wishes of the CTF Commander at all times. That's third hand information, I think it's useful.

COLONEL FAIN: Do you have any clarification to this point?

COLONEL AT LEE: Yes.

Questions by Colonel At Lee:

171Q: You referred to the, out in front of the push, you mean the coalition forces encroaching into the AOR?

171A: Yes, sir, our coalition forces always start with air defense fighters or they don't go at all. And like I said in earlier testimony, that's to protect our high value assets that are essentially defenseless.

172Q: You referred to the TAOR?

172A: Uh, hum.

173Q: And we've had discussion of the AOR, is there a distinction?

173A: Well you've heard me say TAOR because that's the right term. If you know how CENTCOM and EUCOM are divided, Iraq is part of CENTCOM not EUCOM. But because of the proximity to Incirlik and Batman and Diyarbakir during the war, they broke up Iraq into a northern TAOR and southern AOR after, you know, after hostilities. And they gave EUCOM the responsibility, the tactical responsibility for Northern Iraq above 36. It's still in CENTCOM's AOR and that's the reason. It's just a line on the map that someone drew back when CENTCOM was stood up and that's why we have a little bit of -- a little shade of gray difference on what we call it.

COLONEL FAIN: Is there anything you'd like to add to this portion of your interview that you've haven't already added.

WITNESS: I think it's the worst thing we can imagine. We never envisioned or anticipated. We build scenarios all the time, particularly with our Mad Dogs and Dukes, what if. And this one never entered the thought process.

COLONEL AT LEE: It's 1300.

[The interview recessed at 1300 hours, 26 April 1994]

[The interview reconvened at 1302 hours, 26 April 1994]

COLONEL AT LEE: The time is 1302. Colonel Fain -- Excuse me, the individuals who were present the last time we recessed are once again present.

Questions by Colonel Fain:

174Q: In previous testimony you stated that you give a briefing that includes the Rules of Engagement for OPC conduct, is that correct?

174A: Yes, sir.

175Q: Are you familiar with all of the rules that govern the Rules of Engagement?

175A: I'm -- I'm familiar with specifically the OPC modifications to our peacetime ROE.

176Q: Would you relay for me what you consider the primary Rules of Engagement to be?

176A: Yeah, the -- in OPC we enjoy the clearest ROE that's ever been known to man probably, [Classified portion deleted (26 words)]

177Q: And who has the authority to conduct, initiate or declare that hostility?

177A: Ultimately, the guy pulling the trigger or pushing the pickle button, meaning the pilot of the armed fighter.

178Q: In a situation where an unknown track was observed north of the 36 degree line, what are the responsibilities of the Duke?

178A: I suspect to warn the fighter of activities and in our AOR it's pretty easy because you can see where the track originates and if it's in Iraq south of 36, then you sort of understand that it's an Iraqi aircraft or it could be, I guess, a UN aircraft or a civilian airliner or something. It's originally in Iraq, so that's your first big clue, that it's -- that's not good. And if he heads north crosses 36, then he is most certainly meeting most of our definitions for hostile act and hostile intent.

DOUGHERTY

179Q: Are there other considerations for an unknown track in the northern part of Iraq north of 36 from whence there was no initial track or organization?

179A: Yes, sir and if it's an unknown track that just pops up, say on radar either in the fighter or in the AWACS, then it's worth investigating either electronically or visually.

180Q: And how would you expect that investigation to be conducted and concluded?

180A: In this example, the track remains unknown. If he's -- I know I'm at a -- and this is a secret briefing and I will share this with everybody in this room if that's the way we're going to work this.

COLONEL AT LEE: This is a secret portion releasable Multi-National.

180A(cont'd): Now, there are electronic identification equipment onboard both AWACS and our American fighters that I'm aware of ----

181Q: ---- The specifics of those do not need to be discussed.

181A: And those are our long reach, long range beyond visual range tools for identifying aircraft either by the absence of a friendly "squawk" or the existence of a hostile "squawk" or, there's another procedure for identifying a bad guy based on some ----

182Q: ---- That's sufficient.

182A: So, these are -- these are pretty neat things and we use them all the time. Some of them don't always -- can't always positively identify someone hostile, so we use them and if we can, we can find out from long distances if they're hostile. And if we can't and he's still unknown then we have a -- in our AOR we have a decision to make. It says that you may if you can identify it as hostile, engage it, and destroy it; and if you're not confident that you've identified an Iraqi military aircraft as hostile, then we're sort of down to trying to make a visual identification to see who we got.

183Q: And if that visual identification were conducted by pilots operating interceptor type aircraft, if that identification revealed an Iraqi military aircraft what action would you expect those pilots to take?

183A: [I would expect them to follow the ROE.]

184Q: Is there a requirement to consider medical markings?

184A: Yes, sir, that one, in parenthesis, in that caveat, that modification for OPC, ROE is that if it has medical markings you're not to engage and destroy.

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185Q: What considerations would be given to a military aircraft that is characteristic of the Iraqi Air Force but without markings?

185A: [Classified portion deleted (13 words)] Now, are you talking about F1s for example?

186Q: Any type of military aircraft that -- the F1s perhaps, not since we're flying them obviously on our side, but an aircraft like a MIG 23 and Hind helicopter that's detected identified by aircraft type, but no markings are visible?

186A: I would -- if they were even -- Iraqi military -- I don't expect an Iraqi to have a giant Fin Flash, just like when I used to chase drug smugglers, I didn't expect them to be lit up with, "I'm from Venezuela and I'm carrying cocaine". I mean, they're -- they try to disguise or to camouflage themselves.

187Q: Would an aircraft, an interceptor engaging an identified an Iraqi military aircraft be required to obtain approval from any airborne or ground element?

187A: No, sir.

188Q: Is there any requirement to consider distressed aircraft, aircraft without radios, or defector aircraft in this process?

188A: No, sir, that's why it's so clean. It's -- There's not much fuzzy area. It doesn't have a six page or it doesn't have a whole laundry list of things you need to quantify and qualify before you engage.

189Q: How about consideration for those things -- let's take for example, a defector prior to identification as an Iraqi military aircraft?

189A: What's the subject of this sir, what ----

190Q: ---- An aircraft that's an unidentified track, that is either executing international procedures for distress for example. Unidentified as an Iraqi military aircraft. Is there a requirement to consider those actions?

190A: Like flying a triangle or something like that?

191Q: Yes.

191A: There's a -- the route or the basis for our OPC/ROE is EDR or ED of 55-47, which is EUCOM directive, 55-47 which is based on U.S. peacetime ROE. In fact, you know, it reads a lot of U.S.- specific things, but it's been translated into this theater and now specifically to OPC. There's lots of that in there. I'm not particularly familiar with that. I'd have to go back to my area interceptor and alert days to think about that. But, yeah, it has loads of that information, you pull up on one side and wag your wings and lead away or push him to the right. Lead him out of

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the area and make him land. There's all kinds of interceptor things that have been with us since ADC days and those are all in there.

192Q: Do those considerations and things that you've just discussed apply if upon your identification you determine that it's of the Iraqi military aircraft with no medical markings?

192A: Absolutely not. It would be silly to use those procedures.

COLONEL FAIN: Sir, any questions?

MAJOR GENERAL ANDRUS: (Nodding a negative response.)

COLONEL FAIN: Follow-up.

QUESTIONS BY COLONEL AT LEE:

193Q: The understanding that you've given today, is that consistent with the briefing that's giving to your crewmembers?

193A: Yes, sir.

COLONEL AT LEE: That's all I have.

COLONEL FAIN: That concludes that briefing.

MAJOR GENERAL ANDRUS: You need to read the final statement here don't you.

COLONEL AT LEE: Do you have any further information, statements, or evidence that you wish to present?

WITNESS: I don't think I have anything that you haven't asked me. I mean, there's lots of things I can answer, but I don't know if you want me just to push off in all different directions. So, I think I'll just limit my remarks to what you had asked me because I think that's pertinent.

COLONEL AT LEE: Another way to put it, is there anything that we haven't been smart enough to ask you that's relevant to the areas we've been inquiring about?

WITNESS: I think everything that's relevant is things we've been doing since the 14th, that I think you're probably aware of, that obviously we did not have an air tight procedure for deconfliction, although we thought it was pretty good. And we're trying to make sure that our procedures like after any accident are made better. We're investigating -- we're looking closely at ROE.

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MAJOR GENERAL ANDRUS: It may be appropriate to not go into things that are taking place after the accident.

WITNESS: All right sir, and that's what I would have lots of stuff on, but I didn't think it was pertinent sir.

COLONEL AT LEE: Not the change in procedures, no. If there were things that you have learned that are significant to what occurred up to and through the events of the 14th?

WITNESS: No, sir, the only thing I did was that one departure where I talked about my experiences with MCC forward and Eagle Flight activities being sometimes not completely under the tight preview of the CTF CG, that's what I think is significant information.

COLONEL AT LEE: You're reminded that this is an official investigation. You are ordered not to divulge the nature of this investigation or the questions, answers or discussions that have occurred during this interview. You may not discuss them with anyone unless authorized to do so by the board president Major General Andrus, CINCUSAFE, or higher authority. If anyone other than a member of the board should approach you regarding your testimony or the matters discussed here, you must report it immediately.

Do you have any questions.

WITNESS: No, sir.

COLONEL AT LEE: The time is 1315 and this interview is complete.

[The interview was completed at 1315 hours, 26 April 1994.]

The above sworn interview statement, given by MARK ELLIOTT DOUGHERTY to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board as recorded by me by stenomask. Words contained within bracket, [], indicate language that has been substituted at the direction of the Board, to avoid the release+ of classified information which could not be downgraded and/or personal details which would disclose the identity of military members directly involved in the incident. The substituted language accurately conveys the essential meaning of the original language. Except as so noted, I certify that the foregoing transcript is a true, accurate, and verbatim account of that statement.



THELMA I. HARRIS

Court Reporter

Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

DOUGHERTY

V-075

V-076

TAB V-081

V-076A

CATLETT, CHARLES E., JR.

V-077

V-078

V-078A

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SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

TECHNICAL SERGEANT CHARLES E. CATLETT, JR. 552nd AIRCRAFT CONTROL WING

The interview was conducted by Major Aaron D. Byas, at Incirlik AB, Turkey, beginning at 1125 hours, 25 April 1994. A standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn.

EXAMINATION

My name is Charles Edward Catlett, Junior. My grade is Technical Sergeant, E-6. My organization is 522nd Aircraft Control Wing, with the 963rd Maintenance Squadron. I am presently deployed to Incirlik Air Base.

I have a high school education with some technical college level. I have completed Aircraft Maintenance Specialist School as an Airman Basic. I went through the Supervisory Training Class and also the NCO Academy.

My Air Force Specialty is Aircraft Maintenance Specialist. I have a seven skill level. My duties and responsibilities are I'm the dedicated crew chief for aircraft 77-0351 and that consists of taking care of the airframe, the engines and what ever else may happen with the aircraft. I went to Tech School in Chanute Air Force Base back in 1977. I also went to Able Chief and several other Field Training Detachment Courses on this particular airframe. And then just on the job training. I dealt with AWACS in 1977, September, and stayed in AWACS until March of 1981, then separated from the Air Force. I came back in November 1982, into AWACS, into the phase dock. I've been there ever since.

I am not aware of any other equipment or system problems which could in any way degrade the effectiveness of the systems on aircraft 77-0351, except for those write-ups documented on the 781 Form. Other than a few minor problems, like the hydraulic pump going out and the air crew turning on the radio too soon on the ground, my overall assessment of aircraft 77-0351 leading up to and including the sortie flown on 14th of April is that the airplane was flying perfectly.


The problem with the radio was that they were supposed to wait until they reached 10,000 feet and they burnt all the power out. And they ground aborted for that. We fixed it in a half hour to 45 minutes after we got it back to the parking spot. On the 14th of April everything on the aircraft was working as it was supposed to. The power amp and the amplifier were changed.

CATLETT

I don't have any further information, statements or evidence that I wish to present.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions. The interview was concluded at 1132.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of TECHNICAL SERGEANT CHARLES E. CATLETT, JR., as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.



BRYAN T. LAWLER, Lt Col, USAF
Legal Advisor

CATLETT

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TAB V-082

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NOLAN, WILLIAM C. III

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**TESTIMONY OF
FIRST LIEUTENANT WILLIAM C. NOLAN, III
494TH FIGHTER SQUADRON
RAF, LAKENHEATH**

COL AT LEE: The time now is 1713 is now on the 25th of April 1994. The persons present are the Witness, Lieutenant Colonel Mudge, Colonel Velluz and I am Colonel At Lee.

This interview is being conducted at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. This is an official AFR 110-14 Aircraft Accident Investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters and the possible involvement of U.S. fighter aircraft in the crash of these helicopters in the northern No-Fly-Zone of Iraq on 14 April 1994.

This investigation is being conducted at the direction of General Robert C. Oaks, CINCUSAFE. This investigation is not a Safety Mishap Investigation conducted under AFR 127-4. It is a aircraft accident investigation conducted under AFR 110-14. The purpose of this accident investigation is to obtain and preserve all available evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary action, adverse actions and for all other purposes. Testimony before a Safety Mishap Investigation Board is given with the understanding that it can only be used for mishap prevention purposes and all witnesses are advised that the testimony will be treated in confidence.

However, testimony given in this accident investigation may be used for any purpose deemed appropriate by competent authority and may be publicly disseminated.

Do you understand the difference between a Safety Mishap Investigation and this Accident Investigation?

WITNESS: Yes, sir, I do..

COL AT LEE: Do you understand the purpose of this investigation?

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

COL AT LEE: Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: No, sir.

COL AT LEE: Your testimony will be recorded and transcribed verbatim so that a written record can be made available to the appointing or higher authority. For the benefit of the reporter, please avoid the use of acronyms or jargon. Speak slowly, clearly and loudly.

NOLAN

Remember to explain your testimony carefully so that others who do not have your technical training will be able to understand it.

As this is an official investigation, you are required to answer questions put to you by the board. You are further advised not to discuss classified information unless necessary to develop your testimony. If it is necessary for you to discuss classified information, you need to identify it as such.

Do you understand?

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

COL AT LEE: If there are no questions, if you'd rise, I will put you under oath.

(The witness was sworn.)

EXAMINATION

Questions by Colonel At Lee:

1Q: Would you state your name and grade?

1A: My name is William Conlon Nolan, III. I am a First Lieutenant in the U.S. Air Force.

2Q: Your organization?

2A: I fly for the 494th Fighter Squadron at RAF, Lakenheath.

3Q: What are your normal duties and responsibilities in the Squadron?

3A: My normal duties are, basically, two-fold. One is, of course, as an aircrew member. I am an aircraft commander of an F-15E aircraft. Along with the normal flying duties that we have, we have certain squadron functions that support the flying job. The job section that I worked for is called the weapons shop and they work directly for the Director of Operations of the Squadron and I have supervisors in the weapons shop and I work for them directly. Do I need to clarify exactly what happens there?

4Q: That's fine. What types of jobs have you held in the past?

4A: In the little over a year that I've been there, I've been in the Standardization and Evaluation Office and that was all, prior to the weapons shop.

5Q: How long have you flown the F-15?

5A: I've flown the F-15E since January of 1992.

6Q: How many hours do you have in the F-15?

NOLAN

6A: I have roughly 430 hours.

7Q: How many total flying hours do you have?

7A: Total flying hours are 850 in that area.

8Q: What other aircraft have you flown?

8A: During undergraduate pilot training, I flew the T-37 and the T-38. During lead-in fighter training, I flew the AT-38. Prior to my Air Force service, I have roughly 50 hours in several light aircraft--Cessnas, Beechcrafts--skippers of that nature.

9Q: Do you have any special qualifications--flight lead, supervisor of flying, missile air combat?

9A: The only qualification I have, other than just basic aircrew aircraft commander, is flight lead status. That's your basic two ship flight lead.

10Q: Have you flown in Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, OPC, before?

10A: Yes, sir.

11Q: When was that?

11A: I have flown here for six weeks prior to this tour starting in November of 1993 and that carried through January of 1994.

12Q: How long have you been in Turkey this rotation?

12A: I have been here for 10 days.

13Q: How many total flights have you flown into northern Iraq in the Area of Responsibility, the AOR?

13A: Total flights would number in the vicinity of 15 to 20.

Questions by Colonel At Lee:

14Q: Can I ask you the specific day that you arrived in the AOR on this tour?

14A: On this tour?

15Q: I understand it would be on the 15th of April?

15A: My first--we flew--we were flying Operation DISTANT THUNDER our first two weeks here so my first AOR flight during this tour was not until last Thursday which was the 18th or so.

COL AT LEE: Thank you.

I have no further clarifying questions.

NOLAN

COL AT LEE: We'll take a recess. The time is 1720.

(There is a brief recess taken at this point.)

COL AT LEE: The time is 1722. The individuals who were present when we began are still present.

Colonel Mudge?

Questions by Colonel Mudge:

16Q: I'm going to ask you some questions about the Rules of Engagement that they use at OPC. The Rules of Engagement that we are going to discuss are the Rules of Engagement that were in effect on 14 April. Will you please, in your own words, explain the Rules of Engagement that were in effect on 14 April?

16A: Sir, the Rules of Engagement, as I understand it, for flights into the Area of Responsibility, all center around the actual objective of Operation PROVIDE COMFORT and that is; of course, to protect the northern No-Fly-Zone north of the 36 parallel in Northern Iraq. As I read the ROE, [Classified portion deleted (277 Words - ROE)]

17Q: What is your assessment of the clarity of the ROE on 14 April?

17A: In my mind, there was no real question as to the clarity of the actual rules having not seen or flown in any other operational events such as Operation PROVIDE COMFORT. I thought the ROE was cut and dry. Of course, the problem you'll run into, obviously, is the limitations of the various aircraft to be able to identify other aircraft and being lucky enough to fly one of the

NOLAN

aircraft that has that outstanding capabilities for identification. It didn't seem to me that that would be that difficult to do. Besides even having any question at all as to the nature of the flight, whether or not it was military or civilian, after it is positively identified as not a coalition aircraft and a positive hostile identification is added, having any question to do with that at all, we always had the backup of a commit or engagement without expending ordnance to visually identify the aircraft if there were any question whatsoever.

18Q: Are you comfortable with your knowledge of the ROE?

18A: Yes, sir, I am.

19Q: What specific Rules of Engagement training have you had?

19A: Since I have been here at OPC, our squadron weapons shop and intelligence shop has had several academic classes as to the clarification of ROE set forth in the OPC guidelines. As with any operational community, the responsibility always resides with the aircrew to understand and know the rules and the emphasis, of course, is placed in that nature for all aircrews to read and understand it and then we just have backup academics group discussions and so forth, a lot of it residing of the experience of several highly experienced members of our squadron to teach, basically, their techniques and lay down guidelines that the squadron can use in conjunction with the ROE--I mean that by being more stringent and placing our own guidelines on the ROE itself so we have had several instances of academics and group study.

20Q: Was that before 14 April or after?

20A: When I first came here on my first tour, we had probably at least three and the only reason--I know of at least one that I requested personally because being a young wingman on his first operational tour at an AOR I just wanted to make sure that I knew--there were some things that I didn't quite understand, but at that point, I was a wingman and just to have more discussion on that--it sheds more light and it opens a door of understanding on all the rules. Since I've been back here and we flew Operation DISTANT THUNDER for two weeks which was not an OPC sortie and since the completion of that, prior to flying OPC, we had one discussion among probably three-fourths to most of our squadron just making sure everybody had gotten into the OPC mindset and were out of our training environment for the other operation and back into the serious OPC.

21Q: Where did you have your first ROE training?

21A: My first ROE training, official ROE training--it would have been in late November or early December of 93.

22Q: Where did you receive that training and from whom?

22A: That was here at Incirlik in SOC 1, which is our squadron operations center. The training was provided by members of our instructor cadre; specifically if I can remember, I believe it was--are names okay, sir?

23Q: Just an instructor in the squadron is fine.

NOLAN

23A: I believe the chief instructor in flight lead when I was here was Captain Starr Smith and at our request I believe he went out of his way to explain from his experience respective the ROE and how the squadron should operate. That's back when we were developing squadron standards on several contingencies within the AOR and that was also in conjunction with our intel shop.

24Q: If you were unable to identify an aircraft as a positive hostile with your electronic system, how would you attempt to identify unidentified aircraft?

24A: Under those circumstances, the way I run my flights, if we cannot identify any aircraft as negative friendly and positive hostile then we will run the commit as to a tactically sound position to visually identify the aircraft and that would mean whether making a stern conversion on an aircraft which means, basically you fly an intercept where you roll out, basically, close enough to the rear of the aircraft to visually identify where you're not giving up your offensive posture in case he makes a hostile maneuver but also affording you the chance to go visually identify the aircraft. There are other circumstances where it could be a defector or an aircraft that has just strayed--a civilian aircraft that has strayed. Of course, under those circumstances, is you could not positively identify them, then the visual identification would be in order.

25Q: After you visually identify an Iraqi aircraft, what is your action?

25A: I suppose a lot of that would depend on exactly what happens in that situation. Being a lot of variables out there, the rules--as I read the Rules of Engagement, [Classified portion deleted (17 Words)] However, what I would do would be to check the intent of the aircraft. We've had discussions lately as to the possibilities of defectors from the Iraqi Air Force would be to maneuver my two ship with one for an offensive posture and the other to close fairly close to the aircraft, just to try to get a feel for exactly what he wants and then see how responsive the aircraft would be to our cues as in--Follow us, we can take you to a place to land, so to speak so a lot of it would depend on exactly the posture of that aircraft, if he made any sort of hostile actions, then, of course, we would engage him, as appropriate.

26Q: Under what circumstances might you receive permission to fire on an unidentified target?

26A: To receive permission? The way I read the ROE, [Classified portion deleted (15 Words)] Under the new ROE, as far as helicopters are concerned, we would--

27Q: No, I'm just concerned about the ROE...

27A: For aircraft?

28Q: ...applicable on 14 April or before?

28A: I would not--I would not fire on any aircraft even though he [met ROE Criteria] until [Classified portion deleted (10 Words)]

29Q: What did the ROE authorize you to do?

NOLAN

29A: As I see it, the ROE [Classified portion deleted (10 Words)]

30Q: If you committed on the helicopter and you VID'd it as a Hind, would you then engage and destroy that aircraft?

30A: For the ROE, prior to the change?

31Q: Yes.

31A: The way I read the ROE, I certainly would because, as I understand it, helicopters are also--it doesn't mention--well, it does talk about helicopters, [if they meet the criteria.]

32Q: If you came in and VID'd it as a Hind, how close do you think you'd have to get to identify it as a Hind?

32A: Giving what I know about helicopters and the fact that they don't really pose the air-to-air threat that most people think they do, you can actually make a point of getting fairly close to a helicopter and I caveat that with being at a high tactical air speed to visually identify it. Based on its limitations to employ air-to-air ordnance, I would think you could easily close within two to three thousand feet in a tactically sound approach and still get a good look at it at a tactical air speed.

33Q: Do you think at two to three thousand feet that you could identify whether or not it was a military helicopter or other?

33A: I think, at that range, that you could. Having never run an intercept on a helicopter, a lot of this is obviously conjecture. I would think that you would need to get inside at least three thousand feet to see it and if it took to get closer to positively ID it, then I would do what I had to do if that meant flying directly over it several thousand feet.

34Q: How close do you think you would have to fly to a helicopter to identify the fin flash?

34A: I would say--if I had to make a guess, it would definitely be inside 3,000 feet, probably in the nature of 1,000 or 2,000 feet seeing as how there's not really much room for a fin flash on a helicopter, it couldn't be that big, but then again, most aircrew are taught to recognize helicopters by their appearance and not what's written on the side.

35Q: If you saw a Hind in the AOR and engaged it, would you attempt to determine whether it was a Syrian Hind?

35A: Having not thought about that until you brought it up, probably not, sir.

36Q: So if you had seen a Hind in the AOR, you would have engaged it and destroyed it?

36A: I would have assumed it was an Iraqi Hind because I am unaware that Syria has Hinds and actually flew in northern Iraq.

37Q: Is there an exception in the ROE to engaging helicopters or other aircraft that aren't military aircraft?

NOLAN

37A: Is there an exception?

38Q: Are there any exceptions to firing on Iraqi military aircraft?

38A: According to the new--

39Q: ... to the old ROE, that you know of?

39A: None that I know of regular Iraqi aircraft. Obviously, knowing that the UN flights sometimes use Russian-built helicopters, I would assume that you would be able to identify a UN painted aircraft or, in this case, probably an Iraqi aircraft or the same type of aircraft.

40Q: If you were in a situation where you were visually identifying an Iraqi military aircraft that had a red cross or red crescent on it, would you engage and destroy that?

40A: No, not at all. Medical aircraft, as I understand it, there is no reason to engage medical aircraft whatsoever.

41Q: What is your perception of the ROE training and the guidance that you have received?

41A: I think the guidance that we received, based on the fact that we had so many young guys and guys on their first operational AOR tours, I think our ROE academics are good. Several times each time I'm here we get together and discuss tactics and whenever you discuss tactics, you always have the inevitable conversation about ROE because a lot of times or in most instances, ROE draws your tactics so I think we've had sufficient academics for everybody to at least have a basic understanding of the ROE.

42Q: What ROE references do you have to use while airborne?

42A: While airborne? Aside from--I know that we have--the only stuff that we fly with that is, well actually that's not true either--we have the Operation PROVIDE COMFORT inflight guide which doesn't made any references to the ROE, per se, monthly--just ACO rules. Specific references--I know not of any that we fly with unless somebody wants to take a copy with them. I can't understand why they would do that.

43Q: Have you ever had Cougar or Duke point out helicopter flights to you before in the AOR; Cougar being the AWACS controller?

43A: Not on this tour here, except for today.

44Q: On a previous tour?

44A: On a previous tour, I do not recall any.

45Q: If you wanted to find out information, and this is on the 14th or prior, if you wanted to find out information about helicopter flights, where would you find that?

45A: What I understand about all the information on helicopter flights would be on the back of the daily frag that we get that's got the UN helicopter flights. They were written in some code--

NOLAN

the acronym escapes me, but that information was pulled by our intelligence shop and included in our step brief. Other than that, from a previous tour, the only other helicopter information would be at--would come through our intel shop for step briefs based on helicopter movements and I don't recall us ever being briefed on anything like that.

46Q: Frag--you're talking about the Air Tasking Order, the ATO?

46A: Yes, sir, the ATO.

47Q: And you said that your intel shop pulled that information and briefed you when you stepped--stepped is when you are preparing to go to your airplane to fly?

47A: When we left the squadron operations center to fly our sorties.

48Q: Had your intelligence shop ever briefed you on helicopter flights at your step briefs?

48A: I remember, I believe, in all my sorties in my first tour, I believe two times; once and it wasn't a helicopter--it was a UN flight that was in support of the U.N. Force troops and the other was a UN helicopter flight, a possibility of coming in from northern Iraq towards the Irbil area and then back into Iraq. There's only the two instances of the UN flights and one of them being helicopters that I remember being briefed specifically.

49Q: So you do not remember ever being briefed on Eagle Flight?

49A: No, sir, not at all.

50Q: Considering the various sources that are available to you to describe the Operation PROVIDE COMFORT procedures, what is your perception of their clarity and the guidance that you are given, either written or verbal, regarding OPC flying?

50A: Perception of their clarity? Having read all the material associated with OPC, I don't remember reading anything that I needed to have clarified. It seems to me the working is set up sufficiently for even the younger aircrew members without the experience of previous Area of Responsibility to understand fully.

51Q: What tasking have you had in the AOR?

51A: Different types of tasking that I've had include: One, defensive counter air which is air-to-air CAPing, basically. I've also had--

52Q: And that CAPing is combat air patrol?

52A: Combat Air Patrol, yes, sir. Basically, as a quick clarification, having the radars pointed down track searching for airborne activity into Iraq and north of the 36--I've been tasked to do that as well as reconnaissance which is flying over various Iraqi installations to get a good look at those, including surface-to-air missile sites and also in my first tour, we were frequently tasked to fly in the lower altitudes, as I understand it, as part of the providing presence in the area to be seen and heard--just, basically, flying at lower altitudes. We use the instances to keep proficient at low-altitude flying which is our basic mission or one of our basic missions.

NOLAN

53Q: When you were flying your DCA missions, would you have had the opportunity to intercept and engage a helicopter?

53A: No, sir, I've never had the opportunity.

54Q: Never had the opportunity, but would it be conceivable that you could be required to do that?

54A: Certainly conceivable.

55Q: Have you had any visual reconnaissance training that included helicopters?

55A: We have--the only training I've had on helicopters is your basic visual identification and recognition training test, pictures of various types of aircraft as well as helicopters so I have been trained and consider myself sufficiently trained to be able to identify military aircraft and helicopters from all sorts of different Air Forces and countries.

56Q: Would you please describe in a little more detail the helicopter vis recce training, how often you get it, who would give you the training?

56A: The training that--I have noticed trends in training come on at various times depending on the tasking of your unit--if I can use, for example, just recently our squadron has gone to--well, actually, our Wing at Lakenheath has gone to a tactical evaluation which is basically an operational USAFE test just to be able to judge our capabilities. Are we mission ready? During this time, we had probably two to three times a week, which is in between my first tour and my tour here, numerous tests on visual identification of aircraft because that's one of the things that we could be tested on so I've had visual recognition and testing numerous times within the last six or seven months.

As far as having been in OPC the first time, in my first tour, we had, within the six weeks I was here we probably had three or four scheduled academic courses and then we also are encouraged to train ourselves, to review the pictures, and we also carry booklets that have pictures of the various aircraft when we fly to refer to.

57Q: Do you remember, in your vis recce training, seeing helicopters from the rear aspect?

57A: Several instances I remember specifically. I don't recall the actual helicopters that we saw, but it seems to me out of all the helicopter pictures I've seen and it's been from all aspects, front, rear and from above, actually.

58Q: Do you know where he could expect to see fin flashes on the helicopter?

58A: Depending on the type of helicopter and the body size, I would think anywhere from the rear quadrant of the main fuselage to the tail if it has some sort of vertically-developed tail, I would assume it would be there. Also, I'm not much on helicopter terminology, but the rotor boom--whatever the rotor sticks on between the main fuselage and the tail rotor--if that has any sort of substance and that--depending on the type of helicopter, different sizes, fin flashes might be there as well.

NOLAN

59Q: Do you remember seeing photos of the Black Hawk in your vis recce training?

59A: I do--the fact I don't, specifically, remember any Black Hawks--I couldn't say for sure. I can't say I remember it right now. I know I've seen all kinds of American military aircraft and that would include the special ops aircraft so I am going to assume that yes, even though I can't specifically remember it, I'm sure that I've seen several pictures of the Black Hawk, moreover, because I know what a Black Hawk looks like.

60Q: Have you ever seen a Black Hawk with aux tanks installed?

60A: That I have not. I have never, to be perfectly honest, I have never seen a Black Hawk with wing tanks. I didn't even know that Black Hawks had wing tanks.

61Q: Do you know what markings are on the Black Hawk helicopters?

61A: The only Black Hawk helicopters I've actually ever seen are the ones here at Incirlik and they are basically painted dark green and black, a very dark color. I'm unaware of any markings at all that you can see from a distance, other than standing right next to them and reading the numbers.

62Q: What briefings, training or education have you received on the purpose of OPC?

62A: Briefings, training or specific education--The only training that I've had on the purpose of OPC would be within the squadron itself and then that wasn't really directed at moreover the purpose of OPC but our job here at OPC only because I'm relatively familiar with the guidelines of OPC do I think I know what the whole operation is about, but I don't remember receiving any specific instructions on the actual purpose, other than what our purpose is.

63Q: What do you think that purpose is?

63A: The purpose for the overall Operation PROVIDE COMFORT, as I see it, is to protect the northern No-Fly-Zone as set out by whatever UN resolution and I can't remember the name, but moreover there's a two-fold to protect the ethnic minorities located in northern Iraq, more specifically, the Kurdish people, from the Iraqis.

64Q: Where would you find information about the airplanes that were flying in the AOR?

64A: Information concerning their times that they're in there or information concerning the aircraft, specifically?

65Q: Information concerning aircraft in the AOR?

65A: Everyday, as part of our flying material, we're issued a product put out by our intelligence shop that's got a flow sheet from the Air Tasking Order that comes down for that particular day. In that flow sheet it charts out exactly who and when is flying in the AOR that day. Based on the time sheet, knowing a little bit about the Ops and the AOR, you know generally who is out there when you are out there, what other players there are and, basically, what their jobs are and where they are. It doesn't tell you that specifically, but if you understand how the whole thing works, you know what particular aircraft, the jobs they do and you know, basically, where they do it

NOLAN

and given our capabilities of the aircraft, between having the sheet there and hearing it on the radios and being able to see it--most of it in your aircraft, then I think we have pretty good SA based on the system, what all is going on out in the AOR is there.

66Q: Did that information that you worked with have anything about helicopter flights?

66A: On my previous tour, no, sir.

67Q: Were you ever tasked to be the first fighter into the AOR?

67A: I've never been, personally. Every time I have been there, there have already been aircraft with airborne interceptor radars on board so I've never been tasked to sweep the AOR clean.

68Q: So the first people normally tasked into the AOR are those with airborne interceptor radars?

68A: That's the way I understand it, to sweep the area to make sure there is nobody untasked or unknown in the area.

69Q: That you know of, was anyone ever flying in the AOR before the fighters were in the AOR to sweep?

69A: The only aircraft that I'm aware of that were ever in there before we were would be the private Turkish Air Force and in all the instances that I've been out there, those are the only aircraft that were out there before we got there, other than US coalition aircraft, OPC aircraft, it was always an F-15 Sierra or an F-16 occasionally that was out there before we were.

70Q: On your way to or from the AOR for a file in the AOR, have you ever heard Eagle, one of the helicopters, come up on freq?

70A: Prior to today, sir, never.

COL MUDGE: I have no further questions.

COL AT LEE: I have a couple for clarification.

Questions by Colonel At Lee:

71Q: You indicated that the information available to you gave you pretty good SA, Situational Awareness?

71A: Yes, sir.

72Q: When you described the aircraft that you'd seen, Black Hawks at Incirlik, how close had you gotten to those aircraft?

72A: I have actually been aboard one of the Black Hawks. We have a program where at least once a week we will invite an aircrew from another weapon system to come talk to us and give us a capabilities brief and we do the same. In either one of those circumstances, the special

NOLAN

operations squadron had come over and gave us a capabilities briefing and we went and looked at their aircraft and actually sat in it and so forth.

73Q: Were you referring to subdued markings on those helicopters?

73A: Yes, sir. I don't remember any outstanding markings at all on the helicopters. I just know they're painted a very dark color--dark green or black even.

74Q: You indicated that when you were here on your first tour for six weeks there were three or four training sessions on ROE; one of which you had requested to clarify some matters in your mind. Do you recall what it was that you needed to clarify or wanted further explained?

74A: Basically, to me as I said earlier, the ROE discussions, generally, were an inevitable part of a tactics discussion and to me as a young wing man there were some things I wasn't absolutely clear about--what our squadron tactics were going to be, given certain contingencies like a high fast flyer which was specifically what it was. I didn't exactly know how to handle that so, basically, to be able to start with a tactics review and a clarification, you need to understand the ROE because as I say most of the time it drives your tactics so that would lead into an inevitable discussion--well, based on the ROE, what are the actual rules if we're going to play the game this way or have this particular tactic. It wasn't, per se, a discussion just solely on ROE but that's always the basis of our tactics discussion--well you can't necessarily drive all your tactics. I mean they all have to be driven by the ROE.

75Q: You referred to the intel shop, that's the section of your squadron that would deal with military intelligence matters?

75A: Yes, sir, everything from troop movements to aircraft identification.

76Q: When you referred to SOC 1, that's your squadron operations center?

76A: Squadron operations center--that's correct, sir.

77Q: Do you have any further information, statements or evidence that you wish to present?

77A: No, sir.

COL AT LEE: You are reminded that this is an official investigation. You are ordered not to divulge the nature of the investigation or the questions, answers or discussions included in this interview with anyone unless authorized to do so by the board president, Major General Andrus, CINCUSAFE, or higher authority. If anyone other than a member of this board should approach you regarding your testimony or the matters discussed here, you must report it.

Do you understand?

WITNESS: Yes, sir.

COL AT LEE: Do you have any questions?

NOLAN

WITNESS No, sir.

COL AT LEE: The time is 1803 and this interview is concluded.

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I certify that the above sworn nterview statement, given by FIRST LIEUTENANT WILLIAM C. NOLAN, III to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board, was recorded by me by stenomsk and that the foregoing transcript is a true, accurate, and verbatim account of the statement.



MAUREEN A. NATION, DAFC

Court Reporter

Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

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TAB V-083

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MANION, KEVIN J.

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**VERBATIM TESTIMONY
KEVIN J. MANION, CAPTAIN
561 FS NELLIS AFB, NV**

COL WILCOX: The time is now 1845 hours on 25 April 1994. The persons present are the following: Lieutenant Colonel Mudge, Lieutenant Colonel Velluz, Staff Sergeant Moore and I'm Colonel Wilcox.

This interview is being conducted at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey. This is an official AFR 110-14 Aircraft Accident Investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the crash of two U.S. Army Black Hawk helicopters and the possible involvement of U.S. fighter aircraft in the crash of these helicopters in the northern No-Fly Zone of Iraq on 14 April 1994.

This investigation is being conducted at the direction of General Robert C. Oaks, CINCUSAFE. This investigation is not a Safety Mishap Investigation conducted under AFR 127-4. The purpose of this accident investigation is to obtain and preserve all available evidence for use in claims, litigation, disciplinary action, adverse administrative proceedings and for all other purposes. Testimony before a Safety Mishap Investigation Board is given with the understanding that it can only be used for mishap prevention purposes and all witnesses are advised that the testimony will be treated in confidence.

However, testimony given in this accident investigation may be used for any purpose deemed appropriate by competent authority and may be publicly disseminated.

Do you understand the difference between a Safety Mishap Investigation and an Accident Investigation?

WITNESS: Yes, I do.

COL WILCOX: Do you understand the purpose of this investigation?

WITNESS: Yes, I do.

COL WILCOX: Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: No.

COL WILCOX: Your testimony will be recorded and transcribed verbatim or summarized so that a written record can be made available to the appointing or higher

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authority. For the benefit of the reporter, please avoid the use of acronyms or jargon, speak slowly, clearly and loudly. Remember to explain your testimony carefully so that others who do not have your technical training will be able to understand.

As this is an official investigation, you are required to answer questions put to you by the board. You are further advised not to discuss classified information unless it is necessary to develop your testimony. If it's necessary for you to discuss classified information, you need to identify it as such.

Would you please rise so that I can swear you in.

(The witness was sworn.)

EXAMINATION

1Q: Would you state name?

1A: Kevin J. Manion

2Q: What is your grade?

2A: 0-3, Captain.

3Q: Organization and station?

3A: 561st Fighter Squadron from Nellis.

4Q: What is your present duty assignment?

4A: Meaning?

5Q: Where you presently assigned?

5A: At Nellis Air Force Base.

6Q: And your TDY assignment?

6A: I'm TDY to Incirlik Air Base.

Questions by Lieutenant Colonel Mudge.

7Q: What are your normal duties and responsibilities in the squadron at Nellis?

7A: I'm the Stand Eval Officer for the squadron. I'm, obviously, an the F-4G pilot which takes up all of my time.

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8Q: What types of jobs have you held in the past?

8A: I was an A-37 pilot in Panama. I went through the RTU, at F-4G. Are you talking about additional duties now?

9Q: Yes.

9A: I've been a training officer, stan eval officer, weapons officer, wing training officer and that's about it.

10Q: How long have you flown the F-4G?

10A: I have been flying the F-4G, years or hours?

11Q: Both.

11A: Approximately three years and I've got about 600 -- between 600 and 700 hours.

12Q: Have many total flying hours do you have?

12A: Approximately 1,500.

13Q: What other aircraft have you flown?

13A: Training aircraft; T-37, T-38, AT-37, A-37, F-4E and F-4G.

14Q: Do you have any special qualifications, for example, flight lead, supervisor flying, dissimilar air combat?

14A: I'm a four-ship flight lead. I'm in instructor upgrade, not complete yet. A supervisor of flying here at Incirlik, not at Nellis yet.

15Q: Have you flown in Operation Provide Comfort, OPC, before this rotation?

15A: No.

16Q: How long have you been in Turkey on this TDY?

16A: I have been here now approximately five weeks.

17Q: How many total flights have you flown into north Iraq Area Of Responsibility -- AOR?

17A: I believe 14 flights.

18Q: On your flight into the AOR on 14 April, what were you tasked to do that day?

18A: I was number one of a two-ship, mixed F-4G F-16, suppression of enemy air defenses mission, I was carrying HARMS, the F-16 on my wing was carrying CBU-87 and it was our job to ensure -- well to suppress enemy air defenses, meaning, missile threats.

MANION

19Q: Would you explain where you were when the incident with the Blackhawks occurred?

19A: I was on the boom getting air-to-air refueled at the time.

20Q: What information at that time did you know about the Blackhawks?

20A: Well, I knew that there was an MCC flight in the area due to the Intell brief. I did not know precise location. I knew the approximate location, like in the mountains area, close to ROZ, but I didn't know the exact location. I hadn't heard anything over the radio at that time.

21Q: So, you had not heard anything on the radio regarding Eagle Flight?

21A: That's correct.

22Q: Did you hear any radio calls regarding the intercept or engagement of those helicopters?

22A: I only heard two radio calls. Again, I was on the air-to-air frequency which is not a tactical frequency. The two radio calls that I heard were -- maybe there were three. I guess there were three because Cougar, the AWACS controller, directed Puma 22, I think is his call sign -- to work west immediately, which was confusing to me. Then I heard the Eagles were engaged; I heard that call on that frequency. Then I heard Splash 2. Those were the three radio calls I heard on that frequency.

23Q: When you said, "Eagles engaged", was that Eagle Flight or the F-15 Eagles?

23A: My assumption was that it was the F-15 Eagles.

24Q: Which was Tiger?

24A: Tiger, I believe.

25Q: Who made the "Eagles engaged" and the "Splash" calls?

25A: Cougar made the calls to the air-to-air controller on channel 10.

26Q: Did you have any other information about the engagement at all other than those radio calls?

26A: No.

(The Aircraft Accident Board recessed at 1854 hours, 25 April 1994, and resumed at 1855 hours, 25 April 1994, with all parties present when the Board recessed again present.)

MANION

Lt Col MUDGE: I'm going to ask you some rules of engagement questions. When you answer these questions, would you please keep in mind that I would like to discuss the rules of engagement that were in effect on 14 April.

27Q: Would you please explain in your own words the rules of engagement that were in effect on 14 April?

27A: Air-to-air wise?

28Q: Yes.

28A: [We can proceed] -- for the F-4, the way that I can determine if an aircraft is hostile is with type 2 active interrogation, a lack of Mode I, a lack of Mode IV, all indicating that he is, in fact, a hostile aircraft. I can also [use two other means.] All of those are clearance for fire for me.

29Q: Who has the authority to determine the clearance to fire?

29A: With the presence of type 2, lack of Mode IV, lack of Mode I and the AWACS designation as Bandit, then I'm clear to fire.

30Q: Do you have to have a Bandit call from AWACS?

30A: No. Our on-board systems with all of those combined are enough that Bandit is declared hostile, I can do that on my own with our systems.

31Q: If you are unable to perform the electronic identification, [Classified portion deleted (4 words)] and you have VID, what are you required to VID; to visually identify?

31A: The type of aircraft ensuring that it is not a friendly aircraft.

32Q: If you are to come in and VID a Hind helicopter, would you engage and destroy it?

32A: I would engage and destroy a Hind helicopter if I was, in fact, sure that it was a Hind helicopter. It would be very peculiar for me -- I realize that the bases are not anywhere near here so most likely I would be unsure, I would realize that the aircraft was, in fact, hostile, and I would be clear to fire, yes.

33Q: How would you determine that it was hostile?

MANION

33A: By the fact that are none that exist on the friendly side, basically, with the coalition forces that we have here.

34Q: What is your assessment of the clarity and ease of use of the ROE?

34A: I think the ROE is straight-forward and it's available for ease of use. Everyone has a copy of it that's used, so it's available, and it's easy to use.

35Q: Are you comfortable with your knowledge of the ROE?

35A: Yes. My specific knowledge is much more into the Surface-To-Air, I'm sorry, the SAM arena, but I am comfortable with my knowledge of the ROE.

36Q: What specific ROE training have you had?

36A: When the -- when our deployment showed up at Incirlik, we all had a meeting and went through the ROE, basically, line by line as a group; that was our training. Then, from that point on, it's question and answer during a flight brief and that sort of situation. "When are you going to be allowed to shoot again?" It's more tailored toward SAM's threat for us. "When are you going to be allowed to shoot a Barlock?" "When are you going to be allowed certain radar?" Those are the kinds of training that we utilize.

37Q: Who conducted the briefing when you arrived here at Incirlik?

37A: Well, let's see I, basically, conducted the briefing as a Stand Eval Officer by taking out the ACO and the ROE as it stood, read it line for line and ensured that everybody had a solid understanding of it.

38Q: Did you receive any specific training to conduct that?

38A: No.

39Q: Was it simply from a review of the regulations and the ROE that you conducted the training?

39A: Yes, that and there was a continuity letter, basically, about ROE left from the previous Detachment Commander.

40Q: Before firing on an unidentified aircraft in the AOR, what do you have to take into consideration?

40A: Well, I take into consideration his orbit or his location, I guess. For example, there is a EF-111 who is out there all the time and he is never squawking. So, we find a contact, no correlated IFF returns and take a look at his position relative to where we

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expect the other aircraft to be. And, if he is, in fact, near that location then we go, that is probably the EF-111, for example. So, I'm looking very seriously at the location. And then we have a very good ROZ system on our aircraft where we can associate a contact, we correlate a contact, and a radar spike which is a radar signal locked onto my aircraft; we can determine very specifically what type of radar that is. So, a lot of those things come into play.

41Q: If you were to intercept an unidentified aircraft, would you take into consideration under the ROE whether or not it was a defector aircraft?

41A: Yes. Slow flyer, gear down, those sorts of considerations are a reason for holding your fire.

42Q: Under the ROE, as you mentioned earlier, your EID criteria, would you consider a lost or defector aircraft [Classified portion deleted (8 words)] you discussed earlier?

42A: Okay. Say that again.

43Q: You are using your EID criteria to determine hostile, how would you know that he was slow, gear down?

43A: Well, you could tell he was slow by radar contact. Gear down, we wouldn't be able to tell [Classified portion deleted (7 words)]

44Q: So, under your understanding of the ROE, it would be possible for you to shoot down someone doing that?

44A: Yes.

45Q: If you were to VID a Hind and make the decision to engage and destroy it, how would you tell if it was an Iraqi Hind or a Syrian Hind?

45A: It would be very, very difficult for me to do that with a helicopter. I've tried looking at helicopters before with an A-37 flying it at a 170 knots, and I found it virtually impossible; it would be extremely difficult. The only way I would be able to tell would be some sort of fin flash, if that existed, and quite frankly I don't know what a Syrian fin flash looks like.

46Q: If, you, on the 14th of April were flying out there and had intercepted a Hind and identified it as a Hind, would you have engaged and destroyed that Hind?

46A: My radar -- if the Hind was, in fact, flying high enough and there was a clear enough background, the possibility exists, but with an F-4 radar and a helicopter at a low

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altitude it would be very difficult. My flight, with the F-16 on my wing, with all of that criteria met and I'm talking about location, EID criteria as hostile, VID and no kidding VID of a, in fact, Hind -- are you asking if I would engage the Hind aircraft? With all of those constraints that I just mentioned, yes, I would engage the aircraft.

47Q: If, you, were to meet all that criteria that you just discussed, who would have the authority to clear you to engage and destroy?

47A: Again, with the VID that you just talked about, I have the authority to engage the aircraft.

48Q: Does any pilot have that authority?

48A: Yes.

49Q: Are there any exceptions to the rules that we discussed as you understand it to the ROE so that you would not engage and destroy?

49A: As far as -- a visual identification is pretty cut and dry.

50Q: If, you, found an aircraft in the AOR that a red cross or a red crescent, would you engage and destroy that aircraft?

50A: No.

51Q: What is your assessment of the ROE training and guidance that you have received?

51A: The ROE is available. As far as specific training -- structured training -- there doesn't seem to be any structured training. For example, class or somebody who is a professional at Rules of Engagement going to sit down and talk with you. It's available to all those -- everybody -- to look at, read and understand. It's adequate.

52Q: Adequate in a sense that self-study would be sufficient, along with the group discussions that you mentioned earlier?

52A: Correct.

53Q: In your flying in the AOR on or before the 14th of April, had you ever had Cougar or Duke -- the AWACS controller or the airborne command element -- ever point out helicopter flights to you before?

53A: I can't recall what they did.

54Q: Have you ever seen helicopters in the AOR before?

54A: No.

MANION

55Q: Have you ever heard Eagle Flight on the radio?

55A: I had heard Eagle Flight. I have heard AWACS, Cougar, speaking to Eagle Flight on the radio, but I have never heard Eagle Flight on the radio.

56Q: Before you flew any of your missions, did you ever have any information about the helicopter flights in the AOR?

56A: Yes.

57Q: Where did you get that information?

57A: From our Intell Brief, prior to our stepping out the door.

58Q: What would they brief you?

58A: They would brief that an MCC flight would be orbiting such and such a vicinity. It would usually be an area 20 miles wide or 20 miles long by 5 to 10 miles wide, and then give a general time when they would be there.

59Q: Was that -- did they give you the route of flight?

59A: No.

60Q: When you say the area they were orbiting, could you give an example of where some of the flights orbited?

60A: In the northern edge of Iraq, underneath ROZ 2. I would say that would be the general vicinity and that's typically where they would point out the aircraft from the name of that bigger town up there in the north.

61Q: Zakhu?

61A: Zakhu, east to about 50 miles or so in that general vicinity.

62Q: Did those flights ever have any effect on your AOR operations?

62A: No.

63Q: And you never have seen them there before?

63A: No.

64Q: Do you know if there was any other documents available -- were there any other documents available to get that information about the Eagle Flights other than your Intell Briefs?

MANION

64A: Not that I know of.

65Q: Considering all of the various sources that describe OPC procedures, what is your assessment of their clarity and adequacy?

65A: OPC procedures?

66Q: Yes.

66A: It seemed to be very straight-forward, very clear. The two volumes of the ACO seem to be very clear to me.

67Q: Have you ever had any experience or training attacking helicopters?

67A: No.

68Q: Have you ever had any experience or training conducting VID passes?

68A: Yes.

69Q: Could you describe that training?

69A: The training typically would be something like a Red Flag. If you are going to do a VID pass -- a VID pass, in general, is looking for an aircraft type, in my experience, that being an F-16 or an F-15. At Nellis there are different colored F-16s, so you have to watch out for the color, the type of the aircraft, the block that it is flying in, so through sorties -- training sorties -- is where, basically, I get all the VID training that I have ever had.

70Q: What -- visual -- vis recce training have you had that included helicopters?

70A: Intell wise the vis recce slides and projections those sorts of things -- photos. There are helicopters occasionally along with the rest of the aircraft that we do ID, as you know on an Intell training basis.

71Q: Could you describe the vis recce that you do receive?

71A: Typically, it will be at an Intell Brief, last a half an hour, and Intell Officer or enlisted individual will put up a slide for a number of seconds, -- I don't know exactly how many, a couple -- then they will turn the slide off and ask, "Okay, what was that?" Number one, "Friend or foe? Number two, "What kind of aircraft?" And, that sort of thing.

MANION

72Q: How often is that training conducted?

72A: At least every half, I'm sure they do it more than that, off my cuff I would say at least once a half is when I get to see it.

73Q: Do you remember ever seeing views of helicopters from the rear aspect?

73A: The helicopters, I can't tell you precisely what view, but from all aspects.

74Q: Do you know where you might expect to see fin flashes on a helicopter?

74A: I would look for them on the tail bone, on the side of the aircraft, possibly after the passenger compartment, that's where I would focus my attention.

75Q: Do you ever remember seeing pictures of Black Hawks?

75A: Yes.

76Q: Do you know if those Black Hawks that you saw on those photos and slides ever had the aux tanks installed?

76A: I would say that I cannot recall if the photos themselves had them.

77Q: Have you seen a Black Hawk with the aux tanks?

77A: Yes.

78Q: Do you know what markings are on the Black Hawks here?

78A: No.

79Q: Did you know that OPC Black Hawks fly with aux tanks?

79A: No.

80Q: Based on your experience that you discussed earlier, how close do you estimate that you would have to get to an unidentified aircraft helicopter to ID it?

80A: You would have to get I would say approximately 2,000 feet, 2,500 feet -- that's a guess.

81Q: How close do you think you would have to get to identify a fin flash?

81A: 1,000 feet.

82Q: If that fin flash was subdued, how close do you think you would have to get?

82A: Closer; 500 feet.

MANION

83Q: What briefings, training or education have you received on the purpose of OPC?

83A: On the purpose of OPC? We have, basically, a newcomers brief as we show up here, I guess you would call it Wing Staff or OSS Staff, going through what we are doing here, beyond that that's about it.

Questions by Colonel Wilcox.

84Q: Several times during your testimony you referred to ROZ, what does that mean?

84A: Restricted Operated Zone.

85Q: Can you tell me what MCC flight is?

85A: Again, I don't know the exact --

Questions by Lt Col Mudge.

86Q: I think, it's Military Coordination Center; is that correct?

86A: Correct.

87Q: Is that correct?

87A: I believe that is correct.

Questions by Colonel Wilcox.

88Q: You referred to BVR shot; what is "BVR"?

88A: Beyond Visual Range.

89Q: You indicated that you had "RHAW systems" on your aircraft?

89A: RHAW meaning, Radar Warning and Homing System. "RHAW" is an acronym for the radar receiver that we have that identifies other aircraft radar when it's locked onto our aircraft.

90Q: What is an "aux tank"?

90A: An auxiliary tank.

LT COL MUDGE: I have no further questions.

MANION

COL WILCOX: Do you have any further information, statements or evidence that you wish to present?

WITNESS: No.

COL WILCOX: You're reminded that this is an official investigation. You're ordered not to divulge the nature of this investigation or the questions, answers or discussions included in this interview with anyone unless authorized to do so by the board president, Major General Andrus, CINCUSAFE, or higher authority. If anyone other than a member of this board should approach you regarding your testimony or the matters discussed here, you must report it immediately.

COL WILCOX: Do you have any questions?

WITNESS: No.

COL WILCOX: The time is 1920 and the interview is concluded.

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE

I certify that the above sworn interview statement, given by KEVIN J. MANION to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board was recorded during an open microphone interview session monitored by SSgt Beverly Y. Moore. The tape from that session was reviewed and transcribed by me and the foregoing transcript is a true, accurate, and verbatim account of that recorded interview statement.



BARBARA BRIGMAN
Court Reporter
Incirlik Air Base, Turkey

BROWNE

V-075

V-076

TAB V-084

V-076A

NILSEN, CARL R., JR.

V-077

V-078

V-078A

V-079

V-080

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V-082

V-083

V-084

SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

STAFF SERGEANT CARL R. NILSEN, JR.
552nd AIR CONTROL WING

The interview was conducted by Major Aaron D. Byas, at Incirlik AB, Turkey, beginning at 1115 hours, 25 April 1994. A standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn.

EXAMINATION

My name is Carl Robert Nilsen, Junior. My grade is E-5, Staff Sergeant. My organization is 552nd Air Control Wing. I am presently assigned to Incirlik Air Base, Turkey.

I currently have 58 semester hours of college. I have attended NCO Leadership School. My Air Force Specialty is Electronic Computer and Switching Systems Journeyman. My skill level is 5.

My responsibilities are to maintain and repair the E-3 computer and data display systems. I have been to tech school at Keesler Air Force Base, Mississippi. I have also been to the CC2 School FTD course at Tinker Air Force Base. CC2 is a computer course. I am not sure what CC2 stands for.

I do not know of any other equipment system problems on 77-0351, except for those documented write-ups on the 781 Form, which in any way could have degraded the effectiveness of my systems. When it landed the last time, I know we had a write-up for magnetic tape transport number 2, which was not working correctly. There are three tape transports, it just brings down one. It's fully mission capable, degraded to mission. My overall assessment of my systems on aircraft 77-0351 leading up to and including the sortie flown on the 14th of April 1994 is that they were working just fine. The aircrew debriefed us and there were no major problems at all.


I've been with AWACS since November 1992, which would be a year and approximately six months, almost a year and a half.

I don't have any further information, statements or evidence that I wish to present.

NILSEN

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions. The interview was concluded at 1120 hours.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of STAFF SERGEANT CARL R. NILSEN, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.



BRYAN T. LAWLER, Lt Col, USAF
Legal Advisor

NILSEN

TAB V-085

SCHNEIDMULLER, GEORGE C., JR.

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V-076A

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V-08

SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

OF

**GEORGE C. SCHNEIDMULLER, JR., SSGT
963D AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SQUADRON**

The interview was conducted by Major Aaron D. Byas at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey beginning at 1103 hours, 25 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14 and the witness was sworn.

EXAMINATION


I am currently deployed to Incirlik AB, Turkey. I have completed high school, and Air Force Leadership School. I have also gone through technical school for Radar and IFF, and I've also been to other specialty courses for radar and interrogator friendly or foe. In the Air Force I have my 7-level as an Airborne Radar Technician. I maintain the radar and the IFF system on the AWACS, which includes the Mode IV system. I have been assigned to AWACS since April of 1991.

Other than the write-ups documented on the 781 form, I am not aware of any equipment or system problems on aircraft 770351 which could in any way degrade the effectiveness of our system. The aircraft 770351 leading up to and including the sortie flown on the 14th of April 1994 was in good condition.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions.)

(The interview concluded at 1112 hours, 25 April 1994.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of GEORGE C. SCHNEIDMULLER, JR. as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.


BRYAN T. LAWLER, Lt Col, USAF
Legal Advisor

SCHNEIDMULLER

TAB V-086

LINDAMOOD, DONNA G.

V-075

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V-076A

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SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

OF

**DONNA G. LINDAMOOD, TSGT
552 AIR CONTROL WING**

The interview was conducted by Major Aaron D. Byas at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, beginning at 1051 hours, 25 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14 and the witness was sworn.

EXAMINATION

I am stationed at Tinker AFB, but I am deployed to Incirlik AB, Turkey. I have a high school education, along with Leadership School in the military. I have been to technical school for my knowledge of the instruments. I attended field training for auto pilot and navigation. I have my 7-level as an Avionics Guidance Control Technician. I maintain all the avionics primarily in the cockpit -- the instrumentation, gauges, instruments, auto pilot and the navigation systems.


I have been with the 552 Air Control Wing for 11 years, 10 of which have been at Tinker AFB.

Other than what is documented on the 781 form, there are no other equipment or system problems on aircraft 770351 which would degrade the effectiveness of the aircraft. The performance of the systems on aircraft 770351, including the sortie flown on the 14th of April 1994, was good.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions.)

(The interview concluded at 1104 hours, 25 April 1994.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of DONNA G. LINDAMOOD as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.


BRYAN T. LAWLER, Lt Col USAF
Legal Advisor

LINDAMOOD

V-075

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TAB V-087

V-076A

GODIN, ROBERT A.

V-077

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V-087

SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

TECHNICAL SERGEANT ROBERT A. GODIN 522nd AIR CONTROL WING

The interview was conducted by Major Aaron D. Byas, at Incirlik AB, Turkey, beginning at 1038 hours, 25 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn.

EXAMINATION

I am currently deployed to Incirlik Air Base. Other than standard high school, the majority of the education I have is through technical training with the United States Air Force. Additionally I have a FCC license with a radar endorsement, which I achieved through my own educational needs. I have completed Professional Military Education all the way up to the NCO Academy.

My current Air Force Specialty is Avionics Communication Navigation Technician. I work on all the communication equipment, specifically voice data radios and cryptographic equipment. I work on navigation equipment including instrument landing systems, tactical air navigation systems, radio altimeters, weather radar equipment, as well as radar beacons. In the navigation department, that's primarily equipment, I work on the ultra high frequency radios, high frequency radios, very high frequency radios, which are the HF, VHF and UHF radios -- all the associated cryptographic equipment. I work on the Tactical Air Data Information System. It basically transmits the surveyed information from the aircraft down to ground sites. I also work on the Joint Tactical Information Distribution System. This system gets all of the compiled data the aircraft surveys and transmits it down to either ground stations or other aircraft. In addition to that, I work on various other systems having to do with internal communications within the aircraft. That's for the most part the majority of the equipment I work on.

Fundamentally, we attended a tech school, which provides the majority of the training necessary in order to be able to perform certain limited tasks within the realm of our expertise. In addition to that, there are a number of other field training detachments that provide additional training which are usually equipment specific. In other words, they train you on working on this exact radio or this exact piece of navigation equipment. Other than that, individuals partake in other types of training such as career development courses, which entail more detailed and specific areas of their work. I've been with AWACS approximately three years.


GODIN

I am not aware of any other equipment or system problems on aircraft 770351, other than the write-ups on the 781 form, which could have in any way degraded the effectiveness of that system. My overall assessment of the aircraft 770351 is that it had been performing exceptionally well leading up to and including the sortie flown on the 14th of April.

I do not have any further statements, information or evidence I wish to present.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions. The interview was concluded at 1045.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of TECHNICAL SERGEANT ROBERT A. GODIN, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.



BRYAN T. LAWLER, Lt Col, USAF
Legal Advisor

GODIN

TAB V-088

MARCIK, ROBERT J. II

**SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY
OF
ROBERT J. MARCIK, II, MSGT
963 AIRBORNE WARNING AND CONTROL SQUADRON**

The interview was conducted by Major Aaron D. Byas at Incirlik Air Base, Turkey, beginning at 1021 hours, 25 April 1994. The standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14 and the witness was sworn.

EXAMINATION

I am deployed here to 552 ACW, Incirlik AB, Turkey.

I have a high school education, along with NCO Prep, NCO Academy and I am currently enrolled in Course 8. I have my 7-level as an aircraft maintenance crew chief. I have experience on KC-135s, C-141s and eight years experience on the E-3s. Currently, I am acting as a Flightline Production Supervisor. I am responsible for making sure that all the maintenance is getting done on the aircraft on the flight line at any given time. I monitor the specialists and crew chiefs.


Other than the write-ups that appear on the 781 for aircraft 770351, I am not aware of any other equipment or system problems which would have degraded the operation of that aircraft.

Before 14 April 1994, aircraft 770351 flew two times while I was here, and the two times that it flew it flew quite well. I do not recall any write-ups that were noticeable after those two flights other than right now they have FMCD MTT write-up which is the fully mission capable degraded, magnetic tape transport. I could not tell you if the FMCD MTT write-up would degrade the mission effectiveness because I am not that familiar with the computers.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions.)

(The interview concluded at 1032 hours 25 April 1994.)

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of ROBERT J. MARCIK, II, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.


BRYAN T. LAWLER, Lt Col, USAF
Legal Advisor

MARCIK

V-088

V-089

TAB V-089

ZIMMERMAN, GARY R.

SUMMARIZED TESTIMONY

CAPTAIN GARY R. ZIMMERMAN 552nd AIR CONTROL WING

The interview was conducted by Major Aaron D. Byas, at Incirlik AB, Turkey, beginning at 1005 hours, 25 April 1994. A standard witness advisement was given in accordance with AFR 110-14, and the witness was sworn.

EXAMINATION

I am Gary Robert Zimmerman, Captain. I am assigned to 552nd Air Control Wing, 963rd Airborne Warning and Control Squadron. My present duty assignment is 552nd Air Control Wing, deployed to Incirlik Air Base, Turkey.

I have a masters degree in electrical engineering. I've been in aircraft maintenance for just over two years now. I've completed Squadron Officer's School in residence. I am an Aircraft Maintenance Officer. My responsibilities in this career field are to supervise aircraft maintenance on the flight line and all their associated items as outlined by ACC Regulation 66-5.

I attended the Air Force's Aircraft Maintenance and Munitions Officer Course at Chanute Air Force Base. That's about a four and a half month course. And then on the job training. At the Aircraft Maintenance and Munitions Officer Course I gained the overall understanding of the inner workings of maintenance in the maintenance unit and management of aircraft. The course talked about specifics, such as electronics and weapons, engines and that kind of thing.


I have been a maintenance officer with the AWACS community since 16 December 1991, so just over two years. This was my first maintenance assignment. I am not aware of any other equipment or system problems on aircraft 77-0351 which could have in any way degraded the effectiveness of the system, except as noted on Form 781. I arrived on station the Monday prior to the accident and the aircraft flew on the 12th, so I really haven't had a lot of recent experience with that aircraft, but it seemed to be doing well. I would have to go back and look at the forms, but as far as I can recall there were no significant write-ups on the 12th. I can't recall any problems with the radar or IFF system.

I don't have any further information, statements or evidence that I wish to present.

(The standard witness caution was given and the witness had no questions. The interview was concluded at 1012.

ZIMMERMAN

I certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate summary of the testimony of CAPTAIN GARY R. ZIMMERMAN, as given to the Aircraft Accident Investigation Board.



BRYAN T. LAWLER, Lt Col, USAF
Legal Advisor

ZIMMERMAN